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'ABSTRACT 
This study traces the background and development of the U.S. 
assistance policy toward China in the late 193O's and throughout the 
194O's. This aid took place in numerous forms but mostly via U.S. 
government programs. Operation of Lend-Lease assistance occupies a 
major part of this study, which was definitely the first major 
commitment of the U.S. resources for the large scale reconstruction 
of another country's economy. Although the aid given during wartime 
was basically intended to strengthen the capacity of China to resist 
the Japanese aggression, all U.S. aid programs had far reaching 
effects on China's post-war industrialization and economic 
development. Besides Lend-Lease, the other major U.S. programs to 
aid China were participation in the operation of UNRRA and the 
dispatch of an American War Production Mission to China. The short 
term objective of tying down three million Japanese soldiers in 
China superseded America's long-term objective of a unified, 
democratic and friendly China. 
Although U.S. aid:programs to China failed to achieve a major 
success owing to the corruption of Kuomintang officials, an outbreak 
of in~ensive civil war, and also lack of proper coordination and 
information about China's actual situation, it profoundly affected 
the United States' later relations and assistance policy toward 
other countries. The U.S. emerged as a major economic giant to 
influence the reconstruction and development of the global economy. 
On the other hand, China's process of westernization was largely 
begun because of this U.S. aid effort. 
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This study traces the evolution of United States' policy 
generating its relations with China in the l93O's and 194O's and 
sets forth the implementation of that policy. Because China was at 
war during the period, the policy debate concerned itself primarily 
with aid and the purposes of aid. The study emphasizes U.S. Lend-
Lease aid to China, the activities of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (which to all intents and purposes was 
a U.S. program), and the American War Production Mission to China. 
Although the aid given during wartime was primarily intended to 
strengthen the military capacity of China to resist Japan, all of 
these programs had farreaching effects on China's post-war 
industrialization and economic development. 
When the U.S. entered the war against Japan two possibly 
conflicting purposes for the aid emerged. On the one hand, the U.S. 
wanted the Chinese to tie down as large a part of the Japanese army 
as possible, so that American forces would be spared the necessity 
of fighting the entire Japanese army. On the other hand, Roosevelt 
looked to the postwar period and wanted a strong, independent China 
for a postwar ally. This study explores the history of military and 
economic co-operation between the U.S. and China during a critical 
period of U.S. and Chinese history, always with a view of the two 
underlying purposes. The hypothesis is to show that of the·two 
purposes of aid to China, the short-term purpose of keeping China in 
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the war was achieved. The long-term purpose of building a unified 
post-war China to fill the power vacuum left by the defeat of Japan 
and also to be a strong ally of the United States was not achieved. 
However, attention must be drawn to the fact that besides military 
aid, the U.S. government did conduct for eight years in the 1940's a 
constructive program aimed directly at offering assistance to China 
for the development of her industries, agriculture, transportatio~, 
education, public health, economy and finances. From 1842, the 
United States had encouraged Chinese sovereignty and opposed the 
European powers' plan to cut up China like a watermelon. One result 
was John Hay's "open door" policy of 1898. For their part, the 
Chinese looked toward the American "red hair" barbarians as better 
barbarians than the other Western barbarians. Although American 
leaders held a sympathetic view of Chinese sovereignty, they were 
not willing to support China openly against Japan and the Europeans. 
Typical of U.S. policy was the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition, 
enunciated in 1931, which merely refused to recognize the situation 
in China created by Japanese invasion. The Chinese, underst'andably, 
were pressing the American government for both political support and 
military assistance against Japan. 
•I 
It took a long time for China to convince Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's administration and the Congress to change its 
traditional policy of isolationism. The U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Henry Morgenthau Jr., the State Department's Far Eastern Division 
Chief, Stanley K. Hornbeck, and the U.S. Ambassador to China, Nelson 
T. Johnson, were influential in persuading the administration to 
grant a silver purchase loan to China in 1938, which marked the 
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beginning of American assistance. Thi~ study seeks, first, to 
examine the gradual evolution of American policy toward China 
culminating in the passage of the Lend-Lease Act of March, 1941 and 
the official declaration of China's eligibility for Lend-Lease aid. 
This first chapter rests principally on an examination of secondary 
sources and official but unpublished histories of the Lend-Lease 
Administration available at the National Archives and Record Center, 
Suitland, Maryland, and the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS). 
The passage of the Lend-Lease Act by the U.S. Congress. 
authorized FDR to supply necessary war supplies to the friendly 
countries fighting against the Axis powers. Chinese lobbying 
efforts, plus FDR's desire to make China a great post-war ally led 
him to promptly approve Lend-Lease assistance to China. China, 
however, needed virtually everything. U.S. Lend-Lease Assistance to 
China can be divided into civilian and military. Military Lend-
Lease assistance was for direct use in fighting Japan, while the 
civilian Lend-Lease program was to help keep the civilian economy 
intact, thus indirectly contributing to the war effort. The 
development of the Burma Road, the reconstruction of Chinese 
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railways, supply of trucks, malaria control, tire production, supply 
of arsenal materials and medicine fell into this category. Civilian 
Lend-Lease got little preference during wartime. 
The second chapter examines and sets forth the different forms 
of civilian Lend-Lease aid to China during the period 1941-1946. In 
addition to the secondary sources, congressional hearings, and 
United States Army documents on Lend-Lease from the International 
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Division of the Army Supply Forces were consulted. Documents from 
the John D. Sumner file at the Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri, from the Harry L. Hopkins file, FDR Library, Hyde Park, 
New York and from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
contributed much to this chapter. 
The main thrust of Lend-Lease assistance was for military 
purposes and the United States sent vast amounts of military 
equipment to China. After the fall of Burma and the occupation of 
the Burma Road by Japan, huge amounts of military supplies were 
stockpiled in India and the U.S., to be moved into China by air over 
the "Hump." The United States provided arms, ammunition, training, 
planes and other war material to China. Chapter Three examines the 
pressure as manifested in conferences of war leaders concerning aid 
such as the Cairo conference, at which the U.S. granted increasing 
amounts of Lend-Lease assistance to China for her Air Force. 
The dispute between Stilwell and Chiang over Lend-Lease aid and 
the questions of training Chinese soldiers and of the Chinese 
contribution in the war have been inadequately if vividly discussed. 
Charles Romanus and Riley'Sunderland's Stilwell's Mission to China 
(Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1953), and Stilwell's Command 
•I 
Problems (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1956) were frequently used 
in this study. Also helpful was Chin-tung Liang's General Stilwell 
in China: The Full Story (New York: St. Johns University Press, 
1972), which came out in 1972 as a kind of primary document on U.S.-
Chinese relations from 1942 until 1~44. Although Chin-tung Liang's 
work is mostly critical of Stilwell, it gives a vivid description of 
the Currie-Chiang meeting, during FDR's advisor Lauchlin Currie's 
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second visit to China in July, 1942, sources for which are 
completely lacking in the FDR Library and in the National Archives. 
The primary materials for the third chapter were the P.S.F. Subject 
Files, of the Harry S. Truman Library, PSF Diplomatic files of the 
FDR Library; the State Department Decimal File, and Naval Aide Files 
of the Harry S. Truman Library; the Congressional Record; the papers 
of the Harry S. Truman, Official File, FRUS, 1943, 1944, 1945; and 
documents of the International Division, A.S.F., Lend-Lease as of 
September 30, 1945. 
The United States, while strengthening China militarily,·had 
the long-range object of developing China industrially and 
economically. The UNRRA Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 
(United Nations) was created in November, 1943 and its primary 
object was to assist China in meeting immediate wartime problems by 
carrying on different sorts of relief work. Also, it outlined the 
broader picture of a future or post-war overall economic development 
plan for China. The main financier of the UNRRA was the U.S. and 
through U.S. influence China became the main UNRRA recipient country 
. ' 
and received 72% of total UNRRA supplies. For chapter five, I have 
made use of Congressional.hearings and records, several doctoral 
•I 
dissertations, UNRRA periodicals and publications, the UNRRA 
Operational Analysis Papers (Washington, D.C.: UNRRA, 1948), State 
Department Decimal File (UNRRA); the papers of Harry S. Truman, and 
the Report of the Director General to the Council July 1947 to 
December 1947 (Washington, D.C.: UNRRA, April 1948). 
After the surrender of Japan, the U.S. faced two problems in 
its program to unify and strengthen China, the repatriation of 
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Japanese soldiers and the settlement of the Kuominang-Communist 
conflict. U.S. Representatives, John Patrick Hurley and General 
George C. Marshall, undertook mediation efforts, and the U.S. 
continued to supply assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek government. 
Following the war's end, military assistance to China was extended, 
but its nature was completely different from that of wartime. One 
contention is that this continued provision of war supplies 
encouraged Chiang to be stubborn about the CCP and caused the 
Communists to lose all faith in America. That led to the breakdowt 
of Marshall's peace negotiations and, ultimately, to civil war. 
The sixth chapter examines the reasons for continuation of 
military Lend-Lease to China after the end of the war, and its 
nature and impact on U.S.-China relations. In addition to FRUS, 
Congressional Records, and newspapers, I have used the papers of 
Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File (Subject File) and 
Official File (OF) in the Harry S. Truman Library, and the 
Department of State.Decimal File 1945-49. The General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer Files in Suitland also were helpful in this regard, as 
were the papers of George 1frsey, and General Records of the 
Department of State (Decimal File), Naval Aide Files. ,, 
The fourth chapter focuses on the actions of American War 
Production Mission's activities in China and the eventual formatio 
of the Chinese War Production Board in 1944. The United States no 
only supplied war materials, but also tried to transfer its 
experience in wartime production management through creation of a 
War Production Board in China. Donald M. Nelson and later on E. A 
Locke carried out the activities of the Production Mission in Chin 
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~hich lasted from November, 1944 until November, 1945. The American 
Jar Production Mission formed a Chinese War Production Board and 
tried to increase production in different sectors. They were 
~orking not only to meet the war's needs, but also had in mind a 
post-war economic development plan which eventually would transform 
China into an industrialized country and thereby eliminate poverty 
and Communism. Although the War Production Mission experts were 
initially successful in raising production in several sectors in 
early 1945, production came to a standstill later on. 
Mabel Taylor Gragg's "History of the American War Production 
~ission in China," has provided the most informative and descriptive 
account, to date, of the Mission's activities in China. Besides 
this, newspaper clippings from the American War Production Mission 
File in the FDR Library were a great help. The John D. Sumner 
papers, E. A. Locke papers, and Clayton-Thorp papers, in the Harry 
S. Truman Library and the AWPM papers at the FDR Library also served 
in this regard. 
Important works in the preparation of this study were: Michael 
Schaller, U.S.Crusade in China: 1938-1945 (New York: columbia Univ. 
Preess, 1979); Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand: 1937-1945 
•! 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963); Tang Tsou, America's 
Failure in China, 1941-1945 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963); 
~kira Iriye, Across the Pacific (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1965); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1953); and Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971). Michael Schaller's work, U.S. 
Crusade in China, 1938-1945 is a remarkable work. Schaller offers a 
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critical analysis of the U.S. Lend-Lease policy toward China. 
However, he blamed the KMT for failures and problems in the aid 
program and often overlooked positive results of Lend-Lease 
assistance to China. Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand 
contains a huge amount of information on financial assistance to 
China by the U.S. and other countries. He had served as a Financial 
Advisor to the Chiang Kai-shek government and his study represents a 
one-sided support for Chiang's activities. The work provides little 
discussion of political aspects of U.S.-China relations nor does it 
provide a critical analysis of the U.S. policy in this regard. 
Tang-Tsou's America's Failure in China, tries to present an 
impartial analysis of U.S. policy with regard to China, but, again, 
it suffers from lack of enough information about economic and 
financial issues. William P. Head, in America's China Sojourn 
(Lanham, New York: University Press of America, 1983), discusses 
specific aspects of Sino-American relations during wartime, instead 
of talking about the overall relationship. Anthony Kubek's How the 
Far East Was Lost (New York: Twin Circle Publishing, 1972) reflects 
an extremely radical, right-wing approach to Sino-American 
relations. Kubek sees only the imperfections or shortcomings of 
•I 
Sino-American relations, as a result of which China went into the 
hands of the CCP. Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific and W. I. Cohen, 
America's Response to China, are by far the two most objective works 
on Sino-American relations, but they give little attention to Lend-
Lease and other economic assistance programs. The present study 
responds to a demonstrated need for analysis of U.S. wartime and 
postwar assistance to China. 
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In certain important respects, U.S. aid programs to China 
represented the first full scale commitment of American resources 
and policies to influence the domestic and international 
circumstances of another country. While the United States had 
established modest economic development and military assistance 
programs in Latin America somewhat earlier, the aid effort in China, 
because of its complexity and magnitude, served as a laboratory to a 
significant degree for the enormous aid initiative that was to be 
embraced by the United States over the next decade. The Lend-Lease 
aid program in general represented the first major U.S. effort to 
strengthen and rebuild its allies throughout the whole world. There 
is no doubt that the main intention of the Lend-Lease was to support 
the allied powers against the Axis. But in China, the successful 
execution of the war depended on a wholesale development of 
reconstruction of her economy, and this effort had a tremendous 
effect on China's post-war economic development. China's road 
transportation, railways, communications, industries and agriculture 
were affected by the war. For a successful execution of the war, it 
was necessary either to bring all needed materials to China from the 
U.S. or to develop these aspects of the Chinese economy. Under 
Lend-Lease assistance program the United States provided all kinds 
of materials related to the execution of war, and since 1943, it 
adopted different measures to rebuild China for both the war and 
post-war purposes. During the wartime, massive Lend-Lease aid was 
also given to Britain, the USSR, France, and French North Africa, 
but only in China was the U.S. concerned with a permanent cure for 
her national sickness. Even the Foreign Economic Administration 
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which was established in 1943 for the purpose of coordinating 
different U.S. wartime programs, adopted a program for China's 
industrial development. Its reports and recommendations were later 
handed over to the Chinese government, after the War Production 
Board was established. 
Since it was the first time that the U.S. had undergone this 
kind of experience, the U.S. wartime assistance policy toward China 
was often conducted on a trial and error basis. There was often a 
conflict of opinion between the State Department and the U.S. 
Embassy officials in China concerning the need and amount of aid. 
The Chinese delegates in Washington often persuaded the 
administration to supply a large amount of military and economic aid 
which was opposed by the U.S. diplomats and military officials who 
were familiar with the Chinese realities. Lack of strict U.S. 
supervision of the use of assistance goods led to abuses and 
corruption among the Chinese officials. Most of the goods; money, 
gold, and war materials were either stolen by the higher KMT 
officials or were hoarded by the government to fight the Communists 
in the post-war period. This flaw of U.S. aid goods largely came 
from its inability to investigate the ways of using it. 
•I 
The myth of the China market and a prosperous commercial 
relation with China had haunted the American mind for a long time 
and this was partly responsible for U.S. economic assistance to 
China. The U.S. officials like John Carter Vincent believed that 
trade is only possible with China once China was established as the 
stabilizing facctor in Asia. By influencing its economic 
development and by offering military assistance against Japan, 
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against the USSR and against the Chinese Communists, the United 
States was trying to bring stabilization in China. It was further 
held by the US officials that trade relations between China and 
America would safeguard American business enterprises in China and 
through selling materials China could pay back the U.S. debt. 
Moreover, improvement of transportation and communication would also 
integrate the agricultural and industrial economies. A strong 
democratic government was necessary for playing a bigger role in the 
development business in China. From an economic point of view, U.S. 
officials believed that industrialization would enhance imports and 
exports and increase revenues with the result that China would truly 
be independent and an active U.S. trade partner. 
Consistent with the above thinking, a basic U.S. policy was to 
encourage industrialization in the hope that poverty and Communism 
would be eliminated in China. It would also help to establish a 
capitalist, democratic and pro-American society in China once the 
war was over. It was a U.S. way of curbing Chinese poverty with a 
Chinese "New Deal." But all these efforts of the United States to 
industrialize China ended in vain. This study will indicate that 
one cannot simply impose sudden changes on another country unless it 
•I 
allies itself with forces in that country which desire change and 
are capable of changing. America allied itself with forces which 
would resist change, i.e., the Kuomintang (KMT), and ignored the 
Communists who were capable of bringing changes in China. This 
study will throw some light on the problems of bringing about 
changes in another country. 
One of the most interesting characteristics of Sino-American 
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relations during the war was that the United States was frequently 
pressed by China to increase the amount of unregulated and lump-sum 
assistance to China. Due to its wartime and post-war visions with 
regard to China, the US administration, especially between the 
period from Arcadia to Cairo Conferences, frequently yielded to 
Chinese threats and manipulation. This definitely represented the 
development of a client-state relationship in which the client 
manipulated its mentor. Moreover, aid to China represented an 
emotional issue on America's part, and without looking at the 
realities, aid was given on a lump-sum and uncoordinated basis. 
U.S. wartime efforts to influence and assist China had a common 
purpose, which was to ensure a friendly, anti-Communist 
administration. It hoped to achieve this aim by offering economic 
and military assistance for its overall development and security. 
Instead of direct military intervention, it was an indirect way of 
doing things. America's efforts involved sending supplies, experts, 
equipment, food, and building materials. However, they were unable 
to supervise the actual use of all the equipment and supplies which 
they sent. The experts were either not allowed by the KMT 
government to investigate the real situation or were unable to do so 
because of the outbreak of the civil war. The only U.S. officials 
who were in touch with the real situation in China were the OSS, 
military officials, and certain China hands (some of the diplomats 
in the U.S. Embassy like John Carter Vincent, John Patton Davies, 
and John Stuart Service). They were either suppressed by the SACO's 
Chinese officials, however, or by John Patrick Hurley and his group 
at the urgings of Chiang Kai-shek. Anyhow, the dispatch of American 
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experts and specialists, military officials, and technicians to 
advise and work in foreign countries was a new thing and naturally 
would involve stumbling and fumbling in its initial stages. Still, 
it was a novel experience on the part of the U.S. in the sense that, 
in the post-war period this experience of sending American experts 
to another country became a major factor in influencing the 
development procedure of that country. The introduction of civilian 
and military officials of other nations to the U.S. was another 
novel innovation. It symbolized the dawn of a new era in American 
history in the sense that the underdeveloped nations around the 
world began to send their students, techni~ians, and engineers in a 
massive scale to the USA, or expected America to send its own 
experts to train their nationals. In short, through its China 
assistance program, the US emerged as the workshop for creative 
expertise. America was just beginning to act as a world power and 
was replacing the British in many respects. 
The China aid experience was also an important episode in U.S. 
diplomacy because it emerged as a financial imperialist. The U.S. 
proved itself completely capable of taking responsibility for the 
reconstruction and development of other nations. Third world 
nations became increasingly dependent on this financial giant for 
help with economic development. Even rotten and corrupt dictators 
became friendly toward the United States. As a result of its China 
aid experience the U.S. learned some important lessons which guided 
its future military and economic assistance policy toward other 
nations. It could no longer trust an ally like Chiang Kai-shek. 
The U.S. administration later realized that during the war Chiang 
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Kai-shek on his side and the American government on its side were 
pursuing quite different and often antagonistic purposes. The U.S. 
was fighting Japan, and it wanted to see that everyone who wanted to 
fight Japan was spurred on. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, was 
interested in surviving as a government. He was not trying to fight 
Japan at all. The U.S. military people rated the China-Burma-India 
theater far below Europe or the Pacific Theater. Therefore, FDR 
sought to make up what he could not do in fact for Chiang Kai-shek 
by promising a postwar world in which China would emerge as a great 
power. 
This China experience later helped the U.S. War Department and 
the administration in general to take a more realistic conception 
about another country's military potentiality and its willingness to 
fight a war. The presence of the U.S. ground forces, along with its 
military assistance to vulnerable areas became a part of its 
military aid. System for strict supervision of the use of its 
assistance goods was introduced. During the Korean War and later in 
the Vietnam War, U.S. ground forces actively participated. The U.S. 
I 
did not merely try to train the foreign troops and rely on them. 
What the U.S. did not learn was how to compell the aid recipient 
•I 
country's armies to assume active participation in the war. 
Despite the positive outcomes of the China aid policy, the 
United States failed to ally itself with the force that proved 
capable of unifying the country. As a consequence, its relations 
with Communist China deteriorated for twenty years after 1949. 
Anti-communism dictated support of corrupt regimes against popular 
democratic forces in many countries, as in Pakistan, Iran, and in 
14 
Nicaragua. Moreover, as it did with the KMT China, the U.S. in 
post-war decades did not make land reforms or other political and 
economic reforms a precondition of its financial assistance program. 
Consequently, American assistance most of the time failed to bring 
an overall change in the economy of many countries. It only brought 
changes in few sectors of the aid recipient countries. 
The "negative" results of China aid experience must be viewed 
in perspective. When we compare C~ina's circumstances with those of 
European countries at the time of the Marshall Plan, it is clear 
that all the elements present in Europe which made for the success 
of U.S. aid were absent in China. In the European countries, 
political unity, highly disciplined populations, highly trained and 
educated elites to run the industries and economy and a highly 
developed capitalistic system were present. In Europe, the 
industrial revoiution had taken place more than one hundred years 
earlier in some regions. The U.S. was helping people who had the 
will to be helped. The great trouble in China was that there was 
not that will nor was there a stable government to implement that 
·I 
will. The people were not supporting Chiang Kai-shek and he would 
not do the things he had to do to achieve the results he wanted to 
achieve. 
In part, as a reaction to the China aid experience, the U.S. 
introduced the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO, and SEATO. 
Whereas China aid was a bi-lateral arrangement between the two 
countries (i.e., the U.S. and China) the ERP, NATO, and SEATO were 
multilateral--arrangements in which a number of countries were 
allied with each other as well as with the U.S. In fact, the U.S. 
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aid experience to China led to a changed mode of international 
behavior. It led to the provision of a huge amount of military and 
economic assistance to several South-east Asian and European 
countries to check the spread of Communism. We may claim that the 
China aid experience was the genesis of long-term aid to other 
countries. It set important precedents for the formation of SEATO 
and CENTO. In all cases, following the Chinese model, the U.S. gave 
massive amounts of military and civilian aid directly to the ruling 
elites of these countries. Perhaps fearing instability or charges 
of interventionist muddling, the U.S. did not ally itself with the 
progressive elements in Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran. The 
policyof "containment" won over a policy of encouraging evolutionary 
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China, a country with an area one third larger than the 
continental United States, became a victim of fascist Japanese 
aggression in Asia before the outbreak of the Second World War. On 
September 18, 1931, Japanese militarists began a long-planned drive 
to expand their empire on the Asiatic mainland with the invasion of 
~anchuria, which had for long been an integral part of China. 1 On 
the pretext of the damage of thirty-one inches of railway track by 
Chinese troops, the Japanese moved into Manchuria. Chinese officials 
denied any kind of involvement.2 After the capture of Mukden, the 
Japanese established the puppet State of Manchukuo and started a 
program of intensive industrialization. Manchuria, however, was 
only the initial stage of Japan's program for Asia. With possession 
of its rich coal 'and iron deposits, the Japanese could use Manchuria 
as a gateway to Eastern Siberia and Northern China. Six years 
later, the Manchurian incident and its consequences led to a clash 
between Chinese and Japanese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge outside 
Beijing on July 7, 1937, which marked the active resumption of 
hostilities between China and Japan.3 
•I 
Some historians suggest that "it was the Chinese Communists who 
caused the Marco Polo Bridge incident by shooting at the Japanese 
soldiers. Whatever might have been the case, in invading Manchuria 
Japan had chosen a very favorable time. China was in a weak position 
to resist the Japanese attack. After Dr. Sun Yat Sen's death in 
1925 China had "bogged down" in civil war.4 Although Chiang Kai-
shek conquered Peking in 1928, China did not immediately become a 
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unified nation. Warlords were still active in various regions and 
China was virtually divided among them. The Cantonese faction in the 
Central Committee of the Kuomintang left Nanking and established a 
separate administration in Canton in the summer of 1931. On the 
other hand, under the leadership of Mao-Tse-tung and Chu Yeh the 
Chinese Communists emerged as another important element in Chinese 
politics. 5 
On the administrative side, the Kuomintang [KMT] exercised firm 
control only in two provinces and political control in eight others. 
At the local level the KMT depended upon the support of established 
elites, usually landlords and this alliance with landlords alienated 
the peasantry. A small group centered on Chiang Kai-shek held power 
within the party. The Military Council, headed by Chiang, held 
almost exclusive administrative power.6 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek always tried to maintain his personal rule by playing one party 
faction against another, and no single group or person could 
challenge Chiang. As a result the government was only able to deal 
effectively with problems in the cities and the modern (industrial) 
economic sector. Ninety percent of the population, largely rural, 
remained outside the control of Nanking. Model reform laws affecting 
•! 
rents, taxes, and usury were passed but were routinely ignored by 
provincial officials and landlords. Chiang's ruling circle neither 
could nor wished to challenge vested interests. After all, they 
themselves might be the first victims of profound social and 
economic change.7 
From an international point of view, in 1931 Japan also had 
more freedom of action than at any time since World War I. The 
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American official Henry L. Stimson observed, "If anyone had planned 
the Manchurian outbreak with a view to freedom from interference 
from the rest of the world, his time was well chosen. 118 After 1929, 
the United States and the European powers were seriously saddled 
with deep domestic crises produced by the world-wide depression. 
Though Britain and America reduced the rate of their naval 
construction after the Washington Treaty of 1922, Japan continued to 
increase its naval power and became dominant in the Western Pacific. 
The first Five Year Plan similarly kept the U.S.S.R. busy, and the 
defense of the Siberian Maritime Provinces remained undeveloped. 
Taking advantage of this situation, Japan attacked China to solve 
the Manchurian problem and check Russian influence in Mongolia. 
Although many Americans sympathised with China, and public 
opinion was hostile to Japan, the Hoover administration, baffled by 
the Depression and committed to passivity, could do little to 
alleviate the suffering of China. During this time, isolationism 
was a powerful influence in American politics. Based on the 
experience of the First World War, neither government, nor public 
seemed at all interested in 'challenging Japan.9 Though readers of 
the New York Times learned of the brutality of Japanese behavior in 
•I 
Manchuria, their attitude was that "we sympathize, but this is not 
our business". During this time Washington's main concerns were to 
collect the reparations from the European allies, to fight the 
Depression, and to keep America out from war. As one historian, 
Thomas N. Guinsburg, observes, "as if the Depression were not 
enough, military conflict erupted in the Far East, further 
convincing the nation of the isolationists' prescience. Nothing, it 
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seemed, could prevent recurring wars of imperialism; to save the 
blood of its sons, the wise nation concentrated solely upon its own 
immediate interests. 11 10 
Reflecting these attitudes, President Herbert Hoover, and 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson chose to seize the high moral 
ground. Stimson at first simply dispatched cautious notes of 
inquiry, and between September 22, 1931 and January 7, 1932, the 
State Department issued.nine communications urging the parties not 
to violate their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
Nine-Power Treaty.11 Five of the nine communications were addressed 
to the Japanese government alone.12 The Secretary of State also co-
operated with the League Council through diplomatic channels, and 
Stimson endorsed the formation of the Lytton Commission to 
investigate the situation in Manchuria.13 But Japan continued to 
advance deep insid·e Manchuria, and diplomatic pressure proved 
ineffective. During this time, the State Department's Far Eastern 
Division Advisor, Stanley K. Hornbeck, made a s~rong argument that 
the United States should espouse legal action rather than moral 
sanction. He also advocated economic sanctions against Japan by the 
United States.14 But Hoover's aloofness and caution prevented ,, 
Stimson from forming an effective foreign policy to influence 
Japanese aggression. Moreover, without being a direct belligerent, 
it was not possible for the U.S. to take any direct action against 
Japan in the middle of the depression. 
On January 7, 1932 Stimson sent a note to both Japan and China 
which ~xpounded the Hoover-Stimson Non-Recognition Doctrine. In 
brief, the note stated that Washington would not accept any 
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arrangement in Manchuria "which may impair the treaty rights of the 
United States ... and that it does not intend to recognize any 
situation, treaty, or arrangement which may be brought about by 
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of 
Paris 11 ,15 Stimson's doctrine of "non-recognition" was "a moral 
sanction against aggression 11 l6 which tried to turn an aggressive 
nation into a law-abiding one. However, there was no political, 
military, or economic force to shore up this policy, and 
consequently it failed to halt Japanese aggression in China. The 
United States also failed to get the co-operation of the European 
powers, especially of Britain.17 While the U.S. took the lead 
against Japanese aggression, Britain and "other western powers 
remained, for the time being, noncommital. 11 18 
Exploiting this disunity among the Western powers and the U.S., 
Japan attacked Shanghai in January, 1932 in an effort to end the 
boycott of Japanese goods by the Chinese people.19 The Japanese 
bombed civilian areas, occupied a part of the ~nternational 
Settlements, and advanced up the Yangtze Valley. During the 
Shanghai phase, President Hoover ordered the U.S. Asiatic fleet to 
maneuver off Shanghai, and sent troops to the International zone of 
•I 
the city to protect the lives of the Americans: But Hoover, 
encouraged by William R. Castle, Assistant Secretary of the Far 
Eastern Division, was opposed to the idea of the tough policy 
against Japan suggested by Hornbeck and Stimson.20 Stimson's 
declaration that future U.S. naval construction would resume if the 
existing treaties were not respected did not influence Japan. When 
the League Council adopted the Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition 
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ind adhered to the Lytton Commission report, Japan withdrew from the 
~eague in March 1933. Although the United States "was the first 
;overnment to protest to Japan, to enunciate the Non-recognition 
)octrine 11 ,21 Henry L. Stimson failed to help China materially 
lgainst Japan. Meanwhile, Stanley K. Hornbeck continued to suggest 
~adical measures to ensure equal commercial opportunities for all 
1ations in China and the territorial integrity of China. In 
ieptember, 1933, Hornbeck supported the idea of Grover Clark, who 
:alled upon the American business community to invest in a capital 
cund that would support construction projects in China. He also 
,roposed a boycott of Japanese goods by the United States and the 
~eague of Nations as well as an embargo on all U.S. trade with 
Japan. In case of a war with Japan he called upon the Western powers 
to form a defensive alliance against Tokyo.22 Although revealing 
future directions •in Sino-American economic relations, none of 
iornbeck's proposals came into practice because U.S. businessmen 
~ere not willing to lose their Japan markets and the European powers 
?roved unable to make a collective decision. Secretary of State 
Stimson did nothing to aid China, and even turned down Nanking's 
request for loans, surplus military supplies, and a team of aviation 
•I 
axperts.23 Stimson failed because of the "relative aloofness of 
President Herbert Hoover, who spoke little of the Manchurian crisis 
in public". On the other hand, a "hostile press and Congress only 
served to compound his problems 11 .24 Henry L. Stimson ended his 
career in the Hoover administration in controversy, expecting a 
realization of his policy by the Administration of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.25 
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There were no radical changes in United States policy toward 
China between 1933-1937, despite hopes that the incoming Franklin D. 
Roosevelt administration would take a strong stance. In the 
beginning, FDR adopted Hoover's policy of non-antagonism to Japan, 
which Y. I. Cohen describes as "a return to his cousin Theodore's 
policy of appeasing Japan".26 Cohen exaggerated perhaps, but it is 
true that "while he (FDR) did have a strong feeling for the Chinese, 
partly based on an old family involvement with the China trade, and 
while he was indignant at Japan's Manchurian action, he had no 
intention, as the next five years would make clear, of risking a war 
in the Far East. 11 27 Although an internationalist, FDR was firmly 
determined to avoid a confrontation with Japan. He also wanted to 
discourage the Chinese government from expecting any kind of 
material assistance against Japan from the United States. FDR, as 
did most of his advisors, believed that "China's fate was of no 
great importance to nor a responsibility of the United States 11 • 28 
The Depression and grave problems at home, an isolationist Congress 
and apathetic public, fear of losing a profitable trade with Japan, 
and China's hopelessly weak, corrupt government forced FDR to renew 
Stimson's policy of non-involvement and Non-recognition. 
•I 
During the period 1933-1937 United States officials, however, 
were not completely indifferent to the China situation. United 
States political leaders had an idea that effective peace in East 
Asia could be achieved through the establishment of a unified and 
economically strong China which would be "powerful enough to defend 
itself against aggression and ensure equality of opportunity to all 
countries by enforcing the principle of the Open Door.29 The Lytton 
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,nunission had also reaffirmed the necessity of a strong China for 
1e maintenance of peace in the Far East. On Feb 24, 1933, the 
;sembly of the League, while endorsing the Lytton Commission's 
aport, urged that "temporary international co-operation in the 
~ternal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr Sun 
at Sen was a prerequisite for peace in the Far East. 1130 Dr. Sun 
at Sen and other Nationalist leaders in China also held the belief 
hat the only way to establish peace in the Far East was to support 
he Chinese reconstruction effort and to abandon the competitive 
truggle for domination of China by other powers. 31 Based on this 
rinciple, the Chinese government appealed in 1934 to the League of 
ations for reconstruction and development aid in order to unify 
hina politically and to permit the Chinese economy to 
ndustrialize. The newly created National Economic Council of 
hina32 asked the League for technical assistance for multiple forms 
f development, like highways, railways, flood control of the 
angtze Valley, health, education and to solve agrarian problems. 
he League responded to the Chinese requests by creating a special 
' ommittee. It collaborated with China in health, education and 
gricultural and technical fields and sent experts to China. While 
apan opposed the League's program of economic aid to China, the 
nited States was unable to co-operate with the League.33 
Besides approaching the League, the Chinese government also 
oped to get direct financial assistance from the United States. In 
he spring of 1933, Dr. T.V. Soong, on his way to attend the World 
conomic Conference in London, stopped in Washington and after 
egotiations with the Farm Credit Administration head Henry 
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Morgenthau Jr, arranged for a US $50 million credit.34 A similar 
credit had been granted to China in 1931 by the United States 
Federal Farm Board for.the construction of dikes on the Yangtze 
River. The 1933 Reconstruction Finance Corporation(RFC) credit was 
to be repaid in three years with a five percent interest rate and 
various taxes were pledged as collateral. During the visit Dr. Soong 
also took the initiative to form a "Consultative Committee" which 
would replace the old economic consortium,35 formed before the First 
World War. The Chinese were uncomfortable with the old consortium 
for two reasons. First, the Japanese controlled it, and, second, 
the Chinese did not like foreign supervision over their economic 
development programs. T.V. Soong tried to include Jean Monnet, Sir 
Charles Addis and Thomas W. Lamont in the proposed Consultative 
Committee.36 But the Japanese realized that "any effort to 
strengthen China would only encourage the Chinese to persevere in an 
attitude of hostility to Japan," and therefore, Japan objected to 
the scheme.37 Due to the Japanese opposition, Soong's attempt to 
organize the Consultative Committee failed.38 
T.V. Soong came back to Washington in August, 1933, to discuss 
financial and other aid. Being aware of his arrival, the Far Eastern 
Division of the State Department in a number of memoranda advised 
the President not to negotiate with Soong about financial aid or 
other aid in the face of British and Japanese opposition. Further 
opposition came from a semi-independent faction in South China which 
objected to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Credit to the 
Chiang government on the grounds that it would be used by Chiang 
against them. 39 The South China factions of the KMT had established 
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virtually a separate government in Canton in 1931. The Division was 
in favor of a collective multinational effort to aid China, but it 
rejected the idea of unilateral U.S. aid. Moreover, the State 
Department also insisted that China should pay back its past 
financial obligations to American citizens.40 Because the U.S. did 
not want to identify itself as the only country to aid the Chinese 
government, and because it did not want to antagonize Japan, it 
could not take any independent action. Soong talked with Hornbeck 
and met President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, but failed to receive any 
aid package. Furthermore, because the Chinese could not sell as 
much cotton, their principal export to the U.S., to finance their 
previous credits in the U.S., their payments fell into arrears. 
Therefore, the RFC in March, 1934, reduced the Chinese credit to US 
$20 million.41 
Despite the fact that the State Department was adamant about 
giving any kind of financial aid to China, the Chinese got a 
considerable amount of assistance from private American groups and 
companies. When the U.S. Department of War rejected a plea by Chiang 
Kai-shek to send qualified Americans to organize and operate a 
school for the training of mi!itary aviators, the Chinese government 
was able to arrange with Colonel John Hamilton Juett and some other 
aviators (all in the U.S. Army-Air Reserve Corps) to come to China 
as private citizens to establish a military aviation school at 
Hangchow. By the end of 1933, Colonel Juett had established an 
embryonic Chinese Air Force.42 Similarly, in the development of 
commercial aviation, the Americans also played an important role 
through the formation of the China National Aviation Corporation as 
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oint Sino-American venture, As a result of the efforts of the 
:. Department of Commerce, the United States became the principal 
1plier of aircraft and related equipment to China. 43 In fact, 
·craft exports more than quadrupled over those of the previous 
Lrs. In this way, these private U.S. groups and enterpreneurs 
lirectly contributed to strengthening China's military 
,abilities. 
The Japanese reacted vociferously to this private foreign 
;istance to China. On April, 1934, Eiji Arnau, a spokesman for the 
,anese Foreign Office, declared that Japan had a special 
;ponsibility to maintain peace in East Asia and that "Japan must 
,ose any operations undertaken by the foreign powers in the name 
technical and financial assistance to China and any projects such 
detailing military instructors or military advisors to China or 
>porting the Chinese with war planes . .,44 The United States 
>assador to China Johnson T. Nelson strongly recommended that the 
l administration_should not let the Japanese pronouncement "pass 
:hallenged" as it ran directly counter to the spirit and the 
cter of the Nine Power Tre~ty. 45 But instead of taking any active 
isure, Secretary of State Cordel Hull sent only an unprovocative 
•I . 
ie memoire to Japan assuring Tokyo that its relations with the 
S. were determined by 'traditional friendship' and international 
~. 46 Afterwards, Hull asked the Far Eastern Division for a review 
United States policy toward China for the purpose of determining 
ather it should be altered for the sake of avoiding a dispute with 
pan, 47 Stanley K. Hornbeck presented the Secretary with a 
norandum which suggested that the American government and its 
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agencies should refrain from giving further financial assistance to 
China in any form whatsoever. Thus, despite the recommendation of 
the U.S. ambassador at Nanking, the State Department was unwilling 
to take substantive measures other than diplomacy to assist China 
against Japan. It was unwilling to offend Tokyo even for the sake 
of America's commercial interests in China. Furthermore, the 
memorandum also urged the United States government to discourage 
American citizens from offering direct help to the Chinese armed 
forces, insisted that the government exercise rigid control over the 
export of arms and munitions to China, and make no attempt to foster 
such exports. Hornbeck further argued against any kind of special 
consideration for China, and stated that China must be made to 
realize that she would have to "stand on her own feet." According 
to Hornbeck, such a policy should gradually create an effective 
spirit of self-reliance among the Chinese people. 48 At the same 
time, Hornbeck supported the idea of collective financial assistance 
to China to carry out an extensive program of internal improvements 
which would contribute to the establishment of effective peace in 
East Asia. These programs, recommended by Hornbeck were not carried 
out at that time, nor was it possible to carry them out in 1934, ,, 
when China was confronted with both internal and external problems, 
and the U.S. was maintaining a virtual isolation policy. But the 
later U.S. aid programs for China both during and after the war 
indicate that the U.S. was deeply interested in the internal 
economic development of China. U.S. policy makers were aware of 
China's need for modernization even before the war started against 
Japan. 
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When Hornbeck was making his recommentations, U.S. policy 
:award China reached a crisis when the Treasury Department decided 
:o purchase large quantities of silver from China. In the early 
L930s senators from the major silver-producing states urged the FDR 
ldministration to stabilize the price of silver both in the domestic 
lnd the world market. In June 1934, under strong congressional 
>ressure, Roosevelt signed the Silver Purchase Act which required 
:he U.S. Treasury to buy silver on the world market at high prices 
'until it constituted one-fourth of the country's monetary reserve 
>r until silver reached $1.29 an ounce on the world market. 1149 
~eing on the Silver Standard, this silver purchase program caused a 
;erious drain on China's reserves and China was forced to adopt a 
nanaged currency. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr used the 
iilver Purchase Act to aid China, and thus established a separate 
coreign policy from· the State Department's toward China.SO As 
iecretary of the Treasury Department, Morgenthau did not want to 
;crap the Stimson Doctrine, but "believed in the'need for the United 
itates to play a role in resisting Nazi and Japanese aggression. 1151 
1orgenthau also believed that developments in East Asia posed a 
totalitarian challenge to democracy and he favored co-operation 
Jetween the United States and the Soviet Union in resisting both 
;errnany and Japan. His view of Far Eastern relations was far more 
traditional than popular postwar interpretations of the 1930s would 
suggest, and he saw Far Eastern poli-tics as a three way contest 
~etween currency blocs--the emerging yen bloc, the established 
sterling bloc, and the energetic dollar bloc.52 To Morganthau, the 
dollar bloc included North and South America and China. In other 
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words, Morgenthau tried his best to link Chine.se currency to the 
dollar, and the State Department opposed his policy for fear of 
antagonizing Japan. As Morgenthau himself explained it to a Senate 
Democrat leader, "This thing is awfully big--it's an international 
battle between Great Britain, Japan, and ourselves-- and China is 
the bone in the middle.53 Although FDR did not want to challenge 
the State Department's policy of appeasement of Japan, Henry 
Morgenthau Jr. took the opportunity of the Silver Purchase Act to 
exploit his "personal relationship with the president to influence 
him toward his world view. 11 54 
When in 1935 the Chinese requested financial assistance, 
Morgenthau sent Yale professor James Harvey Rogers to China for an 
evaluation of the Chinese situation. Deeply impressed by the Chinese 
Finance Minister,·H.H. Kung, Rogers recommended aid to China for 
multiple development and construction.55 But the Far Eastern 
Division head Stanley K. Hornbeck strongly opposed any kind of 
unilateral action ~y the United States. In order to aid China 
Hornbeck was in favor of reviving the old Consortiwn, of which Japan 
was a member, so that a conflict with Japan could be avoided. 
Although Morgenthau temporarily deferred to Secretary Hull,56 this 
episode marked the beginning of a full-scale State-Treasury 
confrontation on Far Eastern policy which lasted until late 1937. 56 
•I 
The State Department urged that FDR either alter the Silver policy 
or encourage an internationally organized response to China's 
financial crisis.57 FDR accepted neither of these two suggestions, 
as he did not want a confrontation with the silver bloc Senators. On 
the other hand, he also rejected the plea for economic assistance to 
30 
carry out monetary reforms. FDR, as with most things, permitted 
domestic politics to set his China policies. 
The situation of China, however, grew more desperate day by 
day. During November 1934, an increased amount of silver was 
smuggled out of China, and in order to prevent this smuggling R.H. 
Kung the Chinese Minister for Financial Affairs appealed to the 
U.S. for assistance.SB The State Department, however, remained 
adamant. In China the situation continued to deteriorate. In 
January, widespread rumors circulated in Washington that the Chinese 
government would be forced into a rapprochement with Japan to obtain 
financial aid from the country that had invaded her and dismembered 
the northern provinces. It was also rumored that China would be 
forced to expel all Western interests and to surrender a vast area 
of North China to Japan. These rumours were confirmed by T.V. Soong 
and Willys R. Peck, a high ranking official of the State 
Department.59 
Against this grim background, China again requested the United 
States to help her in adopting a currency based on gold as well as 
silver by granting a loan of $100 million and a credit of equal 
value. 60 While the State Department viewed the matter as .· strictly 
political, Morgenth_au saw it: in economic terms. He criticised Hull's 
Far Eastern policy as being far too conciliatory toward the Japanese 
,: 
and strongly supported a "go it alone" policy in aiding China. 
Meanwhile, the world price of silver rose from fifty five cents per 
ounce in February to eighty one cents by the end of April, 1935, and 
its impact on the Chinese economy was severe.61 Smuggling reached a 
peak and on the political side China was obliged to accept the Ho-
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Umetsu agreement by the Japanese on July 6, 1935. This agreement 
forced China to expel Hopei Chairman Yu Hsueh-Chung and his Fifty 
First Army from North China, to withdraw Kuomintang elements from 
Hopei province and to eliminate "all anti-Japanese propaganda" in 
North China.62 
During this time Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the famous British 
economist, after making an extensive tour of China, suggested that 
the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse. Leith-Ross 
recommended immediate financial aid to China regardless of Sino-
Japanese relations.63 Ambassador Johnson supported Leith-Ross's 
recommendations. On October, 1935, the· Chinese announced abandonment 
of the Silver Standard and on October 28, 1935, the Chinese 
ambassador Alfred Sze called on Morgenthau to offer the U.S. 
Treasury 200 million ounces of Chinese silver, and to ask for an 
American loan. 
Finally, on condition of American supervision over the Chinese 
currency reforms, o~ November 13, 1935, with the consent of 
President Roosevelt, an agreement was reached with the Chinese by 
which the United States agreed to purchase 50 million ounces of 
silver.64 In order to iron out the details the Chinese government 
sent K.P. Chen, a Shanghai banker, to Washington. Morgenthau was so 
impressed by Chen's economic development plans for China, including 
inflation control, that he beg1an to believe that the United States 
should strengthen China even at the expense of alienating the 
Japanese. 65 By May 1936, the final details had been arranged for a 
monthly silver purchase program. The United States Treasury 
undertook to furnish the Chinese with $20 million against a deposit 
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of fifty million ounces of silver. In order to avoid difficulties 
with the State Department, the agreement was signed on behalf of the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Treasury. In addition, 
Morgenthau arranged with Chen to buy seventy-five million ounces of 
silver from China on a monthly basis. In this way, as Robert Dallek 
says "Because the Chinese agreed to use the proceeds strictly for 
currency stabilization, not for military ends, and because the State 
Department did not think it would offend the Japanese, Morgenthau 
was able to purchase 175 million ounces of Chinese silver during the 
next fifteen months. 11 66 In evaluating the effects of this silver 
purchase, Dorothy Borg finds: "A way had been found to repair some 
of the damage inflicted on China by our silver purchasing program 
while keeping Far Eastern policy intact. Every effort was made to 
furnish China with assistance in a manner that would not violate the 
spirit of the Arnau Doctrine to minimize the importance of Chen-
Morgenthau agreement. 11 67· 
In 1935 and 1936 the complex political situations in both China 
and the U.S. caused United States leaders to follow confused 
policies. During 1935 and the first half of 1936, the Japanese 
increased their hegemony over many parts of China. Lack of unity in 
China and weak Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression caused the 
United States to follow a passive policy, which was a logical 
,, 
response to existing conditions. These conditions, however, were 
not necessarily a long-run basis for inaction.68 In fact the United 
States faced a dilemma in its relations with China. On one hand, 
American officials feared giving the impression that the U.S. lacked 
friendly sympathy for China; on the other hand, they wanted to avoid 
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expressing sympathy in a manner which might lead the Chinese to 
expect more support from the United States than they were inclined 
to give.69 
Despite its inability to resist Japan effectively, the Chinese 
achieved a remarkable change in the overall domestic situation by 
mid-1937. The central government under Chiang Kai-shek established 
firm control over additional provinces, repelled the Japanese attack 
on Suiyuan, and suppressed the Japanese backed Inner Mongols. While 
the Sian incident, where some Chinese warlords imprisoned Chiang, 
led to the creation of a united front, the Nationalists' influence 
increased dramatically. Economically, with the Silver Purchasing 
Program of the United States as Frederick C. Adams notes, "the 
monetary reform was successful; it provided the central government 
with a financial mechanism to aid in unification, and it promoted 
stable exchange rates which eased the country's balance of payments 
problem." The improved financial situation enabled the Nanking 
government to make s_ignificant strides in settling defaulted 
debts.70 The Kuomintang also drew up a number of plans to foster 
growth in industry, transportation, and agricult~re.71 Ambassador 
Nelson Johnson's account concerning these developments became 
important in the formation of: United States policy. "China", he 
said, "had entered a new era of economic development"; the National 
•I 
government was "pursuing its program of economic reconstruction on 
all fronts, agriculture, industrial, and communications."72 All 
these development initiatives provided new optimism and 
encouragement for American businessmen and financiers. Private 
American economic interest groups also believed that "the successful 
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conclusion of these economic plans would provide a check on 
Japanese expansion by promoting political stability in China. 73 
Among the private American economic interest groups, the National 
Foreign Trade Council, the Pacific Foreign Trade Council and the 
different oil companies deserve mention. In 1935, the National 
Foreign Trade Council's economic mission to the Far East recommended 
that the "American government cooperate with U.S. businesses in 
competition with foreign firms. 11 74 
Despite their renewed enthusiasm, the American firms and 
commercial companies, however, were reluctant to invest in China 
because the U.S. government failed to guarantee their capital 
investments. As Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper indicated, 
European governments took the risk of guaranteeing their nationals' 
investments, and he suggested that Washington should asswne "such 
risks in line with the policies of what other governments were 
doing. ,.75 
Meanwhile, Chinese repayment bahavior toward outstanding 
European liablities continued to be an impediment. The Chinese 
government for instance, repaid its old debts to.Great Britain by 
floating bonds in the United Kingdom. This 'rob Peter to pay Paul' 
method only "reinforced the skeptism of financial groups, and made 
it difficult for Washington to promise the diplomatic and financial 
•I 
support desired by private U.S. interests.76 
The Chinese government adopted some practical measures to 
encourage American financial groups to invest in China. It refunded 
U.S .. financial interests for the HuKuang Railway loans, the Chicago 
Bank loan, and the Pacific Development Corporation loan.77 Nanking 
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also promised elasticity in their economic policy for American 
financiers in the field of heavy industries. 
Private U.S. companies had a long history of failing efforts to 
get the co-operation of the State Department in their attempts to 
trade in China. As early as 1934, the State Department rejected the 
American Foreign Trade Council's demand to establish a syndicate of 
American firms interested in doing business in China. It also 
wanted the creation of an American bank supported by the U.S. 
government to finance investment in heavy industries in China. 
Undeterred by the State Department's indifference, the National 
Foreign Trade Council organized an American Economic Mission to the 
Far East headed by W. Cameron Forbes in March 1935, to go to China 
to investigate the investment opportunities.78 After an extensive 
tour throughout China, Forbes was convinced that China was 
experiencing an "Economic Renaissance," and he proposed the 
estblishment of a China Credit Corporation.79 Forbes, along with 
Lamont, tried to co~vince the big U.S. enterprises to invest money 
in China, and requested that the State Department take measures to 
ensure American economic interests in the Far East. Forbes' efforts 
ended in failure. 
The Chinese government continued to seek American financial 
assistance. In February, 1937, the Chinese Ministry of Railways 
•I 
requested aid from Warren L. Pierson·, President of the Export-
Import Bank, to purchase of railroad equipment. Ambassador Nelson 
Johnson forwarded the request. His Commercial Attache' in Changhai, 
Julean Arnold, maintained that the United States could meet China's 
increasing demand for capital goods by extending credit. Arnold 
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further suggested that Washington examine European financial 
mechanisms as a model for future Sino-American trade relations. 80 
A. Bland Calder, the Assistant Commercial Attache' in Shanghai, 
however, "recommended that the formation of a Commission under the 
auspices of the Export-Import Bank with the collaboration of 
officers from the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and 
Agriculture. By creating a united front of American interests and 
by developing a sound loan policy, the Commission would go a long 
way toward controlling the terms of proposed transactions. 81 Willys 
Peck also supported the attache's arguments. But Ambassador Johnson 
argued against endorsement of the Calder idea. As long as the 
"urge to see American products in China was not compelling enough to 
justify a Commission, he saw no need for one. 118 2 The Commission was 
never approved, and Chinese aid requests followed traditional 
patterns until the Second World War brought new needs. 
Meanwhile, important initiatives came from the Export-Import 
Bank. In 1936, the Bank received several applications for assistance 
to develop the Chinese railways. To investigate the potentiality of 
the China market, Pierson decided to visit China in March, 1937. 
Upon his arrival he travelled extensively throughout China and like 
Cameron Forbes he talked with leading businessmen, officials and 
political leaders. He was so impressed by Chiang's policy of peace 
., 
toward Japan, and also by the possiblity of economic benefit through 
participation in the Chinese economic development program, that he 
recommended "the Export-Import Bank assist in financing the sale of 
approximately forty American locomotives to the Chinese Ministry of 
Railways. 1183 Although Pierson agreed with Ambassador Johnson that 
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there was no need for a Credit Commission, his observations of 
China's imports and other facts led him to conclusions about a 
potential Chinese market that were close to those of Calder and 
Arnold. Besides granting credit, Pierson suggested planning to 
promote American business interests and to promote the Export-Import 
Bank's active participation in China's economic development. 84 In 
order to encourage leading American financiers to invest in China, 
A. Bland Calder prepared a long study of China's financial 
situation, and officials of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce in Washington mailed copies of Calder's findings to 
different banks and companies, thus, helping to "acquaint important 
segments of the business and financial communities with the 
expanding opportunities in China. 11 85 
The visit of Chinese Finance Minister Kung to the United States 
in June, 1937 opened further co-operation between the United States 
and China. On different occasions, Kung urged increased American 
investment in China. Many leading financiers like E.P. Thomas 
agreed to co-operate with China, and even Pierson hinted at larger 
co-operation by the Export-Import Bank with enthusiastic U.S. 
financiers.8 6 Furthermore, President Roosevelt wanted to "go the 
limit" in helping China, and·,Morgenthau again arranged to purchase 
62 million ounces of Chinese silver at 45 cents an ounce on the 
condition that Kung buy gold ·~ith the proceeds.87 The Treasury 
Department granted a $50 million loan to China. But Kung failed to 
get a purchasing offer of another $50 million from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. The Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 
1937 precipitated large scale war between China and Japan. It made 
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American businessmen suspicious about investment potential in China. 
Yet this period from 1936 to 1937 marked a breakthrough in private 
U.S. co-operation with China. 
Before the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan 
in July 1937, the activities of the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the 
Treasury Department had convinced the FDR administration that many 
measures which strengthened the Nationalists would help them 
withstand Japanese pressure. American policy-makers had begun to 
think that they had discovered a definitive way to solve the Far 
Eastern crisis, which in the past had eluded them: "a Chinese 
government that would unify the country without endangering the 
rights of foreign nations. 11 88 Although the response of the American 
private sector to investment in China remained disappointing, the 
idea of a strong unified China guaranteeing peace in the Far East 
impressed American officials---so much so that their fear that steps 
to support the Kuomintang would alienate Japan was largely overcome. 
Thus, just before the Marco-Polo Bridge incident, the State, 
Treasury and Commerce Departments had reached a consensus regarding 
the position of China in American foreign policy, The outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War, however, far from encouraging the U.S. 
government to implement its new consensus, renewed confusion and 
revived timidity. Not until after the outbreak of the European War 
did any substantial assistance reach China from the United States. 
In reality, the Sino-Japanese War that began in July, 1937 was 
the culmination of the War of 1931, The Fumimaro Konoye Cabinet, 
which was completely under the control of the Japanese Army, 
desperately wanted to get out of their China commitment by bringing 
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about a complete defeat of the Chinese Nationalist government. The 
Japanese were also afraid of the "United Front" of the communists 
and nationalists. Japan wanted to impose truce terms on China which 
would virtually separate the northern provinces from the rest of the 
country. Chiang Kai-shek refused to accept these Japanese 
conditions. Although the Chinese army offered a vigorous resistance, 
the Japanese army overran Peking on July 25th, and within a few 
months Japan's army overran most of northern China, the coastal 
areas, and major river ports.89 
The first U.S. response to the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-41 
"reflected the deep neutralist and pacifist mood that had captured 
the country after the disillusioning experience of the world's 
failure to stop Japan in Manchuria. 11 90 On July 12, 1937, the 
Chinese government asked Great Britain and the United States to 
mediate the crisis, and on the 13th, a British memorandum to the 
State Department urged a unified Western approach to Tokyo. 91 Hull 
drafted his reply in consultation with financial adviser Norman 
Davis, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Hornbeck, 
politely rejecting London's suggestion of joint mediation. In his 
reply to British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay, Hull claimed, 
" ... cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more 
effective and less likely ~o have an effect the opposite of that 
desired than would joint or id~ntical representations. 11 92 Most 
probably, Hull's reply was influenced by the failure of British-
American co-operation during the Manchurian Crisis. 
To avoid U.S. involvement in the conflict, Hull simply urged 
Japan and China to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner. On 
40 
July 16. 1937, Hull clarified U.S. policy by issuing a public 
statement which admonished all nations to adhere to international 
treaties and commit themselves to the principles of peace and non-
aggression.93 Although Hull's statement was well received both at 
home and abroad, it had no positive influence on events in the Far 
East. Former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson advised Hull that 
the situation in the Far East needed more "than even such a powerful 
moral appeal as yours". Favoring a stronger American action to bring 
an end to the Sino-Japanese conflict, Stimson wrote Hull that 
"Japan's present attempt on China cannot be taken as less serious, 
or fundamental, than the attacks of the Mongol invaders upon the 
civilization of Europe fifteen centuries ago. 11 94 
Stanley K. Hornbeck also increasingly sought a stronger U.S. 
response. He suggested that the administration wait on developments 
as it was reluctant to use force or apply economic sanctions against 
Japan. He also advocated a naval expansion program.9 5 Until mid-
1938 Hornbeck believed that U.S. economic sanctions against Japan 
would be more successful than economic aid to China, and he warned 
the Chinese Ambassador C.T. Wang, in early Augus~ 1937 not to expect 
aid. He also opposed taking the lead in invoking the Nine-Power 
Treaty.96 
Meanwhile Japan extended the war by occupying more territory in 
•I 
China. In August, serious battles took place in and around 
Shanghai. During this time, isolationist leaders in Congress 
strongly demanded withdrawal of American troops from the American 
Legation, recall of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet from China, and 
that civilians be advised to leave or remain at their own risk.97 
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On the other hand, Hull, Hornbeck and other officials were in favor 
of sending more Marines to China to protect the lives and property 
of Americans. Under these pressures, FDR on September 5, 1937, in a 
news conference told reporters that instructions had been given to 
Americans in China to leave or to remain "at their own risk. 1198 
The Roosevelt administration also faced the problem of invoking 
the recently enacted neutrality laws in the Far East. In May, 1937, 
Congress passed the third or "permanent" neutrality Act, which gave 
the executive branch the power to determine whether or not a state 
of war existed. It required a mandatory and impartial embargo of 
arms and ammunition, excluding raw materials. It also placed a ban 
on loans, except short term commercial credit, to all belligerents 
once a state of war was recognized.9 9 Since the war was still 
undecided by both powers, and China would suffer more from such 
action than would Japan, which did not need American arms, the FDR 
administration did not want to invoke this Act. In the middle of 
September, FDR issued an order which prohibited merchant ships owned 
by the U.S. government from carrying arms, ammunition or implements 
of war to either China or Japan until further no~ice. Private 
vessels were allowed to do so, but only at their own risk.100 The 
President also declared his intent to invoke the neutrality policy 
on a twenty-four-hour basis if it was needed. America's passive 
•I 
attitude towards Japan was shown again when FDR's.administration 
refused to approve the use of economic sanctions against Japan at 
the Brussels Conference in October and November of 1937. General 
trade with Japan continued without any interruption. Japan imposed a 
blockade along China's coastline and hampered the Nationalist 
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regime's normal trade relations with the outside world. The Panay 
incident, where Japan sank a small US Navy green boat, led to the 
withdrawal of some part of the U.S. marines from China. The effects 
of the Sino-Japanese War, congressional isolationism, and U.S. 
government inaction on China were catastrophic. "Suffering mounting 
losses on the battlefield and with little likelihood of foreign 
assistance, China seemed on the threshold of defeat," Michael 
Schaller writes.101 
Some U.S. actions, however, did indirectly benefit China. 
Towards the end of 1937, the United States provided China with a 
limited amount of financial assistance. Morgenthau continued to buy 
silver from China which helped to stabilize the currency, thus 
avoiding monetary fluctuation and associated political troubles.102 
Moreover, by refusing to invoke Neutrality Act, FDR in fact enabled 
the Chinese to continue their trade with America based on commercial 
credit basis rather than on cash which clearly China could not 
afford. 
The "quarantine speech" of FDR in Chicago on October 5, 1937, 
was another precautionary warning against Japanese aggression. In 
this speech, FDR's recommendation that "'peace-loving nations 
isolate aggressor state~" formed the background for imposing a trade 
embargo on Japan.102 Moreover, the FDR administration was also able 
to get congressional approval in the spring of 1938 for a long range 
rearmament program for the Army and Navy at an expense of eight 
billion dollars.104 
The United States government's attitude toward China, too, 
gradually began to change. The news of Japanese atrocities in China 
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and the continuous Japanese attacks on American lives and property 
shocked the American public. "The terror attacks on Shanghai and 
Nanking, civilian targets", Michael Schaller insists, "outraged a 
generation of Americans not yet immune to total warfare." Moreover, 
the Japanese policy of aggression in China apparently reflected a 
determination to control all Asia and the Pacific.lOS Third, in the 
mid 1930's Germany became a threat to the British, French, and 
Dutch. In the event of a new European war, China and the United 
States would be left as the "two major sources of power which might 
resist Japan". Thus it became necessary to revitalize China's 
capacity to resist Japan. In this way, as 1938 passed, slowly "the 
outline of a new policy appeared, one predicated on the maintenance 
of a pro-American China which might be a bulwark against Japan. 11106 
Economic aid offered the hope of achieving this goal. Moreover, 
during this time, the fear of losing China either to Japan or to 
Moscow, which meant total elimination of Western interests in China, 
also motivated U.S .. policy.107 
Meanwhile, Japanese atrocities, such as the rape of Nanking 
also created widespread resentment in the U.S. administration. 
After the Panay incident, Japanese attacks on American lives and 
property became common. Many'Americans became incensed when 
newspapers reported the brutal conduct of the Japanese army. "Some 
individuals began to question the validity of isolationism, and a 
few wondered if their government should take action to restrain 
Japan before she destroyed all American interests and rights in 
Eastern Asia". In the Spring of 1938, The U.S. State Department 
received many letters concerning Japanese brutalities in China which 
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"asked for an embargo on scrap iron and steel, oil, gas, airplanes, 
and other munitions to Japan. 11 108 Other sources like a poll in The 
Nation document a similar, but still limited, shift in the U.S. 
public opinion.109 
During this time, Stanley K. Hornbeck realized that the 
Japanese political machine was fully under the control of 
militarists and that there was no hope for civilian moderates to 
gain the upper hand. What was needed was to stop the aggression 
from outside. But the U.S. administration still could not go 
against an apathetic public opinion. Therefore, from the beginning 
of 1938, Hornbeck devoted himself to the formation of public opinion 
in favor of stronger action against Japan. Under his influence, a 
young economist, Elliot Janeway, published two articles in Harper's 
Magazine and in Asia.l09 They were Hornbeck's trial balloons. 
Janeway tried to show that the United States was enabling Japan 
to continue her aggression in China by supplying 75% of her oil and 
steel, and also by providing heavy industrial goods like machine 
tools and lubricating oil. By supporting Japan's war efforts, 
Janeway insisted that the United States was in fact increasing a 
menace to her national interests. 11 111 In conclusion, he demanded an 
embargo. Again, with Hornbeck's encouragement "The American 
Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression" was formed 
under the Chairmanship of Roger S. Green. Harry Price, who had 
taught in several Chinese universities, became the real founder and 
organizer of the committee.112 The Price Committee adopted 
elaborate statements and carried out campaigns "to crystallize 
public demand and support for governmental action, both executive 
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and legislative action, designed to check American war material 
shipments to Japan. 11 113 Meariwhile, returning Americans from China 
began forming their own pressure groups to aid Nationalist China. 114 
Japanese aggression in China deeply affected the American business 
community also. In its occupied territories in China, Japan 
attempted to establish its own economic monopolies in violation of 
the Open Door doctrine. The Standard Oil Company lost its profitable 
trade in the Yangtze Valley area when Japan closed the river to 
commercial shipping. In Inner Mongolia, Japan attempted to 
establish an oil monopoly of its own in June, 1938. "Although they 
carried the trade in China till 1941, Standard, Asiatic, and the 
Texas Company had to endure difficulties in 'obtaining foreign 
exchange, problems with military permits for inland shipments, 
restrictive local quotas, price fixing designed to favor Japanese 
firms, and a host of other bureaucratic irritants. 11 115 ·American 
businessmen began to look upon Japan's expansionist program as a 
threat to "America's security", and "businessmen not only become 
champions of preparedness, but they argued that their leadership was 
indispensable in preparing America for war. 11 116 
The Japanese attack on China also affected missionary interests 
and attitudes in both China and Japan. In Japan, missionaries were 
harrassed by the Army. On, the other hand, missionaries from China 
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sent letters to the Department of State, to newspapers, and church 
organizations in which they demanded a consumer boycott of Japanese 
goods in America, and institution of an embargo on the selling of 
war materials to Japan. These steps, it was claimed, "would force 
her to abandon her invasion of China in quick order. 11 117 By a 
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gradual process, American public opinion turned against Japan. This 
change in the normally isolationist temper of the American people 
held specific foreign policy implications. In Washington, Hornbeck 
and others outlined two broad policy options against Japan; either 
impose an embargo on Japan or aid China. In Tokyo, Ambassador Joseph 
C. Grew vigorously objected to the first approach when Hornbeck 
contacted him. As Secretary of State Hull supported Grew's 
objection, Hornbeck and his faction opted for the second 
alternative. It was the perceived shift in U.S. public opinion 
which made either alternative possible. Continuing Japanese 
expansion made an aid program to China inevitable.llS 
In light of Hull's and Grew's opposition to economic sanctions 
against Japan, Hornbeck opted for economic aid to China. Here he 
was joined by other policymakers, such as Henry Morgenthau Jr., 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and, Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson. Stimson apparently convinced FDR of the necessity for 
stronger measures against Japanese aggresssion. In October 1937, 
Stimson had appealed for governmental action to ban trade with 
Japan. Meanwhile, U.S. officials in China also a,dvocated U.S. 
economic aid to that country. Furthermore, Admiral Henry Yarnell, 
the Commander-in-chief of the' U.S. Asiatic fleet, added his weight 
to giving China aid. Yarnell was fully convinced that Japan was a 
,, 
threat to the U.S. For a time, these arguments were blocked by the 
State Department.119 Chinese representatives were despairing of any 
change. Since the beginning of the war Chinese diplomats in London 
and Washington had tried to get financi~l assistance but without 
success. The Soviet Union was the first country to grant economic 
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and military aid to China.120 In the United States, Hull and other 
high officials in the State Department vigorously opposed any 
economic aid to China. Morgenthau's silver purchasing effort, 
however, continued and in the first year of the Sino-Japanese War, 
America bought a total of 312 million ounces of Chinese silver for 
the price of $138,000,00Q.121 
In March, 1938, China requested a loan of $10,000,000 from the 
New York Bankers Trust Company. But when company officials asked 
the attitude of the State Department, Hornbeck, under Hull's 
instructions, rejected the idea of the U.S. government taking 
responsibility for such a transaction. After having failed to get 
the support of the State Department, the Bankers Trust Company 
refused to grant a loan to China.122 Deterred by the State 
Department, the frustrated Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih again called 
on Hornbeck and requested even a token loan, which he thought 
would at least bolster Chinese morale.123 
Hull remained adamant about economic aid to China. In May, 
1938, China attempted to buy a thousand trucks from the Chrysler 
Corporation which she hoped to finance with a loan from the Export-
Import Bank. Hornbeck supported the project as a "sound business 
deal," and urged that for Ame'rica' s own interests' China should be 
aided against Japan.124 But Hull vetoed the project, despite the 
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willingness of Warren L. Pierson, President of the Export-Import 
Bank to co-operate with the Chinese.125 
The international military situation however, continued to 
deteriorate. The success of German Jingoism, militant expansionism, 
influenced Japan to carry out more vigorous attacks on China, and 
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the Japanese captured Nanking and threatened the KMT's control over 
Canton and Hankow. The fall of Nationalist China seemed imminent. 
When in August, 1938, Hu Shih called on Hornbeck and requested a $32 
million loan for buying wheat and cotton goods, Hull did not give 
any commitment to the Ambassador but agreed to explore the 
possibility of a loan.126 Under Hull's instructions, Hornbeck soon 
met with the Export-Import Bank President and discussed ways to aid 
China. Pierson, already convinced, readily declared his readiness 
to grant a political loan to China. Jesse Jones, Chairman of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation also expressed willingness to co-
operate with the State Department on this issue.127 Despite 
Morgenthau and Hornbeck's support for this plan, as Kenneth McCarty 
notes, "Hull.and many of his advisors continued to oppose a loan to 
China for they did not want to take sides in the conflict and run 
the risk of Japanese retaliation. 11 128 
The next request to grant aid to China came from William C. 
Bullitt, U.S. Ambassador to France and a longtime friend of FDR. In 
order to overcome Hull's opposition, both Stanley K. Hornbeck and 
Henry Morgenthau Jr., contacted Bullitt who was to convince 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. While travelling in Europe, 
Morgenthau discussed with Bullitt the question of granting a loan to 
China in July, 1938. In August, Bullitt urged the president to 
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grant China a loan of $100 million to buy flour and cotton goods in 
the United States. Bullitt assured FDR that a loan to China by the 
U.S. would influence Britain and France to take similar action.129 
Bullitt's advice, according to Morgenthau, caused Roosevelt to 
instruct the Treasury Department to push the question of U.S. 
49 
economic assistance in the sale of flour and grain goods to the 
Chinese government with the Departments of State and Agriculture and 
even with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank.130 Hull had opposed 
such a deal unless an identical offer was made to Japan. However FDR 
postponed a final decision about the loan until the arrival of a 
group of Chinese financiers who had been invited to confer with 
officials in the Treasury Department.131 
Again, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau took the lead 
in aiding China. He was extremely eager to do something to help 
China, as he understood that the Silver Purchasing Program was not 
adequate and China's silver supply was nearly exhausted. Morgenthau 
realised that China needed large amounts of credit to buy strategic 
materials.132 While in France, in early August, 1938, Morgenthau 
"suggested to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris that the Chinese 
government should send K.P. Chen to Washington" to discuss trade 
credits.133 When the Chinese delegation headed by K.P. Chen came to 
Washington in late August, 1938, Morgenthau argued that this 
"mission represented the last opportunity to keep the Western 
Pacific from being. completely dominated by Japan. 11 134 
Upon his arrival Chen met Morgenthau and demanded an immediate 
substantive cash loan to prevent the collapse of the Chinese 
resistance.135 After a long negotiation in late September, 1938, 
Henry Morgenthau and K.P.Chen worked out a plan to secure a loan 
from the Export-Import Bank. The credit was to be arranged on future 
shipment of tung oil (used in varnish and paint) from China.136 The 
amount of the credit was to be $25 million. The actual cash would 
so 
be given to the Universal Trading Corporation(UTC), to buy American 
trucks, oil products, and essential commodities,137 Tung oil sales 
would extend over a period of five years, but in order to meet the 
immediate needs of China, the Treasury Department proposed that the 
Export-Import Bank loan China 50% of the value of the oil 
immediately. After finishing the details of the loan, Morgenthau 
presented it to the President who asked the State Department's 
opinion, Both Secretary of State Hull and Far Eastern Division head 
Maxwell Hamilton opposed the project on the ground that it would 
antagonize Japan and might gradually lead the United States into 
war. Moreover, Hull believed that the proposed loan to China might 
invoke a hostile reaction from isolationists in the Congress and was 
a technical violation of the neutrality laws. On the other hand, 
Hamilton opposed the project as impractical and unsound from a 
business point of view.138 
Hull, however, allowed Hornbeck to present a dissenting opinion 
to the President. In his memorandum of November 14, 1938, Hornbeck 
persuasively argued that this tung oil credit to China would be the 
first step in a "diplomatic war plan" against Japan's "predatory 
imperialism." Hornbeck further claimed that if Japan was not 
stopped in China, the United 1States would soon be facing Tokyo's 
forces closer to home. Hornbeck mentioned that in order to continue ,, 
their resistance against the Japanese, the Chinese desperately 
needed supplies like arms, "and to get this they must have money or 
credits .... Better to have Chinese soldiers continue to fight Japan 
and to take now the small risk of an attack by the Japanese upon 
ourselves than to take the risk of a stronger Japan, a Japan 
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dominated'and using the resources(including manpower) of China in 
support of her onward march of conquest. 11 139 
Despite Hornbeck's forceful arguments, Secretary of State Hull, 
as usual, remained unconvinced. But other factors forced the 
administration to consider the matter of financing China's 
resistance. As Schaller puts it, "Morgenthau's lobbying efforts, 
Hornbeck' s supports for the 'project, and the American shock at the 
recent dismemberment of Czechoslovakia consequent to the Munich 
agreement all magnified the importance surrounding the argument over 
whether to grant China economic credits." Moreover, Schaller also 
mentions that the news of Soviet Union's aid to China made 
Morgenthau and other high ranking officials worried about possible 
Soviet Communist influence in China.140 They did not want to see 
China dominated by the Soviet Union. 
Japan's military operations proved another factor in bringing a 
change in the FDR administration's attitude. As Japan blocked the 
Chinese coastal areas and controlled almost all her seaports, China 
was left with only three routes to maintain her contact with the 
outside world. One was the Old Silk -Route which runs from north-
west China into Russia, and very little American aid could be sent 
through this route. The second one was a railroad from the Port of 
Haiphong through Indo-China into South-Western China, which the 
•I 
Japanese could stop at any time. The third one was the 650 mile-long 
Burma-Yunnan Highway, which was not yet completed. As China's 
seaports were occupied by Japan and air transport was not 
sufficient, China became entirely dependent on supplies over these 
three routes by truck. Thus China needed adequate truck supplies, 
52 
spare parts, gasoline, and lubricating oil, and Chen's mission was 
to obtain American technical and material assistance for the 
development of China's truck transportation network.141 Japanese 
activities in China further aggravated the situation. On November 3, 
1938, shortly after the Munich settlement in Europe, the Japanese 
government issued a statement by which Japan sought to establish a 
new order in East Asia and declared its foundation to be the 
"tripartite relation of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, 
'Manchukuo' ·and China in political, economic, cultural and other 
fields". Other powers were called upon to understand correctly 
Japan's aim and to adapt their attitude to the new conditions in 
East Asia.142 
This Japanese move evoked strong rejoinders from the United 
States, Britain, and France. In parallel but independent actions, 
the communications of the three governments which were addressed to 
Tokyo separately were alike in challenging and repudiating Japan's 
pretension of a Pax Japonica and reasserted that international 
relations in the Far East must continue to be governed by the terms 
of existing treaties.143 However, these protest~ failed to produce 
any positive results in favor of maintaining the Open Door policy in 
China. As one historian F. C. ·Adams noted, "with this declaration, 
Japan issued an outright challenge to the historic Far Eastern 
•! 
policy of· the U.S. If American leaders acquiesced in the Japanese 
demands, the American interests in East Asia would fall under the 
control of Japan. 11 144 This declaration of a New order in East Asia 
was again followed by Japanese military victories in Hankow and 
Canton. During this time, the Chinese officials were so desperate 
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for American aid that the U.S. Naval attache at Nanking, James 
McHugh, was informed by the Chinese that Chiang might have to come 
to an understanding with Japan.145 It prompted the FDR 
administration to take a prompt measure in extending the credit to 
China. Hull, however, remained adamant. 
Morgenthau again made efforts to get FDR's approval for the 
tung oil project. An opportunity appeared to Morgenthau when Hull 
departed for the Lima Conference and left Under Secretary Sumner 
Welles in charge of the State Department in late November, 1938. 
Under an arrangement whereby Morgenthau agreed to help Welles with 
certain problems in Cuban-American relations, Welles promised to 
talk to the president about the Chinese situation. After he met FDR, 
Welles advised Morgenthau that the deal would go through.146 On 
November 30, 1938, under the joint endorsement of Morgenthau and 
Sumner Welles, FDR gave his oral approval for the credits.147 
Morgenthau later commented about this victory over Hull that the 
State Department "blocked it for months but I got the thing all 
cooked up ... We waited until Hull got on the boat for Rio and one 
week out the president said, 'Yes' . 11 148 Despite Hull's absence, 
the State Department threw up as many road blocks as possible. After 
giving his consent, FDR left Washington for Hyde Park. During this 
time the State Department objected on the ground that the project 
-
involved the cooperation of the Chinese and the American governments 
to create a virtual monopoly on tung oil exports, which might 
violate the Nine-Power Treaty and the Sino-American Treaty of 
1844. 149 In order to overcome this objection, Morgenthau arranged 
to keep both governments out of the contract and to have the 
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contract provide for the purchase of only that proportion of China's 
tung oil production which the U.S. had purchased in 1937. A final 
complication arose on December 4 when Hull indicated that he could 
not approve the proposed transaction by sending a telegram to Swnner 
Welles from on board S.S. Santa Clara.150 
On his return to Washington, FDR gave formal approval to the 
deal despite Hull's objections. On December 13, the Export-Import 
Bank agreed to extend a credit of $25 million to the UTC with the 
understanding that China would repay the credit over a five-yaer 
period from the proceeds of the sales. On December 15, the RFC 
issued a press release announcing the agreement as a commercial 
transaction.151 On December 19th, Morgenthau extended the 
arrangements of July 9, 1937, which allowed the Central Bank of 
China to obtain dollar exchange for stabilization purposes beyond 
December 31, 1938, and thus was able slightly to supplement the swn 
for China.152 
The year 1938 marked the turning point in America's policy 
toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. Although the extension of a 
twenty-five million dollar credit to China was not itself a 
significant measure, it was the beginning of U.S. determination to 
restrain Japan by strengthe~ing China. The credit's importance 
"both material and symbolic far transcended its face value. 11153 In 
•I 
fact, this.commitment to China also represented "the first material 
pressure which the U.S. government took in its attempt to restrain 
the post-1937 Japanese expansion and thereby to safeguard American 
interests in China. 11 154 The American government's decision to 
extend credit to China also influenced other countries to assist 
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China. On December 20th, 1938, the British government granted a 
LS00,000 Sterling credit to China. 
Although Japan reacted angrily to this new American measure, 
from the Chinese point of view, the tung oil credit strengthened 
China by providing funds for her transportation network and 
bolstered Chinese morale which to Ambassador Nelson Johnson, "was at 
an all time high," Nelson doubted that, due to the presence of this 
high morale, Japan ·"would be able to complete the conquest of 
China. 11 155 It also led the Chinese to expect more and more credit 
in future, and encouraged the development of a manipulative attitude 
toward the United States. One Chinese negotiator informed H.H. Kung 
that "the $25 million is only the beginning ... Further large sums can 
be expected ... This is a political loan ... America has definitely 
thrown in her lot and cannot withdraw ... Our political outlook is now 
brighter. 11 156 The signing of the tung oil credit agreement with 
China was followed by an increasing eagerness of the FDR 
administration to grant further economic aid to China. Factors 
including the shifting military balance in Europe, the outbreak of 
the Second World War, Japan's forward march into South East Asia, 
and China's capacity to manipulate the Washington political 
situation greatly contributed' to this change in American policy 
toward China. 
As the Japanese advance continued, a few officials in 
Washington advocated financial assistance to China. In two 
memoranda Hornbeck tried to prove that China, with all its 
resources, was strategically important as the key to South East 
Asia. To preserve U.S. and Western control over Asian resources 
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Hornbeck urged the administration to resist increasing Japanese 
pressure on China at all costs. He advocated an embargo on Japan as 
a proper way to achieve that objective.157 Supporting him, John 
Carter Vincent of the Far East Division presented a memorandum to 
Hornbeck in which Carter urged the maintenance of an independent 
China from both the control of either Japan or the Soviet Union by 
increasing economic aid.158 Nelson T. Johnson held a similar 
opinion. While in Washington for a brief visit in February 1939, 
the Ambassador urged the President to play a stronger role in order 
to preserve civilization from the destructive forces of 
dictatorship. To Johnson, the U.S. had to do what it can to "assist 
and encourage the Chinese in their fight for an independent national 
existence."159 From the Treasury Department, Morgenthau's aide 
Harry D. White favored a credit of US $35 million based on future 
Chinese tin exports to the U.S., which he believed "would materially 
strengthen her staying power against Japan, decrease her dependence 
upon Russian assistance."160 White also believed that this loan 
would insure all "reconstruction war" and trade with postwar 
China.161 What White actually meant was that this loan would be the 
beginning of a U.S. commitment for China's post-war reconstruction, 
and this would ultimately opeh China's vast market to American trade 
because China would be virtually dependent on U.S. supplies. 
Despite strong pressure from within the administration in favor 
of assisting China, Morgenthau found it impossible to shake 
Secretary Hull out of his fear of further antagonizing Japan.162 
Even FDR did not dare to grant a new loan to China. Because the 
presidential election of 1940 was approaching, Roosevelt did not 
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like to challenge the isolationists in the Congress and to engage in 
what they would definitely regard 'as warmongering' ,163 
But the changing international perspective and Japan's 
activities made inevitable another loan to China. Public opinion 
began to urge pressure in favor of a sanction against Japan, and in 
July, 1939, the State Department finally gave a six months notice 
about the abrogation of the commercial treaty of 1911. The Chinese 
meanwhile were not idle. K.P. Chen who was still in the U.S. to 
help with the operation of the 1938 credit, in October, 1939, under 
H. H. Kung's direction asked the U.S. for a loan of $75 million to 
be based on future tin exports. Negotiations moved slowly because 
the Chinese were asking for far more than the Export-Import Bank was 
authorized to loan to any country.164 This impasse was at last 
overcome when the news of the establishment of a Japanese puppet 
regime in China reached Washington. On March 30, 1940, Wang Ching 
Wei finally established a Japanese front government with its capital 
at Nanking.165 Thus, there remained practically "no hope of Japan 
ever agreeing to reach a settlement with [the] ChungKing regime. 11166 
Both FDR and Hull realized the need to support Ch~ang against the 
Japanese puppet Wang. Meanwhile Hornbeck suggested two 
possibilities to Hull- - "economic retaliation against Japan" and 
"economic assistance to China. 11 167 Hull again showed his resistance 
to sanctions. He was finally convinced by Hornbeck to support a 
loan to China. In March, 1940, Congress authorized a twenty million 
dollar loan for China, and the agreement which Morgenthau worked out 
was signed on March 7, 1940. According to its terms, China agreed to 
repay the loan by delivering 40,000 tons of tin to the U.S. for the 
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next seven years. "Far short of China's financial requirement, the 
loan nevertheless gave the Nationalist government encouragement, and 
it enabled the U.S. to stockpile tin, 11 168 as reported in 
Morgenthau's biography. 
The Chinese did get the U.S. as a vast potential source for 
more assistance. Taking advantage of their opportunity, the KMT 
government began manipulating this vast reservoir of generosity by 
artistically presenting their helplessness. As well, Japanese 
activities helped to make easier this Chinese manipulation. After 
signing the second loan agreement in June, 1940, T.V.Soong, Chiang 
Kai-shek's personal envoy to the U.S., asked for a credit of "US $50 
million secured on exports of tungsten to buy non-military goods and 
to improve transit to China11 169. 
Soong presented his case to both State Department and Treasury 
Department officials and talked with both Hornbeck and Morgenthau. 
This time Soong presented a novel triangular scheme. According to 
this proposal, the U.S. should buy certain strategic materials from 
Russia and Russia was to be paid with dollars. Russia would then 
use the funds to provide military aid to China, which the U.S. could 
not do under the neutrality law even though FDR had not invoked it. 
The plan marked an important ·political development, and it seemed 
"to be the first time that Chinese Nationalists attempted to involve 
. 
both Washington and Moscow in a scheme to aid the Nationalists.:170 
Although this proposal was attractive to FDR and Morgenthau, and the 
Russian Ambassador Constantine Oumansky showed interest, Hull and 
Sumner Welles yigorously opposed the suggestion of trading with 
Russia, which was virtually an ally of Germany.171 The U.S.S.R. 
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also declined to carry out a triangle trade deal with China. 
In the middle of 1940, when Western Europe collapsed before 
Germany, and Britain temporarily closed the Burma Road under 
Japanese pressure, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to· FDR and Morgenthau 
that the U.S. accept an economic protectorate over certain parts of 
China and guarantee its protection from Japanese aggression. 
Further, in return for postwar U.S. rights and naval facilities, 
Chiang requested a major supply of planes, large amounts of economic 
aid, and dispatch of military experts to China. "These staggering 
proposals" as Michael Schaller says ... were nonetheless important 
in indicating the direction in which Chinese thought had moved." 
Although the FDR administration rejected this request, it indicated 
the desperate need for military aid to China, and also an attempt to 
obtain a commitment for long-term U.S. involvement in China.172 But 
during this desperate international situation, the U.S. could give 
very little thought to ·its future economic role, vis-a-vis China, 
although it had the desire to do so. Of course Chiang's proposal 
for a protectorate was against recognized U.S. policy toward formal 
imperialism. 
Meanwhile, the efforts for a new loan were going on. This time 
both Hull and Morgenthau cooperated. Hull, while getting tougher 
with the Japanese, was still unwilling to impose an embargo on 
Japan. He found assisting China a rather easier task. With the 
initial approval of FDR for a twenty million dollar credit, Hull 
and Morgenthau arranged with Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones 
to grant China a credit of $25 million. In this way, the third loan 
to China was granted on September 26, 1940. Soong signed for this 
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loan on behalf of the Central Bank of China. This loan was also 
granted by the Export-Import Bank, and was guaranteed by the 
government of China. "Unlike the first two loans, the third loan 
could be used for the purchase of military supplies as well as of 
civilian goods. According to the terms of the contract, China would 
repay the loan in five years by the shipment of tungsten or 
wolfram," an American swnmary stressed.173 
At the time of granting the third loan in September 25, 1940, 
Hull and Morgenthau assured China of future aid. Inspired by this 
indication, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek again immediately asked 
the U.S. for a large amount of military aid. But Chiang's desire 
was more to eliminate the Communists than to fight the Japanese. In 
fact, Chiang.had not gotten along with the Communists since the fall 
of 1938, when he had refused to mobilize the peasants as the 
Communists suggested. Chiang was also afraid of the growing 
Communist strength both.within and behind Japanese-occupied lines. 
The United Front was on the verge of collapse. Chiang was afraid of 
the Communist Red Army and regarded them as China's "disease of the 
heart", while he called the Japanese as a "mere disease of skin." 
By the end of 1940, Chiang was determined to attack and destroy the 
Communist New Fourth Army, south of the Yangtze River. During a 
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson, Chiang expressed 
•I 
his desire for a large loan, one thousand military aircraft, and 
American volunteer pilots, which he believed would enable him to 
deal with China's real enemy, the Communists. As a strong anti-
communist, Chiang believed that this would free himself from being 
dependent on Moscow. Although Johnson was opposed to the plan of 
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Chiang's complete break with the Communists and the Soviet Union, he 
favored a timely aid to China by the U.S. and U.K. without which, he 
believed "may in the end result in communist ascendancy in 
China. 11 174 Whatever may be the case, Japanese recognition of Wang 
Wei Ching's puppet government in late November 1940 prompted Nelson 
to recommend immediate political and financial support to China to 
bolster Chiang and thereby to avoid the imminent collapse of 
ChungKing.175 At this point FDR himself took the initiative. On 
November 29, 1940, FDR phoned Morgenthau to arrange a one hundred 
million dollar loan to China within the next 24 hours.176 
Morgenthau believed he needed time to go before Congress. But under 
Soong's influence both Hull and Welles conferred with Morgenthau and 
arranged for an early announcement without going to the Congress. 177 
Morgenthau resented the way Soong and the other Chinese were 
manipulating the American bureaucracy. In fact, Morgenthau wanted a 
system of supervision over the practical use of American funds going 
to China.178 
On December 1, 1940, the fourth (final pre-Leand-Lease) loan 
was granted to China. It consisted of two separate loans. One 
US$50 million grant was for currency stabilization and was given 
from the Stabilization Fund of the U.S. Treasury, with repayment 
guaranteed by the Chinese government. At the same time, another US 
$50 million was granted by the Export-Import Bank. This loan 
consisted of US $25 million in cash granted to the Central Bank of 
China and US $25 million in credits available to the Universal 
Trading Corporation. The contract for repayment was signed on 
February 4, 1941 and called for shipments of tin, antimony, and 
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tungsten from the National Resource Commission of China to the 
Metals Resource Company. The funds were to be returned in seven 
years from the date of contract.179 
A brief review of events related to the United States economic 
assistance program toward China between 1936 and 1940.indicates that 
there was no systematic U.S. policy toward China and that no one 
person or agency in the FDR administration determined the economic 
aid policy. Morgenthau was the center of efforts within the FDR 
administration to aid Nationalist China, and later he found an ally 
in the State Department's Stanley K. Hornbeck. The State Department, 
however, frustrated most of Morgenthau's plans. Secretary of State 
Hull and Ambassador Joseph C. Grew were the center of a faction 
which opposed.aid to China. As a result, major Departments of the 
U.S. government essentially had two different policies toward China, 
and U.S. policymakers worked at cross purposes. Furthermore, 
American civilian and military planners developed different 
perspectives regarding China. 
Even after the signing of the November 1940 loan agreement 
with China, "lines of authority remained blurred as various agencies 
claimed jurisdiction over setting and implementing policy." The 
resulting confusion both interfered with coherent, long-ranged 
planning and allowed Chinese lobbyists, such as T. V. Soong, to 
manipulate deci,sions _ 180 
,, 
At the end of 1940, President Roosevelt decided to play a more 
direct role in dealing with China's problems. FDR wanted to 
establish central control over China policy. "The president set out 
to forge a tightly administered program designed not only to 
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expedite economic aid but also to transform China into a useful 
military and political ally of the United States. 11181 Developments 
in Europe also prompted FDR to assume more personal control over 
foreign economic aid. Stalin's assault on Finland in late 1939, the 
fall of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and the fall 
of France in June, 1940 to Germany compelled the U.S. to abandon its 
technical neutrality toward Britain in favor of "an unneutrality 
that would bail out Britain. 11 182 After his victory in the elections 
of 1940, FDR had greater freedom of action. Roosevelt proclaimed 
the Lend-Lease policy, using "the analogy of lending a garden hose 
to a neighbor, whose burning house endangers one's own, and then 
expecting it back when the fire is out." Roosevelt proposed to lend 
arms and other assistance directly to those nations resisting 
aggression, purporting to expect the return of this equipment (or 
replacements for it) when the fire was out.183 
In January, 1941, ·Roosevelt introduced the Lend-Lease bill into 
the Congress under the name "An Act further to promote the Defense 
of the United States". The bill aimed at giving the president wide 
discretionary power to grant huge amounts of military aid to defacto 
allies. FDR regarded Lend-Lease as part of a global policy of self-
defense against aggression. 184 Moreover, it also intended "to make 
the White House center of military and economic aid to Great Britain 
•I 
and China", and the president himself could direct the transfer of 
strategic aid directly to allies whose defense the president deemed 
vital to the defense of the United.States.185 In March,1941, 
Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act by an overwhelming majority. 
U.S. aid to China from 1937 to the passage of Lend-Lease sets 
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"We shall send you in ever increasing numbers ships. tank, and gnus. " l're!,ident 
Roosevelt addresses Congress on the State of the ~ation, January 1l. 19~1. and asks 
for legislotion to implement the Lend-Lease idea . 
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Secretary of Stale Cordell Hull tcstilics in s11ppon of the I.en<l -Lca,e Bill , before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 15, 19-tl. 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease~ 
Weapon For Victory 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee hears testimony on the Lend-Lease Act, 
February . 1943. Seated from left to right are: Representatives Charles A. Eaton, 
Edith :--ourse Rogers, Robert B. Chiperfield, John 1\1. Vons, Foster Stearns, Karl E. 
Mundt, Bartel J. Jonkman, Frances P. Bolton (behind Jonkman), Charles L. 
Gerlach, Mike l\lansfield, J. W. Fulbright (hands on forehead) , Will Rogers, Jr., 
Thomas S. Gordon, Herman P. Eberhaner, W. 0. Burgin and Pete Jarman. 
Secretary of War Stimson testifies in favor of the extension of the Lend-Lease Act 
during the hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 8, 1943. 
Left to right: Representative Luther A. Johnson, Secretary Stimson, Chairman Sol 
Bloom and Representative Charles. A. Eaton. 
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the background for Lend-Lease aid, which did not make a radical 
break with previous U.S. policy after 1937. Before the U.S. aid 
policy was caught in a conflict between Cordell Hull on one side who 
wanted not to antagonize Japan, and Henry Morgenthau who wanted to 
aid China even at the risk of alienating Japan. The Marco Polo 
Bridge incident and sinking of the Panay, were pivotal events which 
moved U.S. policy out of the Hull-Morgenthau contradiction to the 
general consensus that the U.S. must support China against Japan in 
1937. The beginning of Lend-Lease aid to China in May, 1941, was 
not a new policy but rather a new comprehensive and conditional 
implementation of the policy to support China against Japan. Also, 
the scope of Lend-Lease far exceeded anything attempted before. The 
Lend-Lease and other aid programs to China which started 
predominantly after Pearl Harbor, were not only intended to 
strengthen Chinese wartime resistance, but also, outlined a major 
post-war economic integrity and reconstruction of China. 
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Chapter Two 
Meeting China's Immediate Needs: Operation of the Civilian Lend-
Lease and Other U.S Financial Assistance to China 1941-1945. 
To implement the concept of America as the "arsenal of 
Democracy"l President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted the Lend-Lease 
Bill to Congres on January 10, 1941. This bill was to provide for 
supplying of goods and services to countries fighting against the 
Axis powers. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
Representatives and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate 
held public hearings in January and February, 1941.2 Probably no 
greater array of ~itnesses ever appeared before a congressional 
committee: the list included Secretary of State Cordell Hull; 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox; Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson; Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., William S. 
Knudsen, Director of Production Management; William C. Bullitt 
former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and then Ambassador to France; 
Joseph P. Kennedy, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to 
Great Britain; and William Green, President of the American 
Federation of Labor. 3 After days of fierce debate, the House of 
Representatives passed the bill on February 8, 1941, by a vote of 
260-165. On March 8, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 60-
31. On March 11, 1941, the President signed the bill into law. 
The Lend-Lease program- initiated by the legislation, faced an 
•I 
immediate desperate crisis. It was one thing to order and arrange 
payment for military supplies sent to Britain and other 
belligerents, but it was something else to produce the goods and 
get that material delivered. To deal with the problem of delivery, 
President Roosevelt, on October 9, 1941, asked Congress to modify 
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the Neutrality Act by repealing sections which prohibited the arming 
of U.S. merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce. Responding to 
the president's appeal, Congress by a joint resolution repealed 
Sections 2,3, and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939, thus permitting 
United States merchant vessels to be armed and defend themselves. 
It paved the way for the U.S. Government to render effective aid to 
those nations which were eligible under the terms of the Lend-Lease 
Act.4 
Unfortunately, little could be done to solve the production 
crisis. For many ~onths, America's promise to become an arsenal 
proved an empty boast. Conversion to wartime production was a slow 
process. The "Act to promote the defense of the United States", as 
the Lend-Lease Act was officially titled, authorized the president 
"to sell, trasfer, title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise 
dispose of defense information to the government of any country 
which he deemed vital to the defense of the United States". Defense 
articles and information were broadly defined to include all types 
of goods like food and non- militry supplies and services necessary 
for the waging of total war. The Act offered the President 
discretionary power to transfer such items on his own terms to 
"deserving" countries. It also required the President to report 
quarterly to congress on the operations of Lend-Lease. Congress 
reserved right t'o withdraw the President's delegated powers. Any 
such exchange in excess of $1.3 billion had to be approved by either 
the US Army Chief of Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations or 
both. This "billion thre·e" clause formed the basis for most of the 
aid in the first few months of activity, even though Congress 
67 
appropriated $7,000,000,000 for it on March 27, 1941. Passage of 
the act, however, could not provide instant aid as it would take 
time to convert policy into war materials.5 
In the beginning, Harry L. Hopkins had the chief responsibility 
for Lend-Lease administration and policy. His staff was taken 
principally from the President's War Department's Liasion Committee 
headed by J. H. Burns. In addition to this staff of fewer than 
twenty people, there were thousands of officials from other 
governmental departments and agencies involved in the operation of 
the program. As Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. ,stated: "The Lend-Lease 
program cut across the entire war effort. It was intimately 
involved with our foreign policy, our defense production, our 
military policy, our naval policy and our foreign policy. 116 The 
Navy, War, and Agriculture Departments later played a major role in 
procurement and supply procedures concerning Lend-Lease goods. 
By the end of summer, 1941, Lend-Lease had emerged as a broad 
and complex program of production and delivery. The administrative 
burden was correspondingly heavy. Besides all the problems of 
production, there were the pressing problems of delivering the goods 
by sea or air to all allied countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America. The Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, 
caused a major revision of the Lend-Lease program, and greatly 
•I 
expanded its horizons.7 
Until August, 1941, Roosevelt personally signed every Lend-
Lease allocation order and transfer letter. In late August, the 
president, by executive directive, appointed E. R. Stettinius, 
Special Assistant for Administration of Lend-Lease. Later, on 
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October 28, 1941, the president by another executive order created 
the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and appointed Stettinius its 
director. The President, however,kept Lend-Lease policy making in 
his own hands, while the State Department was responsible for policy 
implementation and negotiation of Lend-Lease agreements. 8 
Although Lend-Lease was originally intended to aid Britain 
with goods and war material, it was eventually expanded to include 
over forty countries and became an invaluable source of military and 
civilian supply.9 After Britain and Greece, China was the third 
country to get a share of Lend-Lease assistance. "The United 
states", noted a government history of US aid," had already been 
giving assistance to China, in accordance with the American policy 
of extending aid to nations resisting aggression, but now that 
assistance was accelerated and increased in in scope by Lend-Lease, 
and military and financial assistance. 11 10 
President Roosevelt, on March 15 1941, four days after the 
passage of the Lend-Lease Act declared; "There is no longer the 
slightest question or doubt that the American people recognize the 
exteme seriousness of the present situation. That is why they have 
demanded and got a policy of unqualified, immediate, all out aid 
for Britain, Greece, China arid for all the Governments in exile 
whose homelands are temporarily occupied by the aggressors .... From 
now on that will be increased and yet again increased until total 
victory has been won ..... China likewise expresses the magnificent 
will of millions of plain people to resist the dismemberment of 
their nation. China, through the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 
asks for our help. America has said that China shall have our 
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help ... 11 After the development of a program to meet the emergency 
needs of China, the President, on May 6 1941, declared the defense 
of China vital to the defense of the U.S. A Master Lend-Lease 
Agreement with China was signed on June 2, 1942·. 12 
What China received from the United States via did not mark a 
change in US policy; indeed, it continued the policy beginning in 
the late l930's expressed in export-import bank loans, stabilization 
credits, and shipments of military, agricultural, and industrial 
goods. The circumstances leading to Lend-Lease also indicated that 
it was a continuation of contradiction and confusion. The State 
Department itself emphasized the continuity of US policy. One month 
after the passage of the Lend-Lease act, the State Department, in a 
telegram to the American Embassy to Chungking stated: "friendship of 
this Government for China and its sincere interest in the 
maintenance of the strength and integrity of the Chinese National 
Government has been demnstrated over a considerable period of years, 
and especially at the present time it is unmistakably clear and 
manifest. There has been extended to the Chinese Government a 
certain amount of financial and economic assist~nce through the 
purchase of China's silver by this Government; the extension of 
loans and credits, the contributon to China's stabilization fund, 
and in other ways. This Government has _sought to co-operate with 
the Chinese Government in measures designed to strengthen the 
Chinese currency internally and externally and to furnish China with 
necessary supplies from abroad. At the present time under the 
Lend-Lease act, it.is our design and intention to intensify our 
assistance in regard to supplies. It is our desire and intention to 
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take all other appropriate and practicable steps which might 
contribute to the strength of the Government; and to the ability of 
the Chinese nation·to resist aggression."13 The State Department 
Officals who composed the telegram failed to mention or were unaware 
of the fact that Lend-Lease would greatly accelerate US aid. 
Another important factor was the desperate Chinese situation. 
China had been resisting Japanese aggression since 1931, and 
psychologically the Chinese felt themselves in the forefront of 
resistance to militarism. Exhausted and nearly bankrupt, 
Nationalist China ~elcomed Japan's participation in the Axis 
alliance and the outbreak of the Second World War. For Chinese 
leaders realized that China would no longer face Japan alone, and 
that the defeat of Japan and the other Axis powers was certain and 
inevitable. "After suffering five years of war", Michael Schaller 
asserts," most Chinese were merely relieved that some other people 
would absorb Japan's attention. The long implication of the 
Japanese-American conflict led KMT officials in Chungking to 
celebrate news of the war as loudly as must have been the case in 
Tokyo". The Chinese president, his Party and Officials began to 
regard their long stand against Japan a successful one. They had 
already learned the technique~ of manipulating the us.14 Chiang 
Kai-shek began pretending to show his eagerness to participate in 
•I 
' the war of the democratic powers against the Fascist dictators. 
[Although Chiang him~elf was a dictator and China was being ruled by 
a one party Government in a fascist manner]. Chiang's main 
intention was to get an increased amount of US dollars. His 
representatives, T.V. Soong, K.P.Chen, and others, according to 
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Michael Schaeller, were always physically present in Washington and 
lobbying the Roosevelt administration officials to grant China 
more aid.15 The lobbying was a major factor in the granting of 
Lend-Lease aid to China. 
On the other hand, the US also had several immediate and long-
range objectives in helping China. The principal and immediate 
American aim was the "unconditional surrender" of Japan within an 
overall.strategy of defeating Germany first.16 To achieve this 
goal, the US followed a policy of keeping China in the Pacific war 
in order to make ma~imum use of her military potential and strategic 
position. In fact, China's physical presence in the war had the 
tremendous consequence of keeping a major part of Japan's Army tied 
down in the China theater. Otherwise, this part of the army could 
have been employed against the United States. Furthermore, it was 
necessary to prevent Japan from using China as a strategic base and 
economic source in its aggression against Southeast Asian nations, 
including the Philippines. American optimism was clearly 
articulated in a 'New York Times editorial which appeared two days 
after Pearl Harbor. "We have", it said, "as our loyal ally China, 
with its inexhaustible manpower - China which we did not desert in 
her own hour of need - China from whose patient and infinitely 
resourceful people there will now return to us .tenfold payment upon 
such aid as we have given. In the presence of these allies we shall 
find the key to the strategy of the Pacific. 11 17 
Another objective which eventually proved to have far reaching 
consequences was the aim of making China a great power and treating 
China as one of the "Big Four" for the purpose of arranging a post 
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war political order in the Far East.18 This vision of China, 
present and future, was held by FDR, most of his cabinet members, 
and many high ranking American officials. FDR held great 
expectations about the military value of China and an "Asian 
strategy centered upon elevating Nationalist China to great power 
status." Roosevelt believed that after the defeat of Japan there 
would be a power vacuum in Asia. He further believed that sooner or 
later the mighty British, Dutch, and French empires in Asia would 
decline. The two major emerging powers in the region would be the 
Soviet Union and Nationalist China. Indeed the structure of the 
post world war played a tremendous part in FDR's thinking. 
Sensitive to the rising tide of Asian nationalism, and to the 
political expansion of the USSR, he was determined that the US 
should influence these events. He looked forward to an Asia of 
stable prosperity governed by independent nation states emerging 
from the colonial empires. China, he believed, would play the role 
of the principal regional power in Asia, replacing Japan. FDR 
sought to join US power to the I<MT and to create an effective war 
time and post-war ally. Lauchlin Currie, Harry Hopkins, James 
McHugh, Claire Chennault, Joseph Alsop, and Chiang Kai-shek 
encouraged and reinforced the'President's thinking in this regard.19 
Moreover, during the war, both FDR and Harry L. Hopkins, on several 
occasions expressed the idea that Nationalist China would line up on 
the US side if there should be a major conflict of policy with 
Russia. In fact, this hypothesis provided a major incentive in 
taking a favorable attitude to the I<MT government in China.20 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull maintained a similar view. "Toward 
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China we had two objectives," Hull wrote in his memoirs, "The first 
was an effective joint prosecution of war. The second was the 
recognition and building up of China as a major power entitled to 
rank with the three big western allies, Russia, Britain, and the 
United States, during and after the war, both for the establishment 
of stability and prosperity in the Orient. 11 21 Thus, the US followed 
a deliberate policy in the Far East regarding China combined with 
its military objective of the unconditional surrender of Japan.22 
But this policy of a rapid and unconditional surrender of Japan was 
not whole heartedly approved by the British and the Russians. They 
always advocated a Europe-first policy. Despite this opposition 
from Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States always tried to 
respond favorably to all kinds of Chinese requests. 
The vision of China as a post war democratic great power was 
also supported by certain historical factors. China had been a 
civlized power for milennia and had a glorious military past. It 
was not inconsistent to think that with the end of European 
imperalism, there would be the emergence of a new and powerful China 
in the East. Moreover, the inspiring vision of making China a great 
power and treating her as one of the Big-Four, had always been 
implicit in the traditional p~inciples of the Open Door Policy. 
Tyler Dennett, the first American to write a history of US.-China 
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Relations, observed that it was a part of US Asian policy. Dennett 
believed that the "Corollary of the open Door was the policy of 
promoting an Asia strong enough to be its own Door keeper. 11 23 
Similarly, the historian T. A. Bisson wrote,"A strong and unified 
China "capable of protecting her independence by her own efforts was 
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the main requisite for a more stable basis of peace in the Far 
East." When this condition was realized, he insisted,"the open Door 
doctrine, in its specifically Chinese application, would become an 
anachronism and cease to exist. 11 24 The FDR administration, by 
granting economic aid, was giving emphasis to the concept of the 
open Door, giving it a practical shape. "I never faltered in my 
belief," Hull wrote in his memoirs," that we should do every thing 
in our power to assist China to become strong and stable. It was 
obvious to me that Japan would disappear as a great oriental 
power for a long time to come. Therefore, the only major strictly 
oriental power would be China. The United States, Britain, and 
Russia were also Pacific powers, but the great interests of each 
were elsewhere. Consequently if there was ever to be stability in 
the Far East, it had to be assured with China at the center of any 
arrangement that was made.2 5 FDR's scheme also had advantages for 
American domestic politics, for it would neutralize those who were 
more concerned with the Far East than with Europe.26 
Assumptions and desires about the post-war world also 
conditioned the US government's aid programs. President Roosevelt 
envisioned a world in which the US would act as an arbiter, 
conciliator, and teacher and which would adjust differences and 
conflicts between the other great powers- Great Britain, the USSR, 
and China- all the while inculcating them with new modes of 
international behavior. In order to put this plan into effect, it 
was necessary to make China a strong competent partner. "It would 
be easier to influence China's development internationally and 
internally," Cordell Hull concluded, "if she were on the inside of 
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any special relationship among the big powers, than if she were on 
the outside. 11 27 
Not only the fear of Soviet expansion, but also a fear of the 
British imperialism caused Roosevelt to regard China as a close 
ally of the US in the postwar period. In fact, FDR and many other 
Americans shared the bitter Chinese response to British 
imperialism.28 FDR knew that he would have the co-operation of 
China in his policy of liquidating the colonial system in Asia. 29 
Even Vice President Henry Wallace expressed concern against British 
colonial policy in Asia and America. As J. Samuel Walker has 
written,"Wallace's ideas for the postwar period were further shaped 
by his pan-Americanism, anti-European biases, and Anglophobia". 
Wallace "opposed British ambitions to maintain their empire and 
hoped that India would obtain its independence after the war .... God 
had made America, he believed, to utilize its resources and 
democratic traditions to break the patterns of European diplomacy 
and usher in an era of freedom and abundance." Wallace also 
challenged Churchill's claims of Anglo-American superiority, and 
declared that·those views were repugnant to other countries and to 
many Americans. He reasoned that in Asia the US "should strive to 
improve the lives of those people to advance its own interests. 11 30 
Although Roosevelt expected' the great powers to.dominate the United 
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Nations, he seemed to share Wallace's anti-imperialism and other 
doubts about the British. Furthermore, FDR was as emphatic as was 
Wallace in calling for the withdrawal of the European powers, as 
well as for the withdrawal of the Japanese, from political influence 
in the Far East and Southeast Asia.31 The British, historian 
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Michael Schaller found, consistently objected to FDR's position that 
China was an equal because they perceived Chinese nationalism as a 
threat to the Empire. Furthermore, the British did not accept the 
altruistic element of US policy. As far as London was concerned, 
US policy was to make China sufficiently strong to police Asia while 
simultaneously remaining dependent upon the us.32 Despite 
opposition from various quarters, FDR remained fixed in his attitude 
toward China and attributed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the 
idea of instituting some sort of interim international trusteeship 
to prepare the colonial possesions of European powers for 
independence. He also sought Russian Co-operationin this regard. 33 
FDR had another idea with respect to China. Since 
cosmopolitanism and the idea of a universal order have always been 
prominent features in Chinese political thought, FDR concluded that 
"in China the US found the most reliable adherent to her idea of 
establishing a just and peaceful order through the machinery of an 
international organization and the spread of international 
goodwill. 1134 In the "program of Resistance and Reconstruction", a 
quasi-constitutional proclamation adopted by the Kuomintang Party 
Congress in 1938, China declared herself "prepared to safeguard and 
strengthen the machinery of p~ace. 11 35 In fact, the Chinese leaders 
had lost no time in strengthening this belief of FDR that China 
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would·be a grateful, friendly, and co-operative partner in the task 
of building and maintaining a just, peaceful, and stable order in 
the Far East.36 
Sentimental impulses, traditional principles, and postwar plans 
provided only a general framework within which immediate military 
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considerations exerted their decisive influence. To keep Chinese 
civilian morale intact, the US sent several types of supplies and 
services which were not directly related to war, but which 
indirectly strengthened the war efforts of the Alli~d powers and 
economically saved China from collapse. This US civilian Lend-Lease 
aid to China can be divided into two periods: from January 1941 
till the late fall of 1944 when the Chinese War Production Board was 
established, and from November 16, 1944, to the conclusion of the 
Soong-Crowley agreement of September 2,1945. 
When FDR introduced the Lend-Lease bill in the congress, 
Chiang's brother in-law T.V.Soong was present in Washington D.C. As 
soon as he came to know about the proposed Lend-Lease bill, Soong 
informed Chiang Kai-shek about this promised treasure trove for 
China. At the suggestion of Chiang, Soong urged Roosevelt to send a 
special envoy to Chunking to examine and investigate the economic 
situation in China. In fact, it was a kind of KMT arrangement to 
get FDR's attention and thus to get a share of possible Lend-Lease 
aid. The Chinese at first requested that Harry Hopkins be sent to 
China, but Roosevelt was not able to spare him. In order to 
establish a personal connection with Chiang and "to avoid the 
delays, leaks, and pressures that ineyitably followed working 
through the State Department", Roosevelt accepted the Chinese 
proposal for sending a special representative. He dispatched his 
economic advisor, Dr. Lauchlin Currie to Chunking.37 Currie became 
the first of many representatives Roosevelt sent to China to help 
transform it from an autocracy to a liberal political system, which 
was part of FDR's vision of post-war Asia.38 
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During his first visit to China, Currie talked to eminent 
Chinese leaders and tried to survey the needs of China. Chiang Kai-
shek requested $50 million dollars and a modern air force. In his 
report to the President, Currie recommended that the US accede to 
Chiang Kai-shek's demands, send American advisors and economic aid 
to China to bring about a reconciliation between the Communists and 
Nationalists. This would also enable Chiang Kai-shek to carry out 
several benevolent reforms. In short, Currrie looked on US aid as a 
Chinese "New Deal. 11 39 
FDR did not accept all Currie's recommendations for several 
reasons, chief of which was China's exces_sive demands in the face of 
the material resources of the Allies when compared with the 
resources of· the Axis powers in the early war years. Also, he 
realised that China's "usefulness as an ally depended on various 
uncertainties, without substantial shipments of American materials, 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek remained, as he had been, incapable of 
significant militiary action. 114° Consequently, it became US policy 
to keep China in the war and to make her an "effective military ally 
by training her soldiers, sending supplies to her troops, giving air 
support to,her armies and encouraging unity among the diverse 
political groups. 11 41 
In order to achieve this end, the US gave civilian, economic, 
and financial aid for the purpose of encouraging democratic 
tendencies.42 The character and extent of this American civilian 
aid to China between 1941-1943 was limited by the resources and 
energies which could be spared from other theaters, as well as by 
transportation difficulties. Such assistance reflected the shifting 
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fortunes of war and was designed to meet a series of "emergencies," 
and for this reason was largely ad-hoc and short range in 
charcter. 43 But President Roosevelt was very much concerned and 
sympathetic with China's cause. President Roosevelt repeatedly 
promised that, "despite all odds ..... to the Chinese armies and the 
Chinese people" Lend-Lease aid would continue. In fact, it 
constituted a political as well as a military commitment. 
Consequently, the Lend-Lease administration adopted a broad program 
of military aid, and non-military or civilian aid for delivery in 
China via the Burma Road.44 
The non-military Lend-Lease program in China, which was 
definitely not as large as that to French North Africa and Britain, 
consisted of supplies requisitioned by China Defense Supplies,Inc., 
and provided by the Lend-Lease Administration. These supplies were 
consigned directly to Chinese authorities and transferred to them 
for their unsupervised use upon receipt. 45 This category of Lend-
Lease aid included transport equipment for other than military 
operational use, raw materials, equipment, and supplies for direct 
or indirect munitions production in China. To the extent that 
actual or anticipated receipts of such materials provided tangible 
evidence of American support ~f the Chinese war effort "they 
manifestly contributed to the confidence of the Chinese people in 
their own political and military leadership. 1146 The character of 
the goods delivered under these programs, as it was stated in the 
report, "closely paralleled each other and were governed by the 
difficulty in getting goods to where they were needed. 11 47 
In translating the funds from the first Lend-Lease 
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appropriation into actual contracts and deliveries, primary emphasis 
was given to improving China's long lines of transport and 
communications with the United States and the world. Paving 
materials to resurface the Burma Road, earth-moving equipment for 
grading and repairing the road, insecticides for the malarial 
marshes along the highway, trucks, spare parts, spare tires, 
gasoline and lubricants, wreckers, service station equipment, and 
the services of a number of experienced American loaders, 
dispatchers, and mechanics were provided during this phase. 48 
Chinese requirements submitted later tended to shift toward 
transportation equipment, raw materials for arsenals and Ordnance 
factories, and finished military items. However, military advances 
by the Japanese and shipping difficulties further changed the 
character of Lend-Lease aid. Henceforth, it would consist of 
supplies for more direct military use, finished ordnance and 
munitions, and aviation transportation equipment. 49 In the cash 
purchase field, industrial equipment for China's wartime industry 
had likewise given way to signal corpps and communication equipment 
and some aviation materials. 
The first requisitions approved for China under Lend-Lease were 
based- on a program formulated' under the direction of Lauchlin Currie 
in consultation with FDR and other Presidential advisors, especially 
Harry Hopkins and General J. H. Burns. The program for China was 
approved by FDR on May 6 1941. The principal items in the first 
requisition included trucks, gasoline, paving materials, earth 
moving equipment for road grading and repairing, and lubricants for 
use on the Burma Road. Railway equipment to improve transportation 
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services, telephone and radio equipment for field communications,and 
metals for guns were also included. The costs of this program alone 
were more than $45,000,000.50 
The greatest obstacle to substantial Lend-Lease aid for China 
remained throughout the war was the transportation bottleneck. 
China was paralyzed by Japanese expansion on both land and sea. 
"The tremendous expanse of the Pacific Ocean", narrates an official 
unpublished history of the Lend-Lease on China,"the presence of 
Japanese submarines in Far Eastern waters, the enemy sea blockade of 
China and the Japanese occupation of Chinese coastal areas presented 
grave logistical problems in shipping goods to China. 11 51 By August 
1939 all the important Chinese Ports were in Japanese possession. 
On the other hand, the Chinese Railways also suffered a major 
set back. After the fall of Canton, in November 1939, the Indo-
China Railway assumed first importance. But the seizure of Nanking 
by the Japanese in November, 1939 cut the flow of goods from Indo: 
China. The fall of France contributed to the worsening situation. 
After Vichy's Governor-General in French Indo-China acceded to 
Japanese demands in July 1940 and closed the railroad from Haiphong 
into Yunnan Province, the Burma Road was the only remaining route by 
which America could send suppl'ies to China.52 
The remoteness of Free China and the undeveloped nature of the 
country made motor transport the largest item of expenditure in the 
first stage of the American program. Trucks became the principal 
vehicles to carry goods not only within China, but also to get 
supplies into China ove+ the Burma road. Since the Chinese 
Government fought with imported materials, motor transport was 
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vitally connected with the prime question of keeping Chinese morale 
high. It was also necessary for carrying foods and raw materials 
for arsenals. All these things together determined the critical 
importance of the Burma Road, and, as American A.id to China gathered 
headway in 1941, the capacity of the Burma Road became the chief 
focus of Lend-Lease interest.53 
The Burma Road had been hurriedly built by China during the 
Sino-Japanese war of 1937-38, and designed for light traffic only. 
Untill 1940, some 40 million Chinese dollars had been spent. The 
road stretches 715 miles from Lashio, Burma to Kunming, China. It 
was surfaced with sand, crushed rock, and stone, but stretches at 
both ends had been tarred or asphalted. The primary bottleneck of 
the Burma Road was between Lungling and Paoshan. The route climbed 
over the mountains to 7,500 feet and then dipped as it crossed the 
single span suspension bridge over the Salween River.54 The road 
badly needed repair and a central administrative authority for its 
overall maintenance. From autumn, 1938 till the end of 1940, the 
Chinese government carried out several experiments concerning the 
administration of the Burma Road, but nothing important was 
achieved. 55 
Attack upon the manifold'problems connected with the Burma 
Road, however, gained new impetus with the inauguration of the Lend-
Lease program. During this time the Chinese accepted the idea of 
improving traffic conditions on the Burma Road by hiring an American 
expert, John Earl Baker, whom Chiang Kai-shek requested of Lauchlin 
Currie during his first visit to China in 1941. Baker was appointed 
by Generalssimo Chiang Kai-shek to organize the road's operations 
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and administration under the Chinese Transportation Control Board. 56 
Baker established a Chinese inspection office at Wanting under the 
direct control of the Transport Control Board of the Chinese 
Military Affairs Commission. He also introduced a system of 
registration of passing trucks. Baker appointed D. F. Myers, 
another motor expert and an advisor to Dr.H.H. Kung, the Finance 
Minister of China, to the important position of inspecting the 
mechanical and shop facilities along the Burma Road. 57 In a report 
to Baker at the end of May, 1941, Myers recommended extensive 
development of the mechanical supervisory staff of the Burma Road. 
As a result, efforts were made to speed up the loading and unloading 
of trucks,reduce the size of truck convoys, and surface the highway. 
Meanwhile, in order to consolidate Baker's works on the road, the 
Chinese Government through the China Defense Supplies Inc., invited 
Daniel Arnstein, President of the Terminal Cab Company of New York 
city to come to China and assist and advise Baker. Arnstein and two 
other outstanding truck experts, Marco Hellman and Harold Davies, 
also came to do Chinese transportation development work along the 
Burma Road. 
After a survey of the Burma Road with Baker, the Arnstein 
mission recommended in August, 1941 that a directing agency be 
established with full authority over all motor transportation and 
personnel. They also recommended the elimination of tax stations, 
expansion of terminal facilities, improvement in loading, servicing, 
and repairing of vehicles, and bringing expert knowledge to bear 
upon the situation which had developed. The report put emphasis on 
strict administration, policing, and application of foreign 
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technical knowledge for the improvement of the road.58 
The Arnstein Report definitely contributed to the development 
of highway and transportation regulations of the Chinese Government. 
Progress was made in amalgamating Chinese transport agencies. 
Asphalting the Chinese section of the road was undertaken. The 
central government under an arrangement with the Yunnan provincial 
government abolished all kinds of provincial highway tolls and 
taxes. But the most immediate results of the Arnstein Report was the 
publicizing of the transit duty of one percent, levied by the 
Burmese Government on Lend-Lease cargoes for China. After some 
negotiation, the British undertook, in lieu of the Burmese tariff on 
Lend-Lease goods, to pay the government of Burma a subsidy of 10 
rupees, the British currency in India, per ton on all Lend-Lease 
goods ·consigned to China, which landed in Rangoon. The agreement 
was effective after September 3, 1941.59 Improvements in inspection 
procedures were made quickly and collection of taxes and customs was 
enforced at once.60 
Efforts were also undertaken to improve the condition of the 
Burma Road. Under the Civilian Lend-Lease program, the US government 
shipped spare parts and repair equipment for broken trucks. In 
order to achieve effective supervision on the road, a group of 46 
American loaders and dispatchers, "terminal managers, shop 
superintendents, foremen and mechanics were recruited in the United 
States and dispatched to Burma at Lend-Lease expense. 11 61 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Government also pushed the hard 
surfacing of the Burma Road. The base of the road was laid by 
Chinese laborers stone by stone. The US shipped thousands of tons 
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of Lend-Lease asphalt, grading and earth moving equipment. 62 The 
first US shipment of Lend-Lease Asphalt amounted to 7,500 tons. 
With all these measures, the capacity of the Burma Road was greatly 
expanded. The peak of shipments over the Burma Road was reached in 
November 1941 when 18,000 tons were transported per month. 63 Edward 
Stettinius Jr. expected to reach a goal of 35,000 tons a month by 
the end of 1942.64 
With the improvement of the Burma Road, what China needed most 
desperately were commercial cargo trucks from the United States. 
Besides carrying Lend-Lease materials from the Port of Rangoon, 
trucks were also needed to transport scarce foodstuffs and raw 
materials inside China. China's incapacity to produce her own 
trucks or to.buy them with cash from the outside world a major 
impediment to the Lend-Lease program. Moreover, for the development 
of Marcopolo route which ran from Soviet Central Asia through 
China's Sinkiang Province, the Chinese requested 10,000 heavy duty 
commercial trucks of a type not available through the Army Supply 
Program. 65 Later, this Chinese request received the recommendations 
of the American War Production Mission's Chairman, Donald M. Nelson. 
From the beginning of Lend-Lease until late 1942, the US 
government procured over 32,000 motor vehicles for China under 
authority granted by the Lend-Lease Act. Of this quantity 29,000 
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were supplied directly through the Office of Lend-Lease 
Administration Channels under practice which existed in early 1942. 
The balance of over 3,000 was supplied for the Chinese Ministries on 
basis of requisitions placed through US War Department channels by 
China Defense Supplies. The types of vehicles shipped to China 
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included cargo trucks, gasoline tank trucks, Signal Corps trucks, 
armored Scout Cars, Jeeps, reconnaissance cars, general utility 
trucks, passenger sedans, and radio cars.66 The Ports of Calcutta 
and Rangoon were selected as points of debarkation before the trucks 
were carried or reshipped to China. In the words of Stettinius, 
"Shiploads of trucks previously for cash reached Rangoon throughout 
the summer and fall of 1941. In July the first of several thousand 
Lend-Lease trucks arrived. A small truck assembly plant for use on 
the docks at Rangoon was shipped in August, as well as spare parts 
and tools with which the supply d~pots on the road itself were to be 
equipped. 11 67 From the port of Rangoon trucks were carried into 
China along the Burma Road. 
With the fall of Rangoon in March, 1942 approximately 1,000 
vehicles of various types were destroyed to prevent capture by the 
Japanese. Still China got a considerable nwnber of trucks and other 
vehicles. As reported by the International Division, A. S. F, "Other 
losses incurred by the Chinese Ministries were caused by diversions 
to US stocks in the China-. Burma India theater." However," the 
greater part of the motor vehicles destined for the ministries 
finally came under control of Chinese Agencies. 11 68 But a huge 
number of trucks not destroyed were captured by the Japanese during 
this time. 
Since there was a widespread spare parts crisis throughout the 
world, OLLA and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) were 
responsible for shipment of a substantial tonnage of spare parts to 
maintain in operation Lend-Leased and Chinese-owned motor 
vehicles. 69 Shipments were made of complete repair shops for all 
' 
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echelons of maintenance as well as tire retreading shops. The war 
department procured about 15,000 tons of vehicle spareparts for the 
Ministries in addition to those originally included with motor 
vehicles.70 Besides, the United States provided China 14 complete 
factories and tools for repairing motor vehicles, with the help of 
which the Chinese Ministry of Communications set up repair work 
shops in Chunking, Kunming, Kweiyang and in four other places. With 
two additional workshops established respectively in Chunking and 
Chengtu in 1941, the total number of such workshops was raised to 
nine. The US also helped to establish two motor accessories 
factories which eventually started manufacturing a number of 
essental and relatively simple to make motor Vehicle parts as well 
as sundry repairing tools.71 
The Lend-Lease program made a significant contribution by 
establishing two tire-retreading plants in China. After the 
Japanese Occupation of French Indo-China, rubber became a very 
scarce material. In order to meet the desperate rubber crisis, and 
the increasing need in China for replacement tires for the Chinese 
truck fleets engaged in carrying various military and essential 
civilian supplies in west China, the Lend-Lease Administration 
adopted a project to set up a number of tire retreading shops in 
China. 
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On February 26th, 1942, China Defense Supplies Inc., by 
submitting a proposal at the Office of the Lend-Lease Administration 
called for machinery and equipment for one plant to manufacture 
Camelback rubber and ten tire retreading plants in China having 
sufficient capacity to handle the tire requirements of 100,000 
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trucks and 50,000 passenger cars. The value of this order was 
$2,600,000.72 The expense of the entire order was approved and 
allocated by the Lend-Lease Administration. Later on, however, on 
the assumption of India's ability to produce enough rubber to meet a 
part of China's rubber needs, the Lend-Lease Administration approved 
only a part of the order. To put this plan into action, a contract 
was signed between the US Government and the General Tire and Rubber 
Company of Akron, Ohio on 24th July, 1942.73 In the long run only 
two plants were set up. 
After the receipt of an urgent cable from General Stilwell, 
on November 20, 1942, for an immediate shipment of two of the 
retreading plants and two technicians to set up and begin operation 
of these plants, shipment was made. The material arrived in 
Calcutta in late August, 1943. Meanwhile William G. Holtz and Jesse 
R. McFall were chosen by the Lend-Lease officials in Washington to 
serve as the retreading shop experts. After vigorous efforts, they 
set up the first shop in Kunming in January, 1944, and the shop at 
Kweiyang turned out.its first retreaded tire on August 15, 1944. 
But the Kweiyang shop was dismantled in early December 1944 when 
this city was threatened with Japanese invasion, and the machinery 
was reassembled in ChungKing ·1ater on. McFall and Holz also 
arranged for an educational program for truck owners in an attempt 
to get the-users to bring their tires in early enough to be 
retreaded. The overall tire situation improved as a result of these 
measure. 
As of the week ending June 16, 1945 the production output (in 















Under a Chinese requirements program of 1945 it was 
contemplated that these retreading shops would be expanded, but as 
soon as the war came to an end the plan was abandoned.74 
Significant developments also took place under the Lend-Lease 
program in the Chinese Railway sector. Since civilian Lend-Lease 
had been initiated to China until the end of the War Department's 
procurement of railway supplies amounted to about 3,000 tons of 
material which consisted of "locomotive parts, railroad signal 
equipment, air brakes, welding equipment, lubricating and engine 
oils, asbestos packing sheets, spare parts for rolling stock and 
repair shop materials. 11 75 
The Civilian Lend-Lease Program, however, also helped China 
open a second rail route from Burma into China. The Yunnan-Burma 
railway stretched from Kunming to Lashio, where it connected with 
the railroad running from there down to the port of Rangoon. Plans 
for this railway were inaugurated in 1938 which foreshadowed an 
expenditure of $US20 million, and efforts were made to finance the 
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project with European assistance. Major N. R. Davies, a British 
engineer, first surveyed the possibilities of such a railroad at the 
close of the 19th century. When the tonnage capacity of the Burma 
road was proved inadequate at the end of 1941, the US Government 
planned to set up a meter- gauge railway with a service of five 200 
ton trains a day on this line. It was planned to finish the Burmese 
portion, a 112 mile stretch, first. 
A request for American assistance was made for the construction 
of 292 miles of track between Siangyun and Burma, and plans were 
pushed in March 1941.76 After the British Government consented to 
bear expenses for construction of the Burmese section of the 
railway, orders for bridge trusses, locomotives, rails, spareparts 
for rolling stock, railroad signal equipment, air brakes, repair 
shops and other equipment were submitted to the US government for 
procurement.The estimated cost was approximately $18 million, and in 
May 1941 a survey was made of available equipment in the US. 
review of the requirements by military and Lend-Lease officials 
resulted in the allocation of $15 million of Lend-Lease funds for 
the project. Of this total, $1 million was for medical supplies and 
equipment.77 
It was estimated that th~ Chinese section of the railway could 
be completed to Siangyun by the end of 1942, providing the Burma 
•I 
section could be completed six months earlier and deliveries could 
be made in time from the US. Major John E. Ausland of the US Army 
Corps of Engineers and formerly of the Burlington Railroad assisted 
and advised the Chinese in the many technical problems which arose. 
The construction problem on the Chinese section centered upon the 
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requirement that the Burmese section had to be completed first in 
order to supply materials for the Chinese part. On the Burmese 
section the chief engineering problem in construction was the 
Salween River Bridge. An inadequate labor supply and the menace of 
malaria were also problems. 
In order to bring about a satisfactory completion of the 
construction of the Yunnan-Burma Railroad a minimum work force of 
200,000 had to be recruited by civilian Chinese contractors. But 
the "high mortality from malaria in the Yunnan-Burma border region 
was therefore a hindrance both to the recruitment and the 
preservation of the manpower supply. In one report in September, 
1941, it was stated that of 2,000 coolies, 400 were lost by death 
and 600 by desertion, and of the remaining 1,000, 80% were already 
sick with malaria. 11 78 At this point the US had to intervene. 
Thus, the Lend-Lease Medical Program for China came in part due 
to her transportation problem. To combat malaria the US Public 
Health Service Medical Commission to China was sent at the request 
of the Chinese Government made through T.V. Soong in June, 1941. 79 
Three medical officers of the Service, at the request of the State 
Department, had already gone to China to fight malaria in 1940. 
This 1941 mission was a high powered one, backed by the US 
government and the Rockfeller Foundation. The Mission was financed 
in the amount of $1,150,000 from Lend-Lease funds. Salaries and 
expenses of the American personnel were paid from Lend-Lease funds 
which were made available to the head of the mission Dr. Victor 
Haas. The salaries of the Chinese personnel were paid by the 
Chinese government with US funds.BO 
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The Mission included fifteen persons of whom eight were 
specialists in malaria; three entomologists and five sanitation 
engineers. By the late autumn of 1941 there had been or was being 
shipped to Burma equipment for 15 first aid stations, twelve 25-bed 
hospitals and the greater part of the other supplies needed for the 
work of the Mission. Donations of drugs had already been made. The 
American Red cross in June, 1941 rushed to Burma 200,000 atabrine 
tablets by air from Honolulu and 10 million quinine tablets 
purchased in Batavia. The Chinese Benevolent Association of 
Columbine, Sumatra, contributed three and a half million quinine 
tablets. Meanwhile, a large staff of Chinese doctors, nurses, 
sanitary engineers, and 500 coolies had been organized by Dr. H. C. 
Chang, Principal of the Hsing- Ya Medical College and dispatched by 
the National Health Administration of China to co-operate with the 
American mission. These Chinese dug drains, built delousing 
stations, and constructed sanitary areas around the main railroad. 81 
Before the mission arrived it had been extremely difficult to 
persuade Chinese laborers to come back to the malaria ridden valleys 
through which the railroad was being built. They did not know what 
malaria was, but a well founded tradition had been handed down from 
generation to generation about the evil airs that took the lives of 
those who dared to enter that forbidden territory. But very soon 
•I 
the activities of American Lend-Lease doctors spread every where. 
Confidence returned to the workers who had fled to the hills,and 
they began reporting back to work. In short,the medical mission was 
successful in abolishing malaria along the railway, and made a 
valuable contribution to the control of malaria in the Yunnan 
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province. 82 By the swnmer of 1941, the improvements in the Burma 
Road and new railroad construction encouraged the Lend-Lease 
managers to turn their attention from transportation equipment to 
military material. 
By the end of 1941, the Yunnan-Burma Railroad was being rushed 
to completion. The US Engineers hoped to operate the 400 miles of 
the railroad by the end of i942. Unfortunately it did not happen. 
Japanese soldiers from Thailand captured Rangoon by March, 1942, and 
Mandalay and Lashio by May of that year. Consequently, the Yunnan-
Burma railroad fell under Japanese control. In this way, "the last 
land route through Burma was shut tight. Lend-Lease for China, just 
beginning to get into its stride, came to almost a dead stop. 1183 A 
huge amount of railway materials were stockpiled in India. Lend-
Lease next turned its attention to an air transport program to get 
supplies to China. 
Air transportation in China presents a history of long conflict 
between the Lend-Lease Administration, State Department, and the War 
Department. The program for non-military aid had first been drafted 
in March, 1941, and called for a total of 35 Douglas DC-3 transport 
planes. The most likely agencies to operate such planes were the 
China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and the Central Aviation 
Transport Company(CATC), the sucessor of the German Eurasia Company. 
CNAC stock was owned 55% by the Chinese Ministry of Communication 
and 45% by Pan-American Airlines. The CTAC, however, was owned 100% 
by the Chinese Government. The CNAC rendered an effective and 
important service both for Ghina's internal transport and for US 
military operations and commercial interests.84 
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After May, 1942 when the Burma Road and the Yunan-Burma 
railroad had been closed by Japan, "the only method of getting Lend-
Lease material into China was by air transport from India over the 
Himalayas", commonly known as the HUMP route.BS To this end, a new 
air field was constructed at Dinjan, in the Jungles of Assam. During 
this time CNAC's Lend-Lease planes were assigned to carry out 
operations over the HUMP route. In 1942, the demands for transport 
planes and Lend-Lease claimants were so tremendous that very few 
such aircraft could be assigned to the US allies. As Arthur Young 
put it,"Transport planes were one of the scarcest items, being 
urgently needed in every theater of war. 11 86 Despite this crisis, 
under a contract with CNAC in 1942, the US government provided two 
transport planes per month. Under this contract 25 planes were 
supplied to China in all. All these planes, however, were assigned 
to freight operations between Assam, India, and the Kunming area. 
Besides using these twenty-five planes, the US Army Ferry Command 
had taken over three of CNAC's passenger transport planes, and there 
was even "talk of the American Army taking over CNAC". General C. 
L. Bissel, Chief airport transport advisor to Stilwell, was very 
much against the separate existence of the CNAC, and influenced by 
Bissel General Stilwell always opposed giving CNAC more planes. 87 
At the beginning of 1943, the CNAC had only three passenger planes 
to maintain three flights a week between Chungking and Calcutta via 
Kunming, bi-weekly flights to Lanchow, and weekly flights to 
Kweilin. But China desperately needed more planes for reasons other 
than maintaining China's external and internal mail and passenger 
service.88 
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Because of the limitations on the use of Lend-Lease planes, the 
Chinese Government in February 1943 made a separate request for 
allocation of five transport planes, and the US Department of State 
whole heartedly supported this request.89 Among other things, the 
Department of State considered post-war American interests in China. 
It looked toward China as a potential post-war aviation market for 
the US. In a memorandum, William R. Langdon of the Far Eastern 
Division expressed the fear that "disappearence of CNAC as a result 
of the operation of this tendency and the lack of material and 
governmental support would create a vacuum in China's internal 
commercial air communications. It is conceivable that in those 
circumstances some European interest might eagerly rush in and be 
accepted by the Chinese, with a consequent loss to our aviation 
interests of their ground-floor advantage in China. 11 90 But this far 
sighted appeal of the State Department had no impact on the 
Munitions Assignment Board (Air) and the War Department which always 
acted according to immediate war interests. Since China's 
contribution to the war, in the US Army's opinion, was very 
insignificant, "the War Department was reluctant to send planes to 
China". Operations in Europe always received higher preference in 
the Lend-Lease Administration·' and also in the War Department. 91 
Moreover, the Munitions Assignment Board declined to recommend five 
planes without the approval of General Stilwell, as all Lend-Lease 
materials destined to China were subject to his disposition.92 It 
also did not fail to mention that expansion of non-military air 
transport service within China would constitute a "severe drain for 
fuel and repair parts on the limited air space available for 
I 
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transport into China. 11 93 Although in February 1943, the United 
States alloted five more Lend-Lease planes for CNAC, their use was 
restricted to military purposes. China did not get any Lend-Lease 
transport planes before November, 1944 when Donald M. Nelson, 
Chairman of the American War Production Board and the architect of 
the Chinese War Productionoard (CWPB) helped to get some more 
transport planes. 
Lend-Lease, however, made significant contributions in raising 
the carrying capacity of the CNAC and US Ferry Command from the 
Indian stockpiles. Although they were necessarily far less than the 
60,000 tons a month that had been scheduled to go to Burma on the 
land routes, air shipment substantially increased the tonnage as 
more Lend-Lease planes were assigned to this route in 1943 and 
subsequently. 94 
Lend-Lease also came to assist the petroleum procurement 
program of the Chinese Government. In 1941 the Chinese Government 
ordered thermal cracking and polymerization plants capable of 
producing low octane gasoline for trucks from the US. Since 
gasoline was desperately needed for war effort, the US War 
Department procured 122 tons of oil producing and refinery equipment 
designed for air lift especially for the Kansu Oil Field Project. 
About 70% of this material was shipped overseas, but "on account of 
the unfavorable turn of the situation in Burma, a portion of the 
machinery was lost at Bhamo and Wanting. 11 95 The remaining 30% of 
the material was held up in US storage due to inadequate allocations 
for air shipment over the HUMP.96 Later on, at the end of 1944 the 
Chinese War Production Board adopted an extensive program to develop 
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and standardize the oil industry in China. 
Until the establishment of the CWPB, Lend-Lease could do little 
to promote the industrial needs of unoccupied China. It was, 
however, successful in sending portions of Tire retreading plants 
and oil reclaiming plants through Treasury procrement program. Also, 
it took a policy of procuring and supplying to China small 
quantities of textiles machinery and accessories for 
papermachinery, copper wire, and sundry machinery from India.97 
Most of the industrial plants and parts for China during this time 
were either stockpiled in India or in the US. 
By 1943, the US Government had supplied $105,130 worth of 
industrial goods to the Chinese Government, and also had provided 
laboratory equipment needed to carryout electorical research.98 
Chinese industries also received assistance from some private US 
associations and organisations. In the spring of 1942, twenty 
leading US industrialists requested the US Government to grant a 
major loan for the development of the Chinese Industrial Co-
operation, on the ground of post-war economic and commercial US 
interests in China. 99 As a result of the efforts of American 
Industrial Co-operation (Amindusco), Inc., the American Committee in 
Aid of Chinese Industrial Co~~peratives, China got a total of 
$118,230,417.25 between June 3, 1943 and March 31, 1945 from 
Amindusco, New York.lOO Moreover, the Amindusco also took the 
initiative in removing serious handicaps to the rapid expansion of 
Chinese industries due to the shortage of technical personnel by 
sending technical experts in fields such as small iron smelting, 
cotton spinning, wool textile manufacturing, co-operative marketing, 
98 
and business analysis. In June 1942, Arnindusco sent Reverend Dr. 
J. Henry Carpenter who had been associated for a long time with the 
Co-operative movements in the US, Newfoundland, ~nd Mexico to China 
to help its 2400 industrial co-operatives.101 The Organization was 
brought under centralised control and the considerable autonomy 
which had been previously enjoyed by regional and local industrial 
co-operatives headquarters was ended.102 
After transportation and industry came the "Ministry" programs, 
which "covered those projects for supply of equipment and services 
to Chinese agencies and military forces for use outside of the 
Chinese Army program. 11 103 Under this program, the War Department 
sent raw and semi-finished materials, tools, and equipment for 
arsenals, and essential industries, drugs and medicine, and 
equipment which had a direct bearing on the Chinese war effort. War 
Department sources contributed an important share of the Chinese 
Ministry Program. At the beginning of Lend-Lease, the Ministry 
program was "originated in China Defense Supplies or in the Chinese 
government agencies without the recommendations of the US Theater 
Commander's office in China. Different Chinese Ministries would 
directly submit their requirement lists to the War Department. 
Later, in order to make sure.that the requirements would not 
interfere with the US military effort, a procedure for investigation 
was introduced by the War Department Military Aid Representative and 
Theater Command Representative before the Ministry projects were 
considered by the War Department. After the establishment of FEA, 
its representative at Chungking also participated in reviewing the 
Ministry requirements. When the Chinese War Production Board was 
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established, it co-operated with the FEA in screening the Ministry 
Programs.104 
Communication materials formed an important part in the Chinese 
ministry program. In a world of damaged transportation and in an 
esxtremely isolated situation, US Army officials in China and the 
War department realized the need to send communication equipment to 
China to facilitate the flow of information about the enemy and also 
about their overall situation. Communication equipment for Chinese 
Ministries shipped to China under Lend-Lease was destined either for 
military forces not included in the War Department sponsored Chinese 
Army program or for civilian use in connection with military 
operations. The Chinese Ministry requirements included such major 
items as all purpose radios, short-wave radio transmitters and 
receivers, switch boards, teletype writers, meteorological 
equipment, and hundreds of tons of wire. Besides the major items, 
the US Government shipped a considerable tonnage of spare parts for 
maintenance as well as parts and raw materials for the manufacture 
of signal eqipment ·in the two main interior plants as well as 
numerous family type shops inside China.105 After 1941, the US 
procured about 14,000 tons of Lend-Lease communication materials for 
China. Moreover, in 1945 under the "1945 Non-Stilwell Program" or 
B-45 list" 933 tons of communications materials were granted to 
China.106 Also for training and entertainment of 300 Division 
Chinese troops not included in the war department sponsored Chinese 
Army program, the US under the Lend-Lease program sent about 25 tons 
of highly critical material "which included Cameras, Projection 
equipment, power units, raw negative film, developing material, and 
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training films."107 
Another US contribution to China's war effort was the building 
up of Chinese arsenals. Since it was not possible to carry a huge 
amount of arsenal equipment over the HUMP,the US decided to 
reorganize the Chinese small family type arsenals by supplying of 
raw materials. Much of the raw material was procured by the FEA. 
On the other hand, the war department procured mainly finished and 
semi-finished materials such as barrel forgings, trench mortars, 
rifle and machine gun barrels, powder, explosives, manufacturing 
gauges, and ammunition components.108 After the Japanese occupation 
of Burma, it became increasingly difficult for the US to supply a 
large quantity of raw materials to China by air. Except for copper, 
material was held in US storage for shipment at the earliest 
possible moment. Moreover, the Japanese had.captured Chinese areas 
in which small personal weapons were made. Without them an Army 
could not function. Thus the basic or fundamental necessity was to 
supply at least rifles and ammunition to the field. The US as well 
as Britain and other allied powers wanted to keep China in the war 
against Japan. Therefore, they had to deal with the issue of 
putting a rifle and ammunition in the hands of every Chinese soldier 
' ' capable of carrying the weapon. At the end of 1942, however, the 
supply program of the China Defense Supplies Inc. (CDS), contained 
"rifle powder, •copper, zinc, and bullet Cups, all for making small 
arms ammunition." Arrangements were also made to procure saltpeter, 
acetone, benzol, and glycerine from India where these were mostly 
available. 109 In 1943, arsenal raw materials flown in amounted to 
3,519 tons and in the first 8 months of 1944 3,960 only.110 
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Even the United States had to pay attention to the Chinese 
soldier's standard of living. Under the Quarter Master portion of 
the Ministry program, which was responsible for uniforms, residence, 
health, and supply of necessary commodities of everyday life of the 
soldiers, the US delivered to China about 1200 tons of supplies such 
as blankets, canvas shoes for non-Chinese program forces, 
multivitamin tablets for dietary supplements, and DDT powder. To 
protect the Chinese soldiers from the severe cold winter, blankets 
and shoes were provided, while the tablets and DDT helped prevent 
malaria and other diseases. The Quarter Master progrram in China 
was comparatively smaller than in other theaters because much of the 
material normally considered as Quarter Master supplies, such as 
cotton sheeting, foodstuff, and household commodities were available 
from India or were provided by the FEA after 1943.111 
The sad situation of China's medical services led the United 
States to adopt a medical program for the Chinese Armed Forces. 
Under the Ministry program, the War Department procured about 5,500 
tons of medicine, 0£ which about 50 tons were allocated to different 
Chinese Veterinary hospitals for care and treatment of animals, and 
150 tons were allocated for medical care of Chinese arsenal workers. 
Realizing the extreme crisis :of medicine in China, in July, 1943, 
the office of the Surgeon General of the US Army rendered valuable 
assistance to China by managing the purchase of medical supplies 
which were paid for under Lend-Lease appropriations and delivered to 
China Defense Supplies, Inc., at the seaboard for shipment to 
China.112 Realizing the need to control malaria in the Chinese 
Army, the FEA approved immediate procurement of five million tablets 
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of quinacrine from November allocations in 1943. Under another 
program it started procuring 75 million tablets for monthly 
allocations valued at $337,SOo.113 The medical tonnage constituted 
the latest technical medical products. Under some other allocations 
China was given all types of military medicines and drugs, surgical 
instruments, X-Ray equipment and films, training manuals and the 
latest developments in sulfa-drugs and Penicillin. Besides the 
Lend-Lease procurement and supply program,the other organizations 
which delivered huge medical supplies to China were, the American 
Redcross, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, and China 
Relief Inc. Also, the Rockefeller Foundation arranged training 
programs for Chinese nationals inside the USA.114 
Under the Lend-Lease program, several land-routes were either 
constructed or developed for war purposes. After the closure of the 
Burma Road in May, 1942, surveys for additional landroutes began 
immediately. At first in early 1942, a route running from Sinikang 
province down through the eastern Himalayas to Sadiya in the 
northeast of India had been surveyed and approved an an alternate 
route to the Burma Road. Although Lend-Lease requisitions for 
urgent equipment were approved and plans to begin construction were 
rushed, before construction began, the Burma road was cut and the 
project for an alternate landroute had been abandoned. The only 
remaining land route to China was the old North west Highway, or 
Marcopolo Road, across Sinkiang province from the Soviet Union. In 
1942 China suggested two alternate routes through the Soviet Union. 
One was from Iran and Karachi and hence via Central Asia to China's 
Northwest, and the second one was the air route via Alaska and 
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Siberia.115 Concerning the using of motor routes the US was ready 
to supply necessary trucks and gasoline to support the 
transportation on this route.1116 The Soviet Union, however, was 
rather reluctant to let other countries use its land as transit 
routes for China, most probably for fear of being attacked by Japan. 
The USSR refused to come to an understanding with Great Britain or 
the USA on this matter. In mid-1943 the US Lend-Lease authorities 
sent 500 trucks for use in the Sinkiang Sector, and the British sent 
a similar numbers of trucks from India. But when the first convoy 
of trucks reached Meshed, in Iran, in the fall of 1943, the Russians 
refused to let them pass through Russia.117 The US desperately 
needed to use this route for supplying industrial and civilian Lend-
Lease items from the Indian stockpiles in order to save the starving 
people in the border district of Free China.118 In another effort, 
the US in December, 1942, sent Gordon Bowles and a mechanic to India 
as representatives of the Board of Economic Warefare (BEW) and OLLA 
to explore possible motor routes through Afghanistan and Russian 
Turkestan for the purpose of opening a new channel of supply to 
China.119 The Soviet Union, however, again refused to grant them 
any kind of visa and the mission was not a fruitful one. Finally, 
after long bargaining both with the British in India, and the US in 
the fall of 1944, Russia gave her consent to the entrance of a 
convoy of vehicles which would reach China via Central Asia. But 
before this convoy could leave Iran it was diverted because of 
disturbances in Sinkiang province. It entered China early in 1945 
Via the Stilwell Road.120 
The US also tried to open caravan trails and coolie routes 
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across the Himalayas through Tibet from India. Although it was much 
shorter, only pack animals could cross the high mountain passes, and 
approximately six months would have been required to make the long 
trip. Moreover, the Dalailama Government of Tibet objected to the 
passage of military equipment through Tibet. The unfavorable 
weather, political troubles between China, Tibet, and the British on 
the question of Tibet's sovereignty led to the cancellation of this 
project. Still, in the swnmer of 1944,a very small quantity of 
Lend-Lease goods was carried by mule Caravans through Tibet.121 
The United States, however, was successful in developing a new 
road to China, the Ledo Road. On December 1, 1942 its construction 
began under the overall control and supervision of General Stilwell, 
who was the driving force behind its construction. Financed by 
Lend-Lease, American and Chinese Army engineers struck out through 
the Naga Hills to build this new road. It needed almost two years 
to complete and was a 600 mile long land route from Assam, India to 
Kunming. At first it was called the Ledo road but later on it was 
named the Stilwell 'Road by Chiang Kai-shek. It was completed in 
early 1945, and paralleling the road was a four inch pipe line 
which, "in addition to supplying fuel for vehicles, could also 
deliver quantities of aviatidn gasoline. 11 122 The first convoy of 
goods over the road reached China on January 28, 1945. By September 
30, 1945, 143,300 tons of goods were delivered to China over the 
Stilwell Road.123 
The total value of Lend-Lease goods and services supplied to 
China through December 31, 1943, amounted to 201 million dollars, of 
which 175.6 million dollars represented goods and 25.4 million 
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dollars represented services rendered. In addition, goods valued at 
191.7 million dollars were consigned to the American Commanding 
general in the China-Burma-India Theater for transfer to China. 11124 
In another study based on FEA's "Cumulative Report of Fiscal 
Operations Under the Lend-Lease Act," it has been estimated that the 
total value of total Lend-Lease aid to China from May 6,1941 to July 
· 125 31, 1944 was$ 418,178,684.85. 
Besides Lend-Lease, the US through the State Department's 
Cultural relations program, also provided American experts to aid 
with such questions as food production, the management of co-
operatives, commodity of standardization, and engineering methods. 
In January 1942, the US Cultural-Relations program was extended to 
China. It was decided by the US State Department to send 
outstanding technical and educational specialists to China, to 
extend aid to Chinese students, and to furnish urgently needed 
information material in different branches of knowledge.126 
Moreover, under the civilian Lend-Lease program, Chinese engineers 
and technicians were also provided with training and skills.127 
Although these program existed before Pearl Harbor, after United 
States entry into the war, the Department of State expanded the 
program with funds provided by the Board of Economic Warfare, the 
Lend-Lease Administration; and the Office of War Information.128 
The US Department of State consolidated the work of Lend-Lease 
by introducing a program of cultural and technical exchanges with 
China. To enable China to become self-dependent in food,the US sent 
many agricultural experts to China. Experts in corn and potato 
breeding, pharmaceutical chemistry, insecticides, fungicides, 
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veterinary medicine, and chemical and mechanical engineers were sent 
to China.129 Later on, the Chinese requested experts in 
agriculture, public health, industrial engineering, education, 
journalists, and telephone engineering. Efforts were also made to 
create western educated and well principled intellectuals. The 
Department sent student trainers, periodicals, magazines, books, 
microfilms, and motion pictures. It also began a radio broadcasting 
program for the Chinese. Many Chinese intellectuals were also sent 
to the USA to acquire information about post war "American views in 
regard to international Affairs, or includes the influencing of such 
views in a way favorable to co-operation between the US and China is 
uncertain at this time. 11 130 US professors were invited to lecture 
at Chinese institutions, and Chinese technicians were sent to the US 
to study technological and managerial subjects. Many experts were 
sent in different fields.131 Besides, every year Chinese students 
were being sent to the US supported by different sources of funding. 
The Chinese-American student exchange program reached its peak 
in 1944 when thousands of Chinese students and experts were resident 
in the us.132 The program, however, was threatened by the Chinese 
Government's policy of thought control. Chiang's government went so 
far as to send a superintend~nt of Chinese students in the US to 
ensure their political reliability.133 Chiang's policies received 
massive criticism in the US press and shocked the State 
Department. 134 To State Department planners, it was obvious that 
Chiang wanted American technology but not American democratic 
practices because th~se threatened the Kuomintang•~ position.135 
Beginning in the fall of 1944, Chiang's government drastically 
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restricted the study of the Western social sciences and invited only 
American technological experts to China. In fact, by 1945, the 
cultural program had been turned into strictly a te_chnological_ 
program emphasizing agriculture, hydro-electric power, and 
industry.136 Perhaps the most significant result of this change in 
policy was the development of the Yangtze Gorge hydro-electric plan 
which eventually came under the Chinese War Production Board. 
By the end of 1943 US Officials had developed a number of plans 
dealing wfth both China's international standing and domestic 
issues, but the Chinese had yet to develop any poli~y of their own 
on Post war reconstruction. They had a vague idea of the formation 
of a capitalist China based on European and American technical co-
operation but not much else. The only area where there was a 
definite policy was the return of Chinese territory occupied by the 
Japanese since the 1895 Sino-Japanese war. China intended to be a 
major regional power and part of the "World Organisation" [i,e,the 
UNO), and she demanded an independent Korea. All these Chinese 
policies were supported by the US Department.of State on various 
occasions. 
Because of its long involvement in Chinese affairs, the FEA was 
acutely aware of the weaknesses of the Chinese Nationalist regime 
insofar as its ability to wage war and conduct peace were concerned. 
Also, by reason of its control over Lend-Lease assistance, the FEA 
was in a position to offer guidance to Chinese industrial 
development. 
For the above reasons the FEA, under the supervision of Alex 
Taub, the industrial advisor to FEA, developed a post-war industrial 
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program for China called "Guide to China's Industry." In this 
program were outlined the desirable size, character, and costs of 
factories which might be constructed for the production of a wide 
range of products. This study also included plans for 
transportation, communication, water conservation, and elective 
power production. It included plans for the training of Chinese 
technical and managerial personnel, for the development of 
industrial medicine and for centralized research in industrial 
development. The plan further recommended how industry should be 
distributed among the north, central, south, coastal, and Manchurian 
regions. Finally the program recommended the development of 
projects similar to the American TVA for flood control and 
production of electrical power. Also in 1944, the U.S. hydro-
electric expert, John L. Savage, was lent to China and Savage made a 
valuable contribution to the development of the Yangtze Gorge 
project and similar other projects.137 
When the "Guide to China's Industry" was completed in 1944, 
Lauchlin Currie asked Taub to join Donald M. Nelson's party and 
present the "Guide" to the Chinese government. While Donald Nelson 
established the W.P.B. and set the pattern for an improvement in 
Chinese war production, Taub ·'presented the "Guide" to Dr. Wong Wen-
hao, Minister of Economic Affairs for China. This report had a ,, 
strong influence on the War Production Board's plans and activities 
in connection with China's industrial development.138 
US Civilian Lend-Lease aid to China was greatly supplemented by 
different financial aid programs designed to stabilize the Chinese 
currency and thereby to check inflation. In April, 1941, the US 
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signed a new agreement with China to purchase Yuan up to an amount 
equivalent to $50 million dollars. At the end of the same month 
with British participation a Chinese Stabilization Board was 
established which was composed of five members, three Chinese, one 
British, and one American.139 
In fact, US financial aid to China, took many forms. Currency 
stabilization was by far the most important, followed by the needs 
for massive credits to finance the war effort and keep Chinese 
morale intact. Silver was also exported from the US to China.140 
In 1938 the US purchased silver from China and in 1942 and 1943 it 
exported silver to China more or less for the purpose of controlling 
inflation in China. In January, 1942, Chiang requested a one 
billion dollar loan from the US which immediately sparked a policy 
crisis within the FDR administration. 141 Ambassador Gauss, Henry 
Morgenthau Jr, and his staff within the treasury department, 
vehemently objected to a lump-sum loan to Chiang without assurances 
as to how the money was to be spent. Both Gauss and Morgenthau were 
aware of the extraordinary corruption of the Chiang regime. 
Hornbeck, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Lauchlin Currie, and FDR himself 
favored loans to China for short and longer range purposes.142 The 
impasse was not broken untill' the Cabinet meeting of 30th June, 
1942, when FDR overruled the objections of Henry Morgenthau Jr, and 
approved a five hundred million dollar loan to China. After 
Congress passed the Loan bill and FDR signed it on February 7, 1942, 
the US and China entered into negotiations in an attempt to reach 
an agreement. Here the Chinese were adamant in their insistence 
that the US should not exercise oversight on how the money was to be 
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spent.143 Subsequent Chinese use of the funds revealed the failure 
on China's part to use the 500 million dollar credit in a productive 
way. "Money was drain out of the Treasury in large, hapazard 
amounts" as Schaller shows, and allocated to a bond and Certificate 
issue within China. Though supposedly a device to reduce inflation, 
it had the opposite result ... Finance Minister H. H. Kung had 
transferred millions of dollars worth of Gold from Chinese 
Government accounts into his own name. 11 144 
Although Morgenthau lost his battle over the issue of a loan to 
China, he won on the s1lver issue. The Chinese requested that 
silver be shipped to China under Lend-Lease for coinnage. 
Morgenthau successfully short-circuited the plan by arguing that war 
time conditions did not permit the shipment of massive amounts of 
silver to Asia. He further argued that given the Chinese habit of 
hoarding silver, it would not circulate and therefore would not 
improve the Chinese economy.145 
The Civilian Lend-Lease program for China was highly 
coordinated and well organized with the dispatching of the American 
War Production Mission to China headed by Donald M. Nelson, Chairman 
of the American War Production Board in August 1944. In order to 
improve the state of Chinese 'industrial production, Nelson 
recommended the establishment of a Chinese War Production Board 
•I 
(CWPB), which eventually became the sole guiding agency of China's 
economic sector. Among other things, the CWPB began to work as a 
"screening agency" or "clearing house" of all Chinese Civilian Lend-
Lease requests. Requests for Lend-Lease items of civilian nature 
from different Chinese Ministries were to be submitted to the CWPB 
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office, where the American War Production Mission members who worked 
as advisors or specialists in CWPB carefully excluded unnecessary 
items. Also, other US agencies cooperated with the CWPB in this 
regard. The screened requests were then sent to Washington where 
the War Department, FEA,and the Chinese Supply Commission 
Representatives would investigate the requests and exclude the less 
necessary or unnecessary items or those which could be produced in 
China. Screening by CWPB saved valuable space in the airplanes 
which could carry direct war materials in an increasing amount. 
It was really an important contribution of the CWPB in war time. 
On the other hand, War production Board specialists often 
fought or argued against the US Army's unreasonable demands for more 
military items to be carried over the HUMP, thus neglecting the 
civilian economy. For example, when General Wedemeyer demanded the 
transfer of C-46 Lend-Lease air planes from CNAC to US military 
purposes, Nelson strongly opposed it and argued that the US must not 
ignore the civilian economic sector. Under Nelson's strong 
pressure, Wedemeyer-'s demands were rejected by Washington.146 
Again, as a result of Nelson's recommendations, China got 15,000 
trucks and· 30 C-46 air planes. The CWPB worked not only for 
immediate war needs but also :for strengthening the civilian economy 
and this had a far reaching impact on outlining a post-war economic 
' development in China. Undoubtedly, handling of civilian Lend-Lease 
affairs offered the CWPB this opportunity. The US Mission 
Specialists served as a check on the Army's overall supremacy in 
Lend-Lease requisitioning and helped keep the civilian sector alive. 
After the surrender of Japan, the US worried about the 
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repatriation of Japanese soldiers, the transportation of Chinese KMT 
soldiers to North China and Manchuria to prevent its falling into 
Communist hands, and the strenghening of the KMT army for China's 
reoccupation. Therefore, the US continued to provide straight 
military Lend-Lease to China 60 days after V-J Day. But the 
treatment of civilian supplies took a different direction. 
Although T.V. Soong and other KMT officials asked for an 
unconditional commitment for $200 million dollars in gold, 20,000 
tons of textiles on Lend-Lease, and 15,000 trucks, later increased 
to 19,000, the US FEA officials did not pay as much attention to 
them, as they did to requests for military Lend-Lease.147 The 
reason was probably that civilian items were not as necessary as 
military items. 
But the civilian Lend-Lease program continued after V-J Day. 
In fact, with the defeat of Japan, the communication line with China 
had opened in every direction,and at the same time, demands for 
military supplies to be used against Japan were also reduced. All 
these factors helped bring about more shipments of civilian goods to 
China. Moreover, following the defeat of Japan, the United States 
developed a program "to execute its policy consisted of the 
extension of credit to enable China to purchase civilian type Lend-
Lease goods having a peace. time value ... "148 
In carrying out the'Lend-Lease termination policy, Leo T. 
Crowley, the FEA Administrator, advised the Chinese Supply 
Commission on August 18, 1945, that no new contracts would be made 
by the FEA for goods or services to be furnished under non-military 
Lend-Lease. The Truman Administration stated that supplies which 
113 
were in the process of manufacture, in storage, awaiting shipment, 
or not yet transferred, and services within agreed programs could be 
obtained against payment on appropriate terms and conditions. The 
Chinese were also notified that all existing non-military supplies 
that had been transferred on Lend-Lease terms and were in shipment 
or under Chinese control at the time of V-J Day could be retained 
against payment or appropriate terms. The continuation of cash 
reimbursement for Lend-Lease shipments for a period of 60 days after 
V-J Day for .agreed programs was also announced in the 
administrator's letter.149 
In an exchange of letters in August 1945, FEA Administrator Leo 
T. Crowley and T.V. Soong agreed to the continuation of the Chinese 
Lend-Lease program, which was under the jurisdiction of the FEA, on 
terms of payment over a thirty year's period at 2-3/8 percent 
interest per year. The Chinese accepted all the goods in the 
"pipeline. 11 150 Arrangements were made immediately for the 
resumption of manufacture and for the shipments of the "pipeline" 
materials. A formal agreement based on the commitments made between 
the FEA and T.V.Soong was concluded on June 14,1946. Under this 
agreement, the financing and disposal of the undelivered "pipeline" 
Lend-Lease goods for China, ·which were in inventory, in procurement, 
and in process of delivery prior to V-J Day, were covered under this 
' agreement. The agreement took effect at 12:00 A.M., September 2, 
1945 and was made "under the authority of the Act of March 11, 1941 
and subject to its conditions. 11 151 The agreement specified that the 
United States would transfer to China and that China would accept 
the goods available in the United States in inventory or in 
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procurement, which were requisitioned and contracted for prior to 
August 18, 1945 but which had not been transferred prior to 
September 2,1945. 
China agreed to pay for the cost of inland and ocean freight 
estimated at $10,900,000, and the US furnished American shipping to 
transport the material. It was also stated that nothing in the 
agreement was to modify or affect the final settlement and 
determination under the Lend-Lease Act or the mutual aid agreement. 
The articles covered in the agreement were in the following 
categories and represented the approximate dollar value listed: 
Communications: 
Transportation ....... $32,000,000 
Signal .............. 150,000 
Industry and Mining ........... 2,675,000 
Ordanance: 





Industrial Equipment ..... . 
Medical ................ . 




The agreement specified that the payment should be made by July 
1,1976, in thirty annual instalments, beginning July 1, 1947, at an 
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interest rate of 2-3/8 percent. Later on, the sale of US War 
Surplus property to China also strengthened the Chinese civilian 
economy.152 
Civilian Lend-Lease points up a tremendous paradox in America's 
China policy. It is the paradox of a conflict between short-term 
and long-term foreign policy goals. In the short-term, immediate 
necessities required that China stay in the war against Japan. This 
was true even after the nwnerous successes of Admiral Nimitz's 
Central Pacific offensive. Even with the capture of Tarawa, and the 
Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands, it was still necessary for 
the US to keep as many Japanese troops as possible, tied down 
occupying mainland China. In the final analysis; US long term 
foreign aid to China was handicapped by this short-term goal. 
In the long-term, the US sought to build a viable democratic 
China. The problem was that these long term goals were sacrificed 
to the short term goal of defeating Japan. The restructuring of 
China would require a long-term commitment from the US which would 
be comparable to the Marashall Plan to Europe. 
In Europe, the US had societies and an infrastructure which was 
already industrialized. Its population not only knew the industrial 
revolution, they had made it! In China, the situation was almost 
exactly the reverse. Long-term US foreign policy goals would have 
required the complete economic restructuring of Chinese politics and 
society, would have required China to pass through the same 
industrial revolution that Europe had already gone through 200 years 
earlier. Moreover, it was easier and more efficient to ship 
military munitions, and air craft to China than it was to 
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restructure a corrupt Chinese society in the middle of the war. 
Consequently, civilian Lend-Lease and other financial operations 
in China were not as extensive as in Britain, French North Africa, 
and in other allied countries. The transportation bottlenecks, the 
negative attitude of some of the US officials and Generals toward 
the Nationalist Government's corruption and vices, and China's 
failure to play an important role in the war against Japan 
decisively determined the amount of her civlian Lend-Lease aid from 
the US. On the other hand, the administrative arrangements of the 
Lend-Lease program in China emphasized military Lend-Lease over 
civilian. The military Lend-Lease aid to China, since the 
establishment of the Stilwell Command [late 1942], consisted of 
supplies consigned to the Commanding General, United States Army 
Forces (USAF) and China-Burma and India (CB&I) theater, "for 
transfer to the Republic of China" at his discretion and subject to 
his continuing supervision. The military advances by the Japanese, 
the fall of Burma, and the occupation of the Burma Road by Japan 
further changed the character of Lend-Lease requirements to those of 
a more direct military nature. Moreover,the fall of Burma involved 
the placing of all transit stocks of China Lend-Lease goods in India 
in US Army custody, subject to diversions for US Army or Indian use. 
All existing procurement operations for China Lend-Lease materials 
were suspended. 
The contraction in the civilian Lend-Lease program had also 
been accompanied by the development of an increasingly critical 
attitude on the part of the War Department toward the continuance oJ 
any non-military Lend-Lease·program for China. This attitude, 
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constantly encountered by the Lend-Lease administration in its 
routine liasion contacts with the War Department was clearly 
reflected on numerous actions taken by high officials of the War 
Department. On numerous occasions the Lend-Lease program had to 
face opposition from the War Department on the question of 
procurement and supplying desperately needed Chinese materials like 
transportation trucks and planes.153 Military necessity, however, 
always dictated that war materials had first priority of 
transportation. In the final analysis it was more important to keep 
the Chinese Army fighting Japanese troops and her Air Force supplied 
with fuel than shipping civilian supplies.154 
The attitude of the War Department was based on several 
considerations including the short supply in the US and the limited 
transport facilities into China. But even when supply was 
available, the attitude of the War Department was that equipment 
should be supplied directly to General Stilwell and not to the 
Chinese authorities. In short, the War Department's attitude was 
entirely guided by·the immediate military considerations, not by the 
far-reaching vision of the State Department and the President. On 
the other hand, the Lend-Lease Administration desired that some 
military supplies be furnish~d directly to the Chinese in fulfilment 
of a national political commitment, even though it might be 
I ,: 
disadvantageous militarily.155 In short, China's failure to 
participate actively in the war against Japan and the awareness of 
US officials in China and General Stilwell of Chinese inefficiency 
and corruption in handling supplies were basic reasons for the War 
Department's opposition to the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies 
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directly to China.156 
Despite the War Department's vigorous opposition, Lend-Lease 
representatives continued procurement operations for China, and this 
resulted in the stockpiling of civilian lendlease goods in Indian 
storage together with military supplies.157 "So little can be 
delivered", Stettinius stated as a reason for stockpiling, "that her 
[China's] war economy is operating on slim reserves, when she needs 
something, she needs it in a hurry. The war in China cannot wait 
while we send halfway around the world for it. That is one reason 
why supplies have been stock piled in India ready to go ..... The 
roads to China will not always be closed. One of our first military 
objectives in Asia is to reopen them. 11 158 Such plans encompassed 
the provision of additional transport equipment, munitions and 
chemical plants, power plants, oil refinery equipment, container 
manufacturing facilities, machines tools, and other items which had 
to be deferred. 
In those undertakings the Lend-Lease Administration 
continuously encountered objections from the War Department on 
civilian Lend-Lease which had been resolved only through direct 
appeal to the President either by the Chinese themselves or by OLLA. 
The frequent need for direct 'appeal to the President discredited the 
relations between US and Chinese supply agencies, as well as between 
the State and War Department. At last in September, 1943 the Lend-
Lease Administration proposed a high level committee under the 
President to review the situation, with Harry Hopkins as Chairman if 
possible.159 Although FDR responded enthusiastically, nothing 
happened. As we have seen, the endeavors of the Lend-Lease 
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Administration were based on political considerations and political 
pledges. These considerations were, however, ill-defined and 
urgently in need of authoritative review. Even the political 
considerations of the State Department could not provide the Lend-
Lease Administration with a workable charter, for the State 
Department did not review any War Department decisions or actions 
based on purported military considerations. As a result, the War 
Department did not accept political considerations as the guiding 
principle in its military program in the China theater, and most of 
the time did not like to respond to the decisions of the State 
Department.160 
Toward the end of 1943 there was, thus, a great need for an 
agency to review the status of the Lend-Lease program for China. 
The formation of such a committee which" might be directed to 
prepare recommendations" as Arthur B. Van Bushkirk, Deputy Lend-
Lease Administrator in Washington suggested, "concerning the extent 
and nature of the non-military aid, if any, which should and can be 
undertaken during 1944 to the National Government of the Republic of 
China, apart from the Army Supply Program schedule of material for 
consignment to General Stilwell. 11 161 The British meanwhile, decided 
to jump into the matter by ptoposing a joint three power Committee 
to determine Chinese "non-military assistance". As proposed by the 
Foreign Office this involved the formation of a "Screening 
Committee" to determine Chinese requirements.162 Sitting in 
ChunKing, Stilwell was suspicious of British intentions. He 
questioned both British motivation and the political purposes of any 
such Committee. 163 In Washington, Dean Acheson was equally 
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skeptical about the British move. He felt that such an arrangement 
would be a technical violation of Chinese sovereignty. In November 
1943, the State Department sent to the British Embassy a 
diplomatically worded aide memoire politely declining the 
proposal.164 Clearly, civilian Lend-Lease was to be determined on 
bilateral lines between Washington and Chungking with no 
interference from an outside power. 
With the passing of time, many high ranking US officials 
pressed for steps to cure the problems of China permanently. As John 
D.Sumner, the US economic expert on post-war China stated, "Despite 
its brevity, ... American Economic assistance to China during the war 
period illustrates the ad-hoc character of our policy. The monetary 
and credit position of the Chinese Government was in jeopardy; the 
United States granted substantial loans. China's war production was 
on the verge of collapse. Gradually it was generally acknowledged 
that the US "should formulate an economic policy which will, over a 
period of years, afford a useful vehicle to aid in achieving the 
American objective-of a·strong, united and increasingly democratic 
China. The United States, however, was also at this time in a 
unique position if it had the intention to do so, it could have 
significantly influenced the: course of China's development." The 
policy of the FDR administration was not only to assist China, but 
also to convert her to a post-war industrial and democratic ally. 
Therefore, seeking to balance his report and the prevailing 
governmental attitude, Sumner recommended a long term, well planned, 
and internationally-financed industrialisation program for China.165 
Other US officials were also thinking along the same line. For 
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example, the need for a far-reaching long-term civilian supply 
prog~am was supported by John Carter Vincent, head of the China 
Affairs Division of the Far Eastern Office of the State Department. 
Carter recommended a welfare economy rather than a defense economy 
for China.166 Moreover, the failure of the 500 million dollar loan 
to improve China's inflationary situation and the War Department's 
continued strict policy on civilian supplies to China led the FDR 
administration to think about something other than providing 
supplies from the US. The administration realized that what was 
desperately needed was to increase the internal production of China, 
which would in turn solve all other incidental problems. It was 
also believed that wartime production would also lead to a post war 
reconstruction program, which meant China's ultimate self-
dependency. 
Although civilian Lend-Lease encountered enormous problems and 
suffered a set back in the amount of total supplies, it definitely 
contributed to the strengthening of the Chinese war effort by 
carrying out different creative programs within China. With the 
help of limited "HUMP" supplies, it enabled different war time 
industries to operate which again helped keep the civilian Chinese 
morale intact. Various civilian supplies, when they reached China, 
confirmed the Chinese faith that the US was on their side against 
•! 
Japan. Besides this immediate war time objective, civilian Lend-
Lease, through its war time production program, developed the 
structure of a post-war economic or industrial development program 
which had far-reaching consequences in the post-war period. 
The far-reaching goal of China's industrialization, however, 
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was picked up by the United States through the dispatching of a Wa, 
Production Board to China in 1944. 
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Chapter Three 
America's Effort to Exploit China's Vast Manpower: Military Lend 
Lease to China, 1941-1945. 
Lend-Lease was primarily designated to strengthen the war 
efforts of the allied nations against the Axis.1 In the Far East, 
China appeared to be the nation that deserved most military Lend-
Lease aid. Part of the aid to China was military, another part was 
civilian. As we have seen, under civilian Lend-Lease, China received 
arsenal materials, construction materials and equipment, 
communication materials and other things. Military Lend-Lease, on 
the other hand, sent to China materials directly related to the 
immediate prosecution of the war like, aircraft, weapons, 
ammunition, ·officer training units, food supplies for the army, 
etc.2 
In the face of the Japanese advance, the United States was 
forced to adopt a long term strategy toward the Pacific region and 
China. Developments in Europe, Japan's rapid conquest of Southeast 
Asia, the perilous .situation in the Southwest and Central Pacific 
made Chinese territory vitally important for the bombing of and 
eventual direct attack upon Formosa, Manchuria, Korea and Japan.3 
Considering all these factors, the United States advocated "the 
immediate objective of effective joint prosecution of the war 
through direct military assist~nce to China, promotion of Sino-
American military co-operation, and assistance in mobilizing .all of 
China's human and material resources against Japan." Parallel with 
the United States' war efforts to strengthen "the political and 
economic bases of China's war effort", the US also sought "to 
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reorganize, train, and equip part of the Chinese National Army as a 
compact striking force capable of playing a major part in driving 
the Japanese from China".4 Thus, the US provided China with needed 
equipment and technical advisors to recruit, equip, train, and 
organize the Chinese army so that it could defeat Japan. The 
principal means of exploiting China's massive manpower was Lend-
Lease. It should be noted that during this period, the Lend-Lease 
effort was also directed "toward the strengthening of the economic 
bases of China's war effort through: expansion of supply routes and 
services into China; Lend-Lease supplies to the limit of transport 
facilities; and Joint Sino-American measures to strengthen China's 
war production, increase its supply of consumer goods, improve its 
internal tr~nsport system, and combat its serious inflation11 • 5 That 
required practically bringing a social and economic revolution to 
China, which did not happen despite the strenous efforts on the part 
of the US to do so. 
Despite the fact that the United States took China seriously as 
a potential ally against Japan, China had practically nothing to 
contribute to the war effort in terms of an organized military 
power. The Chinese army was composed of a coalition army of three 
hundred divisions. Under th~ direct command of Chiang Kai-shek 
there were thirty to forty divisions, and the rest were divided up 
into private armies under the command of different commanders in 
various war areas. Therefore, the Chinese armies were not organized 
in the modern military sense. 6 It also lacked all the qualities of 
an armed force in the Western sense. In an OSS report prepared 
between November 16-30, 1944, the main reasons behind the 
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inefficiency of the Chinese armies were especially attributed to the 
brutal methods of recruiting and training, the exploitation of a 
common soldier by his officer, the lack of adeqaute equipment in the 
hands of fighting forces, and, above all, to the bad food 
conditions,7 As there was no Chinese Navy, China's feeble economic 
situation also prevented it from building a strong air force. 8 
Consequently, during the pre-Lend-Lease period, China continued to 
ask from'the United States several million dollars in economic 
credits, airplanes, American military advisors, and strategic arms. 9 
The US, however, refused to grant China a direct military role 
which, it believed would provoke Japan. The only pre-Lend-Lease 
military assistance to China from the US was the "unofficial 
encouragement to develop an airforce under Claire E. Chennault".lO 
At the beginning of May 1939, when Japan started heavy bombing of 
several Chinese cities, especially Chunking, China could do very 
little to resist. When subsequent developments in the Far East made 
air aid to China increasingly important, Chiang Kai-shek in October, 
1940, asked the US ·for help in the form of planes and American 
volunteers to fight both against the Japanese and the Communists.11 
China did not get plan.~s but did obtain a credit of US $100 million 
to purchase non-military items. Before the _end of 1940, however, 
there took place the organisation of the American Volunteer Group 
(AVG), which eventually came to be known as Chennault's Flying 
Tigers.12 
Even long before the US had become a belligerent, China was 
constantly requesting airplanes from the U.S. to build an air force. 
Due to these repeated request and several pro-Chinese groups' 
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advocacy in the US Administration, it was decided to help the 
Chinese unofficially in developing an air force. Actual 
arrangements for the provisions of American air power to the Chinese 
National Government began with the arrival in the US, in November, 
1940, of a Chinese Air Mission headed by P. T. Mow and Colonel 
Claire L. Chennault. The purpose of their mission was to build a 
strong, well-equipped Chinese Air Force and, in the meantime, to 
obtain some fighter planes and enlist volunteer American pilots to 
fly them. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek gave them wider authority to 
negotiate with American Officials, during which these "officials 
requested the best quality of American planes and equipment against 
Japan. 11 On November 25th, 1940, the Chinese handed over the long 
list of requirements to US officials.13 
Although the US realized the gravity of the situation and the 
"crying need" for a strong air force in China in the face of the 
"greatly improved Japanese plane, the famous Zero", it was not 
possible to meet China's huge needs when America could hardly meet 
the intense demands of Britain and its own domestic needs. 14 Still, 
on December, 4, 1940, the US State Department assured T. V. Soong 
that the US would provide China with 150 planes "within the 
comparatively near future".15 Two weeks later, when FDR was 
fascinated with a plan for bombing Japanese cities and airbases from 
China, Morgenthau and Hull, together with members of the China 
Defense Supplies Committee lobbied hard to divert bombers originally 
allotted to Britain. General George C. Marshall strongly opposed the 
proposal on the ground that Britain needed them more urgently and 
his view was finally accepted. In the end, after a long negotiation, 
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China received 100 P-40 B fighters which Britain released against a 
US promise of 200 newer model planes in May-July 1941. Since Lend-
Lease was not available at that time, China paid cash for those 
planes. The Flying Tigers were to be organised on the basis of these 
P-40s coming to China.16 
The chief outcome of the US pre-Pearl Harbor policy toward 
China was creation of the American Volunteer Group (AVP) under 
Claire Chennault.17 By late 1940, Chennault had concluded that the 
American pilots and ground crews could play a key role in a 
successful aviation program for China. Although the US Constitution 
prohibited nationals from serving in the armed forces of a 
belligerent, the war's imperatives compelled the US State Department 
to be more iiberal. In January, 1940, the Department declared that 
"acceptance of service in China as aviation instructors by 
Americans, not connected with the armed services was a private 
matter between them and China, so long as they did not join the 
combat forces 11 .l8 When in late November 1940, Japan recognized the 
puppet regime of Wang Ching-Wei, the State Department, Michael 
Schaller argues, at last "altered its position and had come to 
support more direct American aid" for China. The State Department 
informed the Chinese Embassy:that, besides developing a plan for 
military aid to China, "the US Government would no longer discourage 
•I 
American volunteer pilots from going to China as mercenaries".19 
Among the most prominent advocates for China's cause were Lauchlin 
Currie, Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and 
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.20 Chennault and William D. 
Pauley, later Ambassador to Peru and Brazil in the Truman 
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Administration, developed a scheme "to recruit American Military 
personnel who would resign their commissions and sign contracts with 
a private corporation, the Central Aircraft Manufacturing 
Corporation (CAMCO), which was, of course, a front". While FDR's 
Executive Order permitted the Army personnel to resign from the US 
armed forces, CAMCO maintained the pretense of neutrality on the 
part of the United States.21 The recruitment of the American 
Volunteer Group began in April, 1941. With the co-operation of the 
US Army and Navy, .Colonel Chennault gradually "secured the services 
of more than 100 veteran fliers, over half of them from the Naval 
Reserve, a few of them from Marine Corps, and the rest from the 
Army. The technical and ground crew personnel numbered more than 
150". 22 On August 1, 1941, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued an 
order which made the AVG a unit of China's Armed Forces. Within a 
few months, these men and their P-40 fighter planes would become 
famous as the "Flying Tigers". Although the AVG was disbanded on 
July 4, 1942, General Chennault remained in China to lead the 14th 
Air Force.23 In this way during 1940-41 "influential American 
officials worked closely with quasi-private individuals and special 
interest groups associated with the Chinese Nationals" and developed 
plans for "ostensibly privat~ American planes and pilots to assist 
the Chinese in a joint effort against Japan".The State and War 
Departments were not officially involved in the development of this 
clandestine air strategy, and Schaller believes the "Americans 
considered this a method of bolstering Chinese morale and warning 
Japan directly of the risk it ran in provoking the United States".24 
This indirect tactic of supplying provisions to China came to 
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an end when China was formally declared eligible as a Lend-Lease 
recipient country in May, 1941. To enhance the Allied war effort 
"President Roosevelt hoped", William P. Head contends, "that 
China's vast manpower supplied with American arms and material could 
be used to hold the Japanese at bay allowing the Western Allies to 
defeat Germany first."25 This prospect of a reorganized and well-
equipped Chinese army fighting by the side of the United States 
inspired FDR administration officials to provide open and increasing 
military Lend-Lease assistance to China. Even Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson believed that "the great tradition of American 
friendship with China constituted the foundation on which a joint 
military effort could be built, and a great military triumph over a 
common enemy would in turn further strengthen the traditional 
friendship leading to closer co-operation after victory".26 On the 
other hand, these expectations of FDR and other US officials were 
exploited by Chiang Kai-shek and KMT officials who raised the hope 
that if Chinese KMT armies were supplied with massive amounts of 
equipment, they would be able easily to defeat Japan. For example, 
Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to Washington, stated to 
Admiral Leathy that if the US could provide sufficient ammunition 
and supplies to China, the J'apanese could be destroyed. 27 This line 
of reasoning was apparently shared by Marshall and many other 
•I 
Washington officials for a time.28 In this way "military exigencies 
furnished the immediate impetus for the United States to take the 
initiative in a decisive way and that Great Britain and US would 
need Chinese man power sooner or latter. 11 29 Acting on this belief, 
Roosevelt Administration officials greatly improved the quality and 
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quantity of military asistance to China, when FDR "bolstered the 
Naval, Air and ground forces in Hawaii and Philippines". 30 On March 
31, 1941, T. V. Soong presented a list of three categories of Lend-
Lease requests which included, 1) sufficient arms and ammunitions to 
equip thirty Chinese Divisions, rail road and highway construction 
equipment, and "one thousand airplanes and pilots under the command 
of Claire Chennault" to bomb Japan proper. These requests were 
highly recommended by Lauchlin Currie and approved by Roosevelt. 31 
As evidence of realization of the awareness of Chinese military 
needs,the US War department Officials granted a "weapons shi-ement 
valued at $45 million which Roosevelt approved on April 23. A 
second shipment valued at $100 million followed shortly11 • 32 
But the US approval of China's Lend-Lease requests involved it 
in problems related to the delivery and proper utilization of Lend-
Lease items in China. Consequently, a series of controlling 
agencies were dispatched to China to insure proper utilization of 
Lend-Lease supplies for war ends. 
The first US controlling agency was the Magruder mission. With 
the shipment of 10% of the first installment of the total Lend-Lease 
allocations for ordinance, motor transport, and military supplies in 
the autumn of 1941, the United states faced a different kind of 
problem concerning the use of these materials by the Chinese. 
American Officials felt that the preliminary plans and steps for 
Lend-Lease aid to China were not adequate and that the Chinese 
agents in Washington did not have sufficient military personnel at 
hand to give technical advice. The accredited representative of the 
Chinese Government for Lend-Lease procurement and administration was 
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the China Defense Supplies Inc. It was feared by the regular army 
planners in Washington D.C. that the Chinese might request more 
equipment than the Chinese army could use effectively or transport 
into China, and unless some such American mission was sent, a great 
waste of American material and equipment might result. Under these 
circumstances, "General G. Marshall, convinced Roosevelt to approve 
creation of an American military mission to China (AMMISCA) early in 
July" 1941. 33 
The proposed military mission to China was headed by General 
John Magruder who was previously an attache in China. He was 
instructed by the War department to "assist the Chinese Goverment to 
obtain appropriate military defense aid as contemplated in the Lend-
Lease Act and in insuring that the most effective use is made 
thereof". While Magruder was authorized to exercise certain powers 
abroad, he was further directed to: 
a. "Advise and assist the Chinese Government in all 
phases of procurement, transport, and maintenance of materials, 
equipment, and munitions requisite to the prosecution of its 
military efforts." 
b. Advise and assist the Chinese Government in the training of 
Chinese personnel in the use•: and maintenance of materials, 
equipment, and munitions supplied as defense aid by the United 
States." 
c." When requested, assist the personnel of the other Departments of 
this Government in carrying out their respective duties in 
furtherance of the objectives of the Lend-Lease Act pertaining to 
China."34 
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The "mission was completely technical in character" which 
included specialists in different fields.35 By mid November 1941, 
twenty officials including Magruder had reached China. After 
reaching China, Magruder went to Burma to examine the War situation 
while other members of his staff made extensive trips South and West 
China. Thus, by the outbreak of hostilities with Japan a cadre of 
American military specialists was well established in China at the 
expense of Lend-Lease. 
Upon reaching China, Magruder and his mission specialists tried 
to coordinate the Lend-Lease requests and supply activities. He 
"pressed the Chinese to improve the quality of their military 
training and logistic system." Moreover, Magruder interfered in 
discouraging the Chinese "requests for high technology offensive 
weapons that might inadvertantly provoke a Japanese attack on 
possessions in the Pacific. 11 36 Magruder soon realized China's 
bankruptcy in terms of a military contribution in the war. When 
Japan occupied the "scattered outposts of the Pacific", he voiced 
his disapproval of too much emphasis by Americans on China as an 
equal partner and he predicted that the Nationalists would conclude 
a defacto truce with Japan, leaving Americans to carry on the War". 
He was equally critical of Chiang Kai-shek's intention of hoarding 
the War time American Lend-Lease aid to fight the Communists in the 
post-War period ,37 
But the dispatching of the Magruder Mission to China could not 
entirely solve the problems of the mishandling and misuse of the 
extended amount of Lend-Lease supplies to China, which were sent 
there with the expansion of the war. Consequently, with the 
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expansion of Japanese attacks in different parts of South-East Asia, 
the US, for the sake of a more proper utilization of its supplies in 
the war, introduced various controlling measures on the use of its 
supplies in China. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan quickly 
moved her armed forces Westward towards Burma and India, as well as, 
Eastward into the vast Pacific and Southward towards- Australia, New 
Zealand and surrounding islands. All British, American and Chinese 
efforts to check the Japanese advance failed. By May 1942, Japan 
captured Burma, occupied the port of Rangoon and cut the Burma road, 
the principal route for supplying Lend-Lease goods to China. 38 
While this rapid advance of the Japanese armies worried Washington 
about the security of the Phillipines and the Pacific area, the 
Chinese KMT.Government started a quick race to aquire more and more 
military assistance from America and other beligerent powers. In a 
meeting with the Ambassadors of the USSR, UK, and USA on December 8, 
1941, Chiang Kai-shek asked them to urge their Governments to 
support the Chinese against the Japanese. None of the powers showed 
any willingness to commit themselves before late December 1941.39 
FDR viewed this indifference of the European powers toward 
China's call for aid with anxiety and indignation, and at last on 
December 16, 1941, FDR asked·'the Generalissimo to convene a joint 
military conference at Chungking no later than December 17, 1941, 
•I 
and expressed hope that an organization could be established to 
accept responsibility for planning and commanding the united 
campaign of the Allied powers. 40 Accordingly, a joint military 
conference was held in December 1941 at which Chinese, British and 
US military personnel represented their countries. On the 16th, 
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17th, and 19th, Generalissimo separately exchanged views with 
British, Russian, US and Dutch representatives with regard to 
organizing the membership of the joint War Council.41 On December 
20, the Chief of the Chinese Board of Military Operations, Hsu Yung-
Chang, drafted an overall plan for joint operations to be undertaken 
by China, the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, and the 
Netherlands. According to this plan, "Chinese resistance was to be 
maintained by continuing the issue of supplies to prepare Chinese 
armies for future offensives." To implement this plan, several 
military Lend-Lease programs formulated by the Chinese were 
submitted through Chinese Lend~Lease agencies in the United States 
to the War Department. These programs included the Chinese Transfer 
Schedule for the months January, February, and March, 1942, the 
Chinese Emergency air Transport program from November 1942 through 
January 1943, and finally the 1943 program .42 
The Chinese proposals for unlimited military assistance were 
successfully encountered by the Magruder mission, which at that time 
was acting as an screening ageny for Chinese Lend-Lease requests in 
Chungking. Before the formulation of any organized Chinese Lend-
Lease program, the Magruder mission had sent its views to its Home 
office with the recommended 1ist of critical requirements to be on 
Lend-Lease to Chinese Government. These requirements were as 
follows: 
a) Raw Materials for manufacture of small arms and other 
ammunition in China. 
b) Small arms ammunition; 
c) Rifles and light machine guns; 
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d) Pack artillery; 
e) Anti-tanks guns, and; 
f) Medium Howitzers. 
The first three items were deemed essential for stabilization 
of the Chinese front. The latter three items were considered 
necessary for later offensive operations. 43 Meanwhile, the creation 
of Combined Chief of Staff (CCS) and Munitions Assignment Board 
(MAB) by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Arcadia Conference in 
Washington on December 2, 1941, coordinated China's war efforts 
through US Lend-Lease assistance on a more stable basis. 44 Although 
Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong wanted China to join both the CCS 
and MAB, the Board politely rejected both requests on June 13, 1942 
in the face of strong British opposition and upon some other 
consideration. However, the establishment of the China Burma India 
Theater (CBI) under the supreme command of Chiang Kai-shek, provided 
the only consolation for China.45 
In order to have a more co-ordinated and efficient operation of 
the military Lend-Lease program, the War Department sent General 
Joseph Stilwell to China. 46 Arthur Young noted that, General Joseph 
Stilwell was sent to China by the War Department as the US military 
representive "to increase the effectiveness of the United States 
assistance to the Chinese Government for the prosecution of the War 
and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese 
army." As the Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek as well as the 
Commander General of the American forces in the CBI Theater, 
Stilwell was given full control of the military Lend-Lease items. 
But the non-military items like arsenal supplies and transport 
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equipment were under Chinese supervision. 47 
Owing to the lack of an efficient transportation system in 
China, the United States had to develop carefully different methods 
of military Lend-Lease shipment to China. In April, 1942, when the 
Burma road was lost to the Japanese, there developed a controlled 
program in China, which resulted in the development of the Chinese 
Emergency Air Transport Program by the US Army in co-operation with 
the Chinese. As an arbitrary figure, the Munitions Assignment Board 
established 3,500 long tons per month as an amount to be moved into 
China, which largely consisted of "ordnance material but also 
included certain arsenal material, signal, medical, and motor 
transport supplies. 48 A part of the Lend-Lease items shipped under 
Chinese Emergency Air Transport Program were used in equipping the 
remnants of the Chinese Army which had retreated into Ramgarh, 
Bihar, India and eventually came to be known as Stilwell's X-Ray 
forces. At the expiration of the first Chinese Emergency Air 
Transport program in October, 1942, an assignment program of 
approximately 5,000 tons per month was developed for the period 
November, 1942 to January, 1943, and this came to be known as the 
Second Emergency Air Transport Program.49 
It was imperative that :the US provide training programs for the 
Chinese Armed forces, and.it was an invaluable program that was 
included in Lend-Lease assistance. Particularly, in the early part 
of the war, the Allies lacked sufficient manpower to challenge the 
Japanese in Asia. Also, at the first Arcadia conference the Allies 
had adopted a Europe-first strategy which meant that the bulk of 
Allied material and personnel would be used to contain German 
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expansion. By default then, it became necessary for the US to train 
Chinese Armed forces to hold Japan in check, while the Allies faced 
the most deadly threat from Nazi Germany. Therefore, in addition to 
supplying military equipment, construction material and other 
components, the United States provided China with military 
assistance under Lend-Lease, from the Army, Navy, and Airforce. 
Such training took place both in China and the United States. 
Setting aside the Chinese KMT Government's desire for such training, 
the US deemed it anecessity for their own strategic interests in 
the region. It was not feasible for the US to send its own Army 
personnel to China in massive numbers due to the fact that American 
personnel were already involved in other Theaters such as Europe and 
Africa. Such military training was also necessary because the US 
needed to arm and train the vast Chinese population. A population 
as vast as China's could be well utilized against Japan's aggression 
once they were properly trained. Although the Chinese had been 
requesting training from their military personnel a long time before 
the US became belligerent, it started officially with the 
dispatching of the Henry B. Claggett mission to China in May, 1941 
to study China's air power, which had been funded py the Lend-
Lease. SO The mission was he'aded by Brigadier Ge~eral Henry B. 
Clagett, Commander of the US Air Force in the Philippines. The 
mission arrived in Chungking on May 17, 1941 and remained in China 
untill June 6, 1941. During these three weeks, a detailed 
inspection was made of Chinese Air Force installations and 
activities in the chief center of Chinese military aviation. In 
general, every facility was afforded the mission for informing 
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itself as fully as possible about the Chinese Air Force. One of the 
"first results of the survey was a recommendation that the Chinese 
pilots and mechanics be trained in the United States. 11 51 President 
Roosevelt approved the recommendation and in a message to Congress 
on September 15, 1941, he said, "on our air fields, thousands of 
British pilots are being trained, and already we are preparing a 
similar program to help the Chinese."52 This recommendation of the 
Clagett mission was later merged with the beginning of a 
comprehensive training program for Chinese pilots and other 
personnel. Lauchlin Currie also recommended on May 28, 1941, that 
"the United States begin to train Chinese pilots."53 Although 
Marshall's opposition killed Currie's proposal, it served as a basis 
for a later Chinese pilot training program. In September, 1941, the 
Chinese submitted two requests for the training of Chinese pilots 
and avaiation mechanics in Civilian Contract Flying Schools.54 On 
September 15, 1941, in a message to the Congress, FDR requested the 
approval of the Chinese pilot training program. 55 
FDR's statements to Congress about the Chinese training program 
raised several legal questions. The first was whether the terms of 
the Lend-Lease Act were broad enough to include the training of 
foreign armies. Especially,: the question arose whether the 
President could direct the training of British pilots in Air Corps 
Schools or the training of Chinese students in Civilian Schools. 
Moreover, if such authority did exist, what Lend-Lease appropriation 
might be used to obtain funds? The Congress requested the Attorney 
General to provide ·a legal opinion on the authority of the President 
to use Lend-Lease funds for the training of Chinese pilots in 
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Civilian schools.56 
In a memorandwn to Stettinius on March 11, 1941, concerning the 
legality of the Chinese Requisitions C-302 & C-303, Oscar Cox argued 
that the "services called for by the subject requisition are for the 
training of the Chinese pilots at Civilian and Air Corps Schools in 
the use of planes, guns and radios which are being Lend-Lease to 
Chinese. Section 3(a)(4) of the Lend-Lease Act provided for the 
communication of information furnished under this Act. The 
instruction called for in the subject requisition constitutes 
communication of defense information and was therefore an expense 
which could be legitimately defrayed out of Lend-Lease funds. 1157 
Gradually, the US Congress also came to realize that it was 
meaningless to provide highly complex modern machinery to friendly 
nations without training foreign personnel to operate and maintain 
the weapons of war.58 
The Attorney General in a message to the President, dated May 
23, 1941, endorsed the legality of the British pilot training 
program. After quoting portions of the Lend-Lease Act, he stated 
that "under these provisions, the President may authorize the 
Secretary of War to dispose of planes, fuel, spare parts, 
instruction books and like articles to the British Government for 
use by British students at an Air Corps training center upon such 
•I 
terms as he deems satisfactory. 11 59 On the basis of the Attorney 
General's opinion, the British pilot training program went forward 
and served as an example for carrying out training of Chinese 
pilots. 
Upon receipt of the opinion of the Attorney General in March, 
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1941, FDR himself settled the question as to what appropriation 
should be used by alloting $ 33,706,330 for pilot training from the 
Defense Aid·Supplemental Appropriation Act of March 27, 1941.60 Of 
this sum, fourteen million came from the categories "for testing, 
inspecting, proving, repairing, outfitting any Defense articles" and 
the rest came from the aircraft and micellanous military equipment 
category.61 
The training of the Chinese students presented a slightly 
different problem than that of the British for the reason that the 
necessary planes, gasoline, spare parts, instructions were to be 
provided by civilian air schools and the cost thereof paid by the 
United States Government. In this case, the Judge Advocate General 
rendered a legal opinion that such training was legal under the 
Lend-Lease Act and recommended favorable action by the War 
Department on the two Chinese requisitions.62 Thus, favorable legal 
opinions were rendered on all questions in these first cases and the 
War Department proceeded to provide training under the Lend-Lease 
Act in both the United States and overseas.63 
The first training program involving Lend-Lease funds were for 
the training of Chinese military pilots and other air personnel. 
Gradually, "many other war-related training programs were developed 
which included specialized training in military science, medicine, 
public health, and the various fields of engineering, 
transportation, communication, agriculture and forestry. 1164 At the 
beginning of this program in August, 1941, the Army did not have 
Lend-Lease funds, and the costs were provided through requisitions 
processed through the office of the Lend-Lease Administration and 
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committed to the War Department, which assumed full control and 
direction of the training. There were five of these military 
training requisitions before FEA processed any training programs of 
its own. These were: 
C-303 August 21, 1941 500 Cadet Pilots $3,550,576 
C-302-A September 10, 1941 100 Cade.t Pilots $ 889,920 
C-303 September 10,1941 50 Radio & Armorer $ 92,443 
C-685 November 08, 1941 9 Aviation Engg. $ 24,000 
C-625 January 15, 1942 10 Armorers $ 20,000 
C-632 January 24, 1942 1 Flying Officer $ 1,000 
Eventually, the army trained a large number of Chinese out of Army's 
its own Lend-Lease funds and such reports did not distinguish 
between training done with OLIA and that done with Lend-Lease 
funds. 65 
The first training of Chinese Army personnel under Lend-Lease 
provided for the instruction of 500 Chinese pilots. Because China 
lacked sufficient pilots and was also incapable of arranging 
training programs of this sort, the US responded to the Chinese 
requests and arranged training programs for the Chinese pilots 
inside its territory. The first group of pilots, consisting of 
fifty students, arrived in San Francisco on October 21, 1941 and 
were trained at Thunderbird Field, Arizona. A year later, a total 
of 338 Chinese had arrived in this country for training under the 
United States Army Air Corps and tpe training was the same as that 
given to American cadets. 
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With the progress of the War, "China took full advantage of the 
various military courses being offered in the United States and 
representatives attended schools for military government, infantry 
tactics, field artillery, staff and command, armored, tank 
destroyers, cavalry and coast artillery in addition to schools 
conducted by the Army Service Forces and the Air Corps." 66 By late 
1943, the first two groups of Chinese Cadets were in action with the 
Chinese Air Force and the 14th Unites Stated Air Force in China. 
Other courses to equip Chinese crews to fly American-made heavy 
bombers, provided under Lend-Lease, were inaugurated for pilots, 
bombardiers, navigators, and radio operators and mechanics. All 
expenses except pay and uniforms for the Chinese Cadets were 
furnished under Lend-Lease.67 
Since there was no modern Chinese Navy, it was impossible for 
China to operate the big Liberty Ships which she received from the 
US under the Lend-Lease program. Moreover, China needed to train 
personnel in order to have a basis for a big Navy. A second Chinese 
training program,sponsored by OLLA's successor, the Foreign Economic 
Administration (FEA) involved a short course offered by Navy 
authorities at Treasure Island, California to train anti-aircraft 
gun crews for the Liberty ships Lend-Leased to China under 
"bareboat" charter to U.S.A. Arrangements were made by the US for 
which funds for "20 Armed Guards" were committed under requisition 
C-1061-B of $45,000 on April 30, 1944. The trainees arrived on July 
3, 1944 but, due to a delay in acquiring interpreters, the training 
was not completed until December, 1944.68 Two small programs were 
also approved in April 1944 by the Lend-Lease for China which were 
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C-1065-B for 12 marine officials and one shipping clerk at $42,750 
and C-1064-B for 40 public health and army medical men at 
$176,ooo. 69 
In the face of an acute shortage of medical officers in the 
Chinese Army, only 18 Public Health Officers arrived in March 1945, 
and under the direction of the US Public Health Service, completed 
their training and returned to their country in October, 1945. All 
the Officers held an M.D~ Degree and had considerable experience. 70 
In all these FEA training programs, FEA only evaluated and approved 
the projects and supplied the funds, while the United States Public 
Health carried out the programs. FEA didn't have the training 
equipment or the administration and technical staff to undertake the 
training it~elf.71 
In order to arrange a better administration of the training of 
foreign nationals, the International Training Administraton (ITA), a 
non-profit service corporation, was established and every effort was 
made to eliminate training that could not be justified as related to 
the war effort.72 -In evaluating the FEA program from a Lend-Lease 
(war effort) point of view, it must be borne in mind that" only the 
20 armed guards and 8 marine officials finished their training 
before the end of hostilitiel;, and 960 of the 1019 who came over to 
the US" were still there in January 1945.73 
•I 
But it does not mean that this training program was without any 
significance in terms of China's contribution in the war. The 
principal benefit of the training programs were to teach Chinese how 
to use and maintain the war material the US sent them. American 
training in China was more beneficial than bringing them to the US. 
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The Chinese medical officers trained in the US, in turn, trained or 
shared their know-how with other Chinese, but also they themselves 
contributed substantially toward the medical concerns of the Chinese 
military. 
In June and July, 1945, the Chinese informally presented two 
training programs which were turned down (after consultations with 
FEA, Chungking) as not likely to be finished in time to be of any 
value to the war efforts. One program was for the training of 185 
Chinese ground personnel and the other was for the training of 296 
marine officers, armed guards and marine cadets to man Liberty ships 
to be provided to China under Lend-Lease. 74 On V-J Day, more than 
700 Chinese were still in training in the US. In an agreement 
signed by the Chinese supply commission and the FEA on March 1, 
1946, the training program was continued on a reimburseable basis. 75 
Besides conducting training programs inside the United States, 
programs were aiso arranged inside China to train the Chinese Army 
by the US military officers. At the beginning, it was thought to be 
impractical and too-expensive to transfer to China the necessary 
requirements of training programs such as equipment, oil and fuel. 
However, with the establishment of the China-Burma-India theater and 
the presence of thousands of ''American troops in Asia, training 
programs were developed and training centres were established by the 
United States Army. The weapons and equipment for the Chinese were 
furnished under Lend-Lease. 11 76 The initiative for the Chinese Army 
training programs in India came from General Joseph Stilwell. 
After his defeat in Burma in 1944, General Joseph Stilwell was 
successful in bringing some of the war weary soldiers to Ramgarh, 
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Bihar, in India and these eventually formed the nucleus of his X-Ray 
or X-Forces. By April 1943, Stilwell arranged for a training center 
in Yunnan province, where the forces came to be known as the "Y 
Force". These two forces together formed the Thirty-Division 
Chinese force of General Stilwell and were trained under Lend-Lease 
funding.77 About Stilwell's desire to reform the Chinese army, 
Grace Person Hayes writes, "General Stilwell had found the 
performance of the military forces in Burma most disheartening. 
However, despite the corruption and inefficiency of the officers of 
Chinese armies and the poor showing they had made, General Stilwell 
had faith in the potential value of the Chinese soldier as a 
fighting man. Since it was apparent that he could not count on 
American troops for a campaign in Burma, and an all out effort by 
the British seemed unlikely, General Stilwell proposed to use 
Chinese troops, those already scheduled for reequipment and 
retraining under the thirty division plan and a second large group 
(100,000 men) that he would train under American officers in 
Northern India. There he could use Chinese Lend-Lease equipment 
which had already arrived or which would be sent from the United 
States but could not be carried farther. Transportation facilities 
were not adequate to move large quantities of motorized equipment 
and heavy field pieces from India to China, but men could be marched 
from China to India if no other means of transportation was 
available." 78 
Stilwell brought up the plan for the training of 100,000 
Chinese troops in India in a meeting with the Generalissimo in June 
15, 1942. This thirty division proposal included the creation of 
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new Chinese army groups one of which would be organized in India 
built from the remnants of Chinese units who retreated from Burma 
and they would be supplemented by new conscripts. The second larger 
group of ~hirty Chinese divisions would be assembled in China's 
Western Yunnan province.79 
Although Chiang agreed with the creation of a small Chinese 
force in India, "since they would be outside the country and posed 
no immediate threat", he "adamantly refused to consider recognizing 
thirty divisions in Yunnan. 118° Chiang considered the presence of an 
independent reformed army on China's mainland a direct threat to his 
authority and a source of potential da_nger. In order to counteract 
the ground strategy and army reform program of Stilwell, Chiang Kai; 
shek supported Claire Chennault's demand for an air strategy 
involving 500 planes to bomb Japanese cities. At last, during 
Lauchlin Currie's second visit to China, Chiang, in exchange for a 
large amount of monthly hump tonnages and an expanding American air 
force, "announced his decision to accept Stilwell's strategy of a 
ground campaign to -open Burma", and approved "in theory the creation 
of a new thirty division force in Yunnan." But it was not untill 
April, 1943 that the work on Y-force began.Bl .The X-ray force which 
origionally consisted of three divisions and later of five divisions 
plus 'Yoke' force, "equalling thirty divisions, became the basis for 
the 'Thirty Division Program', which was first officially presented 
to and concurred in by the Commanding General United States Army 
Forces, China-Burma-India, in March 1942. 11 82 
As a result of inadequate Chinese control of troops, 
insufficient local production and resources and a desire of a more 
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independent United States control, the thirty division program 
gradually developed to a point where the US became responsible for 
the supply of all items required for the Thirty Division Force. War 
Department approval of this plan was granted in October, 1942. 83 
General Stilwell's training project met with approval in Washington 
where the Department saw in it the way of easing their problem with 
Lend-Lease for China as well as a method of acquiring sizeable 
forces for operations in the CBI Theater without having to send 
American divisions to that distant and unattractive region. Chiang 
Kai-shek agreed in general with the plan.84 
In an effort to achieve a Chinese program related to 
strategic requirements and theater logistic capabilities, the War 
Department, in 1943, approved General Stilwell's request that all 
military requirements for China be determined and forwarded by US 
personnel in the China-Burma-India Theater. Accordingly, action was 
taken during 1943 toward organizing a second thirty division 
program.BS Meanwhile, in November 1943, under the command of 
General Chennault, a composite wing of the Chinese Air Force was 
formed of the Chinese and American air men and ground units. It was 
equipped with the latest type of P-40s and B-25s.86 The training 
at Ramgarh was completed by January 1944 and some 3,526 officers and 
29,667 men had been trained and equipped with Americam arms and 
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organized under American officers. The forces in training in Kunming 
had been assembled by the Spring of 1943 in Western Yunnan.87 With 
the exception of light arms provided by China, all other equipment 
such as artillery, engineering, communications, medicine, gasoline 
and trucks were supplied under Lend-Lease. P·rovisions and draft 
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Source: E. R. Stettinius, Jr. Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. 
Press Association, Inc. 
Chinese pilots receive advanced operational training al an air base in the United 
States. These pilots have since returned _to their country to fi~ht the Japanese. · 
Source: E. R. Stettinius, Jr. Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. 
A Chinese soldier guards P-40 planes of General Chennault's Flying Tigers., 
ll'ar Shipping Ac/ministration 
The Maritime Commission huilds Liberty Ships for Lend-Lease. The Liberty Ship 
Chung Cheng on the day she was transferred for operation under the Chinese flag. 
Hoisting the Chinese flag on the Chung Cheng. 
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source: E. R. Stettinius, Jr. Lend-Lease Weapon for Victory. 
animals were supplied by China and guns by both. However, this 
"Yoke" force while greatly superior in number to the "X-Ray" force 
from India, was only partially equipped by America because of 
tremendous difficulties involved in moving sufficient equipment into 
China. By September, 1943, everything was in order. 88 In early 
1943, before the completion of this training, Stilwell drafted a 
plan for training another thirty divisions. But owing to the 
changing military policy of the US War Department, Stilwell was 
allowed to equip 10 percent, i,e, three divisions, of his total 
thirty division program.89 
The satisfactory completion of the training programs at Ramgarh 
and in Yunnan did not solve the problem and Lend-Lease was again 
used by the United States as a leverage to compell Chiang Kai-shek 
to let Stilwell take the Chinese Army in to North Burma. The 
ostensible purpose behind the North Burma campaign "was to open up 
line of communications between Burma and China, but its real 
objective was·to take only Myitkyina for building airfields to co-
ordinate with the American Pacific Ocean operations. 11 90 Although 
Chiang granted Stilwell the command to lead the X-force into Burma 
in December, 1943, he refused to send Y-force there due to British 
refusal to send Navy support in the Bay of Bengal for an amphibious 
operation in North Burma. Despite FDR's repeated request to dispatch 
the Y-force, Chiang remained stubborn on this issue.91 Even 'in the 
face of a strong Japanese onslaught along the Burma-India frontier 
in March 1944, Chiang refused to send the Y-force to Burma on the 
ground that China was not strong enough to commit its Y-force 
pending the desired amphibious operation.92 
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At last, in a message of April 10, 1944, Marshall instructed 
General Thomas Hearn to tell the CBI authorities that unless Yunan 
forces moved, Lend-Lease shipments would be stopped.93 Accordingly, 
Hearn ordered that the Hump tonnage allocated to the Yunan forces 
for April, 734 tons, be transferred to the 14th Air Force. This 
news indirectly reached Chiang Kai-shek through Madame Chiang Kai-
shek and others, and he gave way. On April 15, 1944, the Chinese 
Yunnan Expeditionary Force crossed Salween river into Burma and 
pushed toward Lunglin and Tengchung.94 The Y-force began its 
attack on May 11, 1944, and eventually turned the tide of battle in 
Burma. 95 Meanwhile, X-force, supported by American Army engineers 
and later spearheaded by an American Combat team, opened their 
attack in the vicinity of Ledo in Assam and drove across the 
primitive, rugged terrain into Burma and thence down the Mogaung 
Valley towards Myitkyina. After a long and hard campaign, the two 
Chinese forces joined in the vicinity of Bhamo at the end of 1944. 
By that time, X-Ray force had succeeded in taking the strategic city 
of Myitkyina, and the occupation of Myitkyina greatly helped in 
Admiral Nimitz's "Central Pacific Offensive. 11 96 
From the very beginning, the US granted Lend-Lease to China in 
a planned and co-ordinated manner. In fact, it tried to maintain 
this rational way of dealing with China through out the war period. 
The US, however, was occasionally manipulated by Chinese pressures. 
The famous Chennault-Stilwell controversy illustrates the 
manipulative manner with which the Chinese approached the American 
Government over military Lend-Lease supplies. Chiang Kai-shek's 
government used the controversy as a method of obtaining more 
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supplies from the US since the Trident Conference. After Japan's 
attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chinese KMT Government began to believe 
that America was in dire straits and that she had no alternative 
left in its Pacific and Asiatic policy, other than to help China. 
Moreover, FDR's vision of transforming China to a post-war 
democratic ally, made the US further vulnerable to the repeated 
Chinese pressure. The first incident in this connection took place 
during the summer of 1942 when CCS transferred the US 14th Air Force 
from India, at that time was engaged in carrying hump supplies to 
China, to North Africa in order to resist the advance of the German 
troops under the command of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel.97 Reacting 
to this news of diversion, Chiang Kai-shek handed over to Stilwell 
"three minimum requirements" for maintence of the China Theater. 
These were: 
1. United States should dispatch three Army divisions to India in 
August and September to help Chinese troops restore the supply line 
to China via Burma. 
2. Provide a force of 500 combat planes in the China Theater 
starting in August, 1942. 
3. Deliver 5,000 tons of supplies monthly via India starting in 
August, 1942.98 
Despite opposition from both General Stilwell and the US 
Ambassador, Clarence E. Gauss, the FDR Administration sent Lauchlin 
Currie to China who recommended the acceptance of three revised 
demands of Chiang Kai-shek, and FDR finally accepted Currie's view. 
Meanwhile, the post-war'political vision plus the CCS's agreement 
and the decision to launch a counter -attack on Burma provided 
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another incentive for FDR to meet the three demands of Chiang. 99 
Consequently, Roosevelt promised Chiang an increase in hwnp 
deliveries to 5,000 tons, 500 combat aircraft for China, and an 
increase in the 10th Air Force to fifteen squadrons. FDR said that 
the US would make every effort to expedite aid to China within 
technical limits.100 Although he did not agree to send his troops 
to participate in the Burma campaign, Chiang was happy on the ground 
that he had received Washington's commitment for an increased amount 
of Lend-Lease supplies.101 
Chiang's demands for more Lend-Lease assistance, didnot die with the 
fulfilment of the three demands by FDR. At the Casablanca 
conference in mid January, 1943, the US officials, especially 
General George C. Marshall and Admiral King convinced FDR and 
Churchill that a limited Burma offensive supported by a limited 
amphibious operation by the· British should be undertaken. 102 But as 
soon as Chiang Kai-shek was informed about the decision by a group 
of American and British officials headed by General H. H. Arnold, 
Commander of the US air force, they were given a set of demands 
already prepared by Chiang. The list of demands stated that the 
Nationalist Government could only participate in a Burma campaign if 
China received twice as much tonnage as before (10,000 tons per 
month) and if Chennault actually possessed 500 air planes. The tone 
of these demands, Arnold noted, suggested black mail.103 During 
this time, Marshall and Stimson sided with Stilwell's ground 
strategy, while Hopkins and Currie inclined toward Chennault's Air 
Force and supported him as well.104 Largely influenced by his war 
time and post- war objects, FDR wanted to keep China in the war and 
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again decided to yield to Chiang's demands and stated that it would 
be counter productive to attemt to command Chiang, a man who 
struggled to become "undisputed leader of 400,000,000 people" and 
who had created in China "what it would take us a couple centuries 
to attain. 11 lOS Conceding Chennault's Air strategy in China, FDR 
made a three point decision in early March, 1943. These were: 
1. Creation of the US 14th Air Force with Chennault as commander 
exercising independent command. 
2. Gradual increase of Chennault's Air Force until it reached a 
total strength of 500 planes. 
3. If facilities permits, the air transport volume from India to 
China should be increased to 10,000 tons per month.106 
In accordance to this decision, General Marshall at once 
activated the 14th Air Force under Chennault. An increase in Lend-
Lease supplies for China was requested by T. V. Soong and 
recommended by Chennault at the Trident Conference. Before the 
Trident Conference (lasting from May 12 to May 23, 1943) FDR ordered 
the stepping up of hump tonnage with a priority for Chennault. It 
was decided that, "China would receive ten thousand tons of supplies 
per month, from which Chernault would get a fixed minimum and 
Stilwell the remainder. 11 107: 
When the Allied powers met at Quebec in August, 1943 (QUADRANT-
code name), there was a major change in strategy in fighting against 
Japan. In order to attain a quick victory over Japan, the U.S. 
planned to attack Japan directly from the sea and took the island-
hopping tactics, The major emphasis on an island-hopping campaign, 
however, didn't diminish the importance of China totally. "QUADRANT 
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called for a limited North Burma offensive in November, 1943 with an 
amphibious attack on Rangoon set for January, 1944, an increase in 
supplies to China, and "the introduction of a few thousand American 
commandos for the projected offensive.108 This decision to attack 
North Burma resulted in the following prospects for the China-Burma-
India Treaty: 
1. "An increase in the amount of air cargo being flown to China by 
the Air Transport Command (ATC) to 20,000 tons a month by mid-
1944.· 
2. A road from India to China (the Ledo Road) to enable the 
transportation of 30,000 tons of supplies per month in the 
initial period (Jan. 1945). 
3. A gasoline pipeline from Assam via Fort Henry in northern-most 
Burma to Kunning. 
4. A thin-walled six-inch pipeline from·calcutta to Assam province 
to supp~y the Air Transport Command airfields there. 
5 A thin-walled six-inch pipeline to China. 
6. An American-operated barge line on the Brahmaputra River to 
bring supplies forward from the port of Calcutta to the Allied 
bases in Assam. 
7. Improvement of the Bengal and Assam Railway." Al though these 
projects were too big and expensive, the U.S. "resolutely 
undertook them regardless of the cost. 11 109 
In the meantime, repeated successes encouraged Chiang Kai-shek 
to demand a billion dollar loan out of the Lend-Lease grant. In the 
first phase of the Cairo Conference which lasted from November 22 
till Nov. 27, 1943, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
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upon FDR's repeated insistence, agreed to support an amphibious 
attack on Burma, accompanied by the land operations of the Chinese 
ground forces.110 But the ensuing discussions with Stalin, whom 
FDR and Churchill met in Tehran on Nov. 28, 1943, cast a changed 
light on earlier decisions, and the British amphibious attack plan 
was withheld. 
Chiang Kai-shek's reaction was prompt. He demanded a billion 
dollar loan from the US. As a reason, Schaller says, "While he 
(Chiang) had never approved of fighting in Burma for its merits, he 
must have realized the dire implications which flowed from this 
changed strategy. No plan for a major offensive meant no longer 
increase in the level of Lend-Lease aid. This threatened the 
Generalissimo's plans to stockpile aid for the future. In reply to 
FDR's notification about the changed strategy Chiang demanded major 
compensation in the form of a $1 billion dollar loan and the 
expansion of hump deliveries to twenty thousand tons per month".111 
FDR, however, was not moved by Chiang's demands this time. 
Probably he realized the insignificant role of China in the War. 
After the adoption of the "island-hopping" policy, FDR like 
everybody else, realized the reduced strategic importance of China. 
For the first time FDR oppo.sted the demand for a one billion dollar 
loan. In this regard, he was supported by Stilwell, Gauss, and 
Morgenthau and opposed only by Hornbeck. On January 5th, Chiang 
threatened to cease assisting the construction of American bomber 
bases, and said that "China might be forced to drop out of the Warll. 
Although this threat was not a very serious one, "they didn't want 
to impede construction of the bomber bases." As a result, "a 
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decision was made to grant minor economic concessions to Chiang and 
they had to work out an amicable compromise on the revision of 
dollar-yuan exchange rates".112 
China's demands for more Lend-Lease goods using threats 
continued until V-J Day. Immediately after the Japanese surrender, 
T.V. Soong and other Chinese officials urged the United States to 
grant an unconditional loan on a mutually beneficial basis, but not 
as a "debtor nation". They asked for two hundred million dollars 
worth of free gold, a commitment for 20,000 tons of textiles on 
Lend-Lease, 19,000 trucks, certain military equipment and all kinds 
of assistance for Yangtze Gorge project. The nature of the Chinese 
threat for the above mentioned demands was revealed in a telegram of 
Patrick J. Hurley to the Secretary of State, which read: "Soong's 
attitude in endeavouring to obtain American approval of his requests 
by mentioning that unless the kind of assistance he required is 
immediately forthcoming he will obtain it from others, seems to have 
infiltrated to other departments of the Chinese government. 11 113 But 
after FDR's death and with the arrival of Truman as president of the 
USA, the practice of threatening or pressure was greatly reduced 
owing to the fact that Truman was a practical president who was not 
committed to a future vision of China. 
Although Lend-Lease aid greatly contributed to the 
strengthening of Chinese resistence, it created some incidental 
problems which seriously affected Sino-American relations. The 
problems originated in the Chinese feeling of being neglected by the 
U.S. From the beginning of 1942, the Chinese government gradually 
began to feel that it was being restrained. The next grievance of 
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Chiang Kai-shek was how to arrange a demarcation line between his 
and Stilwell's authority, both on Lend-Lease and on other military 
affairs. The conflict between Silwell and Chiang originated long 
before Magruder had left China. 
Stilwell, a perfect representative of the War Department, 
always tried to evaluate the situation and the needs of China on a 
practical basis, rather than by the post-war imaginary vision of FDR 
which envisioned China as a great postwar ally who deserved 
unlimited assistance wherever she wanted it. Stilwell always tried 
to justify the needs of China, in terms of her contribution to the 
war effort, he found that her contribution was practically nothing. 
From the beginning he was greatly in favor of a reformed and 
reorganized Chinese army trained and equipped in Western fashion. 
He believed that this was the way to success against Japan and also 
would serve post war stability. Although a conservative in terms of 
the prevailing American political system, Stilwell was the supporter 
of a liberal coalition government in China. He found that the KMT 
Government had a tendency to hoard the assistance goods for the 
post-war fight for supremacy against the Communists.114 This ran 
counter to American war aims, he believed, and he wanted to make 
sure that all Lend-Lease supplies would be used against Japan. 
Therefore, time and again he came into conflict with Chiang Kai-shek 
on the question of his control of military Lend-Lease. Chiang, by 
the same token, found in Stilwell an enemy of his free access to the 
unlimited reservoir of the United States. 
During this time, the U.S. press and military were 
criticizing the KMT government severely for (a) "hoarding and 
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failing to make proper use of Lend-Lease supplies," (b) "keeping a 
large army to maintain Chiang's own positions," (c) "containing the 
Communist at North Shens, instead of fighting the Japanese, and 
dictatorial tendencies in Chinese politics".115 All these points 
were discussed during Currie's second visit to China, but Chiang 
Kai-shek and his associates did not take the criticism seriously. 
The first incidence which irritated China was in the spring of 
1942, when in the face of huge stockpiling of Chinese Lend-Lease 
goods in India and in New Port News, US, the MAB recommended a 
reduction in the Chinese Lend-Lease supplies.116 The Chinese 
opposed this reduction and their views on Lend-Lease requirements 
often differed from those of Stilwell. In order to solve this 
problem, Marshall suggested to General Stilwell that he and the 
Generalissimo "get together and send joint Lend-Lease cables" .117 
Since Stilwell was in Burma, Brigadier General John Magruder 
replied on his behalf and proposed in terms "similar to those used 
several times·by General Stilwell, that some restriction should be 
put on the Lend-Lease program for China." Magruder further 
recommended that the use of military Lend-Lease assistance for "a 
limited organization of forces that could be equiped and restrict 
the Chinese Lend-Lease progi'am to equipment for those forces." Even 
Magruder was in favor of applying pressure on the Chinese Government 
to release all illegally hoarded essential Lend-lease materials for 
the cause of the War.llB But the Chinese representative, T. V. 
Soong, strongly opposed the proposal to reduce the Chinese Lend-
Lease aid to China, and at last, the MAB fixed 3,500 tons a month 
"exclusive of air plane fuel as the allotment for China. At the 
158 
same time, the MAB, in order to relieve congestion in India granted 
Stilwell a new authority "to see that materials under the program 
were used where needed. 11 119 In order to check any wastage of Lend-
Lease supplies, the Munitions Assignment Board of the Lend-Lease 
program, on May 11, 1942, adopted new measures, designating Stilwell 
as the recipient of China's Lend-Lease supplies and giving him the 
power to determine "when to distribute" and "where to deliver. 11120 
Thereafter, the Chinese Government's requests to the Munitions 
Assignment Board for Lend-Lease supplies could not be considered 
unless they were accompanied with distribution plans and a timetable 
approved by Stilwell. Stilwell, however, "declined to formulate 
plans for any request to which he had not agreed." As a result of 
which some of the Chinese requests were not accepted.121 
Meanwhile, matters came to a head, when Stilwell met Chiang on 
June 26, 1942 to talk about the transfer of 10th Air Force planes to 
the Middle East without his (Chiang's) approval. Although Chiang 
blamed the U.S. and Great Britain for neglecting the CBI Theater, he 
criticized Stilwell for not being able to effect "timely delivery of 
United States munitions and supplies". To quote Chiang, "According 
to Minister Soong, the United States War Department.has been waiting 
for your (Stilwell's) recommendations on increases in shipments of 
planes and munitions, but:you have not made any proposals for a long 
time. The War Department asked if additional transport planes 
should be sent to China, but you said they were not needed." In 
reply, Stilwell mentioned that the responsibility lay with the U.S. 
War Department, "but didn't deny that he had rejected more transport 
planes for China 11 • 122 During this time Chiang supported Chennault's 
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air strategy and began to press the U.S. for more planes, while 
Stilwell and the War Department advocated a ground strategy. 
Another controversy arose two days later. The China Aviation 
Corporation, a Sino-American venture registered in China, obtained 
several planes under the Lend-Lease Act. When instructed by the 
Generalissimo to deliver two planes for use by the Aviation 
Commission, Stilwell refused on the ground that the planes could be 
used only for military transportation purposes. At a July 2 meeting 
on plans for use of the proposed 500 planes, Madame Chiang asked 
Stilwell to express an opinion on whether the Generalissimo had the 
right to dispose of Lend-Lease supplies.123 In reply, Stilwell 
proposed that he was primarily the commander of all American forces 
in the China-Burma-India Theater. Secondly, to quote Stilwell, 
I am charged with the supervision and control of Lend-Lease 
material, and am to decide the place and time that title 
passes. After title passes, the Generalissimo controls the 
disposition of the materials. I was given this responsibility 
to ensure that American Lend-Lease equipment would be employed 
solely for the effective prosecution of the War, and in such 
matters as the representative of the president, who can under 
the law recall Lend-Lease materials at anytime, prior to 
delivery. Moreover, ... As Chief of Staff, my duties are 
concerned with planning, organization, training and operations 
in the field and don't extend to procurement of material ... 124 
This memorandum opened up a new truth to Chiang concerning 
Stilwell's authority on the :Lend-Lease. In fact, Stilwell's dual 
command and authority over Lend-Lease supplies were agreed upon by 
T.V. Soong and Stimson by an exchange of letters. But Soong had not 
accurately reported to the Chinese Government the arrangement he had 
made with Stimson, nor had he transmitted to the Generalissimo FDR's 
message of July 3, supporting Stilwel1.12S Stilwell wanted to use 
this control on Lend-Lease for the best prosecution of the War. For 
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example, while Currie and Stilwell were visiting the Ramgarh 
training program to check on the preparation of the British-Burmese 
forces for a counter-attack in Burma, on August 4, 1942, Stilwell 
tried to persuade Currie to take advantage of the allocation of 
Lend-Lease supplies as a lever to compel China to accept his plans 
for army reorganization, but Currie opposed it.126 
After reading Stilwell's memorandum, the Generalissimo 
instructed T.V. Soong to take up the matter with the U.S. 
Government. When Soong talked to the War Department, the officials 
of that department supported Stilwell in a drafted message on July 
22, which Roosevelt signed, and this supported Stilwell.127 Before 
this, on July 14, 1942, General Marshall told Soong that Stilwell 
would not be recalled and "even though Stilwell might be recalled, 
any successor would have exactly the same powers over Lend-Lease 
aims to which the Generalissimo objected in Stilwell and the same 
primary responsibility to the United States.128 In fact, the U.S. 
War Department had every intention of controlling Lend-Lease 
supplies for China.through its military representative. Even before 
"delivery was made by the representative of the United States Army, 
ownership of supplies remained with the United States and the United 
States Government could at any time change the recipient, recall the 
supplies, or refuse to hand them over."129 As a reason for this, 
Chin-Tung Liang mentions that the United States War Department "took 
advantage of administrative techniques in an attempt to change 
President Roosevelt's China policy". 130 But this is not true. What 
the War Department wanted, was proper utilization of the Lend-Lease 
assistance, for the prosecution of the war against Japan. 
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Chiang's wrath was next aroused when Stilwell plunged himself 
into internal Chinese politics for the purpose of overthrowing 
Chiang Kai-shek.131 When Chiang Kai-shek learned of it, he 
believed he needed absolute power to control the distribution of 
American military supplies, so that they could not be used to 
strengthen the disloyal elements. "The anger felt toward Stilwell", 
as Michael Schaller says, "is evident in a secret report written 
sometime later by War Minister Ho Ying-Chin. Almost 75% of all 
American tonnage entering China Ho complained, went to American 
ground and air units. The remainder went to the Chinese. Even more 
demeaning were the contraints put on the use of war aid. 11 132 The 
Chinese resentment was expressed in the following statement of Ho 
Ying Chin: 
The Americans want to decide what we need. As a condition for 
turning it over they want to train the troops.· Before that is 
done they want to decide what troops are to be trained. After 
they have trained they want to keep control of them by liaison 
officers. All this means a great deal of trouble connected 
with American aid.133 
Afterwards, Chiang became adamant that Stilwell should be relieved, 
in which question of authority over military Lend-Lease played a 
major and fundamental role. 
Stilwell's first defeat came at the end of 1943, when FDR 
granted China "ten" thousand tons of supplies per month, from which 
"Chennault would get a fixed minimum and Stilwell the remainder" 
(135). This was completely against the principle of quid pro quo of 
Stilwell and the War Department. At the same time, T.V. Soong, with 
the help of Harry L. Hopkins tried to "dump Stilwell and secure 
Chinese control over Lend-Lease". But due to a grand reconciliation 
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between Chiang and Stilwell effected by the efforts of General 
Brehen Sommervell, South East Asian Command (SEAC) representative, 
the question of control of Lend-Lease was suppressed for the time 
beingl35 
The question of control of Lend-Lease again came to a head when 
Stilwell demanded full power to command troops. Although FDR 
requested that Chiang grant Stilwell full commanding authority, 
Chiang Kai-shek "refused to surrender any powers until he was 
assured of personal control over Lend-Lease distribution and plans 
to arm the communists" which definitely "negated the entire purpose 
of Stilwell's assumption of command. 11 136 Even Marshall's warning 
concerning the termination of U.S. aid failed to secure full 
commandership for Stilwell and very soon with the help of Patrick 
Hurley and Donald Nelson, Chiang was able to persuade FDR to recall 
Stilwell from China on October 18, 1944. With Stilwell's recall the 
controversy over control of Lend-Lease also came to an end. It 
should be mentioned here that anyone whom the Chinese suggested as a 
replacement for General Stilwell would be "likely to be a man whom 
the group in power in Chungking believed they could use to their own 
advantage. 11 137 
One of the less effective military projects supported by the 
U.S. Lend-Lease program was the Matterhorn project. FDR wrote to 
Chiang Kai-shek that by carrying out this project, "we can deal the 
Jap a truly crippling blow: something so close to both our 
hearts. 11 138 Even before the departure of Stilwell from China, the 
air power doctrine in the Ch'ina Theater had reached fruition. 
Operation Matterhorn was the embodiment of this new strategy. 
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Besides FDR's long term vision of bombing Japan from Chinese 
airbases, several other considerations were responsible for the 
origin of the Matterhorn project. In the first half of 1944, the 
limited operations projected in the Southeast Asia command 
necessiated a change in the plans for operations in Burma. When the 
amphibions operation Buccaneer139 had been cancelled and the 
Generalissimo refused to permit Stilwell to move the "Y" into upper 
Burma, the SEAC staff reviewed a plan for long term strategy and 
recommended that the "support of the 14th Air Force and Matterhorn 
should be the main contribution of the South East Asia command to 
the war effort this year" (1944). 140 To carry out this plan FDR got 
approval from Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill, and he offered 
to "make available the necessary funds through Lend-Lease 
appropriations. 11 141 In fact, it was another attempt of FDR to 
compensate China for the proposed and cancelled British amphibious 
support in the North Burma campaign.142 The program involved five 
big air-bases ·for B-29 bombers in Chengtu, China, and six in India. 
The targets set for B-29 operations were those advocated by 
the Air planners: 
a. Coke ovens in Manchuria, Korea and Japan. 
b. Japanese industrial and urban areas. 
c. Shipping concentrations in main Japanese shipping centers. 
d. Key aircraft industrial targets in Japan. 
Stilwell believed that these "strategic bombing operations were 
to be the initial step of a sustained air bombardment designed "to 
achieve the progressive destruction and dislocation of the Japanes 
military, industrial and economic systems, and the undermining of 
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the morale of the Japanese people to a point where their capacity 
for armed resistance is fatally weakened."143 This B-29 Bomber 
project was known as 20th Bomber Command, and it was placed under 
the direct command of General Arnold. 
Although the 20th Bomber Command, under this expensive 
Matterhorn project, carried out several successful raids on Japanese 
bases in Manchuria, Formosa, Hankow, and Japan proper, they "did 
very little to hasten the Japanese surrender or to justify the 
lavish expenditures poured out on their behalf", and although the 
"shakedown was indeed valuable, but could better have been done 
elsewhere." Moreover, the way the Chinese Government confiscated 
lands and compensated the owners was bitterly criticized in China, 
and created so much resentment among the Chinese that the Chengtu 
area became a fertile ground for Communist penetration.144 
Considering the tremendous problems of carrying supplies over 
the hump, together with the Japanese drive in East China, and also 
at the request of Hurley and Wedemeyer the bomber bases were shifted 
to the Marianas by·January, 1945. 
Another important "claimant on the supplies carried over the 
hump, albeit a smaller one, was the U.S. Navy's project known as 
Friendship (later SACO, Sino-American Cooperative Organization) 
which was set up, independent of General Stilwell, by a directive 
,: 
issued by the chief of Naval operations on 11 March, 1942. 11 145 
Although SACO was initially established as a branch of the oss,146 
in practice, it was free of control of the U.S.A's OSS headquarters, 
and was guided under the direction of the Chinese Himler Tai Lil47 
Besides, "bureaucratic rivalry unrelated to the specifics of the 
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war", and the U.S. Navy's thirst "to exert influence in the army 
dominated China," thereby gaining an opportunity to play an 
important role "in post-war China which could be parlayed into 
status, budgeting, and policy making capital in post-war 
Washington," led to the establishment of the SACo.148 The SACO's 
supplies "could be procured locally or delivered secretly by U.S. 
submarines, but like all other military projects in China, 
Friendship was largely dependent upon the hump for support. 11 149 
Moreover, it came through the Navy rather than Lend-Lease. As 
Milton Miles put it, "Given an initial allocation of 150 tons per 
month, by early 1945 SACO planes were flying in several hundred tons 
of military supplies per month. 11 lSO The Chinese supplied manpower 
and facilities, while arms and equipment would come from the United 
States. 
In theory, SACO's function was to assist in strengthening the 
allied war effort and "to keep China actively belligerent, in order 
that it might'contain as many Japanese troops as possible and that 
the Allies might retain access to China's air bases and more easily 
gain control of the left flank of the Pacific for the final attack 
on Japan. 11 151 Moreover, it was also SACO's task to make 
arrangements "for eventual titilization of Chinese ports", and 
"organizing a Chinese naval guerilla mine warfare unit, organizing a 
weather information network, and establishing a radio intelligence 
unit. 11 152 By V-J Day, SACO had trained more than 10,000 Chinese 
Commandos in its guerilla training center, "supplied weapons to Tai 
Li's 15,000 men Loyal patriotic Army ... ", and also established a 
police training school to modernize U.S. Naval Units and Tai Li's 
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existing Secret Information Training Institute in Military Affairs". 
For training purposes, the United States provided China about 3000 
former FBI agents, 50 police training personnel and police equi_pment 
like lie detectors and police dogs.153 Although by the end of the 
war, more than five hundred specialists had graduated from this 
training program, Schaller believes that instead of being used 
against the Japanese, the newly gained training experience was 
largely used in containing and destroying the Communists. In this 
way,domestic tranquility would be ensured for the Chinese KMT 
Government after the war was over.154 Toward the end of the war, 
SACO Americans under Milton Miles assisted the Nationalist 
Government in reoccupying cities and coastal territories in North 
China before they fell into Communist hands. At last, between 
January and March, 1945, Wedemeyer was able to bring SACO's 
activities under his control by controlling its supplies and also by 
abolishing its training centers which he believed were not related 
to the war effort. 
The OSS was not satisfied with SACO' s ac.tivities because it was 
predominantly a Chinese organization, and the OSS Americans served 
as "subordinate partners of General Tai Li's Chinese intelligence 
service. 11 155 During early 1943, the OSS Chief William J. Donovan, 
told FDR that SACO was "not a true external intelligence service, 
but is concerned almost entirely with internal political 
security. 11 156 Under Chinese control the Americans were not allowed 
to produce intelligence of their own. Under these circumstances, 
Donovan realized the need for an American intelligence service, 
entirely independent of the Chinese and other allies. Shortly 
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before Donovan's trip to China, in November, 1943, FDR consented to 
the formation of such an independent service. Consequently, the Air 
and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff, known as AGFRTS 
(and more popularly as "Agfighters") was established as a 
provisioned "unit approved by the Theater Commander, China-Burma-
India, 26 April 1944 and assigned to the 14th Air Force. 11 157 Its 
primary purpose was to build upon and expand the intelligence 
facilities of the 14th Air Force. OSS assigned qualified officers 
and men and supplied special guards and equipment necessary "to 
perform particular missions where not available from other sources." 
Its headquarter was at Kweilin and its agents were sent to advanced 
war bases in the Chinese war against the Japanese to collect 
information. There existed a "weekly courier service between the 
various war areas and the Kweilin base. 11 158 
AGFRTS tried its best to impede the Japanese advance by 
obtaining strategic and tactical intelligence and carrying on other 
specialized 'operations. It established direct radio contact with 
friendly aircraft and guided them in dive-bombing and strafing 
missions which caused tremendous iosses to Japanese forces and 
property. Moreover, AGFRTS agents provided intelligence about enemy 
ship movements in coastal waters, collected or stole secret Japanese 
documents, prepared ~tudies on Japanese activities, "collaborated 
with Chinese guerillas to destroy enemy targets, systematically 
scorched the routes to help the Chinese, demolished and mined 
bridges and towers and, provided the "Chinese military their first 
demonstration of modern technique in the fields of intelligence and 
demolition." AGFRTS made a substantial contribution to the war 
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effort.159 
US war policy in China had an economic component in that the US 
propped up the Chinese currency by keeping the dollar at an 
artificially low level compared to the Yuan and also shipped gold to 
China. These economic measures indirectly contributed to the 
strengthening of the Chinese war effort. The US Treasury Department 
believed that if the Chinese Government could sell gold it "would 
undoubtedly have beneficial effects in checking inflation. 11 160 
Also, it would permit the Chinese Government" to raise funds for war 
purposes as a non-inflationary expedient."16l Thereafter, under an 
agreement with China, on July 27, 1943, the U.S. Treasury Department 
agreed to provide China $200 million in gold as part of the 1942 
$500 million currency stabilization loan. By the end of 1943, the 
U.S. had shipped a total of about 10 tons of gold to China.162 
The initial outcome of gold sales were encouraging and 
temporarily strengthened Chinese currency as people began to believe 
"that the arrival of gold has increased the much needed reserve of 
our currency, thereby influencing the stability of prices. 11 163 In 
March 1944, the Chinese Central Bank took control of gold selling, 
and sales were over US $2 million per month. But later on, the U.S. 
Treasury Department was very much disappointed, seeing that the gold 
selling program didn't help very much in improving the inflationary 
situation, and there were repeated charges of mishandling, and 
stealing by high Chinese officials. Moreover, the Treasury noted 
that gold was being sold "in such a way as to be of benefit 
principally, to hoarders and speculators" and in practice it had "no 
helpful effect on the inflationary situation. 11 164 Consequently, 
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T. V. Soong and Secretary Morgenthau 
sign the $500,000,000 Joan agreement, 
January 1942. 
( U.S. Office of War Information) 
Source: Barbara W. Tuckman, Stilwell and the American 
Experience in China, 1911-1945. 
from the late fall of 1944, the U.S. Treasury virtually stopped 
shipment of gold to China. Instead, the U.S. Treasury, suggested 
that the Chinese officials set up a Currency Stabilization Fund" of 
U.S. $500 million.165 However, after prolonged negotiations between 
Soong and Harry D. Whites, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and 
also at the request of Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, Morgenthau 
found himself bound to resume the shipment of gold to China. 
Accordingly shipments began again on May 16, 1945 and continued 
even after the war was over. The KMT Government, collected a 40% 
sales tax when it sold gold and thus helped to cover its budget 
deficit.166 Later on, in response to a Chinese request, a Special 
Committee consisting of Henry J. Morgenthau, Secretary of the 
Treasury; P. Patterson, Under Secretary of Yar; William Clayton, 
Assistant Secretary of State; and the Foreign Economic Administrator 
made arrangements for the shipment during the last six months of the 
war of $189,224,000 of gold, 105-110 million yards of cotton 
textiles, and. 15,000 trucks under the Anti-Inflation program. But 
the delivery of all these goods, however, was not possible before 
the war ended.167 
Besides sending trucks and textiles, the United States, also 
agreed to continue an exchange rate of $20 Chinese to $1 US 
throughout the entire war.period. With the increase of American 
military activities in China, like the construction of big-bomber 
airfields at Chengtu, Kweilin, and Yunan, barracks, and access 
roads, and the problem of feeding and housing the American forces, 
the United States needed a huge amount of Chinese currency in an 
agreed upon and national exchange rate. In order to help the 
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situation, China provided American forces in China, food and 
lodging, and also turned back to the U.S. "as a gift all the 
pursuits which remained of those they had bought" from the U.S., 
along with the gasoline preserved for the 14th Air Force in China, 
under the reverse Lend-Lease agreement, which was signed between the 
U.S. and China on June 2, 1942,168 Although the Chinese contribution 
was significant, it was not enough to meet the huge U.S. war needs 
in China. In order to purchase construction material and to pay 
Chinese workers, the U.S. needed local currency, the Yuan. The 
fixed rate of exchange was very disadvantageous to the US, however, 
because of an 800 to 1000 percent inflation rate. In 1942 the rate 
was CS$20 to US$1. But Chinese currency soon lost its buying power 
due to the excessive printing of currency notes without having 
sufficient gold or silver reserve. When at the end of 1943,- the 
cost of living in China was 8-10 times higher than the previous 
years, Chiang Kai-shek in a meeting with Ambassador Gauss declined 
169 to accept a revised rate of exchange between the two currencies 
Similarly, H. H. Kung and other Chinese officials repeatedly 
rejected all U.S. proposals to rearrange the rate of exchange on the 
ground that, "such a drastic revision of the exchange rate would 
result in an upward revision of internal prices and serious loss of 
confidence in the Yuan."170 At last, "with a view of transporting 
gold to China for purchase of Chinese currency in the open market to 
control inflation and to secure a better exchange rate" the U.S. 
started sending gold to China. This action did not improve the 
situation, however, but it did raise a special tax for the I<MT 
Government.171 
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The situation was further aggravated by FDR's promise to Chiang 
at the "Cairo Conference that the United States was prepared to bear 
the cost of its military effort in China". It is not understood 
that the question of exchange rates was considered in this 
conference. Subsequent to the Conference, as indicated in the 
report of Ambassador Gauss, January 16, 1944, the Generalissimo in a 
message to the president, "urged that a loan of $1,000,000,000 U.S. 
be made to China, or that, otherwise, the United States assume full 
responsibility for-its expenditures in China at 20 to 1 rate. 11 172 
The U.S. War Department respresen~atives in China (the U.S. 
Commander General in China and Edward C. Acheson) told the Chinese 
that the U.S. "was prepared to accept full responsibility for its 
military expenditures subject to the establishment of a reasonable 
exchange rate, which would have some relationship to the actual 
purchasing power of the Chinese dollar." Meanwhile, FDR rejected 
the request for a one billion dollar loan as unnecessary.173 On 
January 15, 1944, Chiang Kai-shek again declined to reconsider a 
change in the exchange rate. 
Although the War Department urged the U.S. military 
representatives to take a firm stand, FDR because of his post-war 
vision, did not like to displeased Chiang, and on January 24, 1944, 
sent a conciliatory message to Chiang and suggested that Gauss and 
Stilwell work out a plan whereby American outlay would be around 
U.S. $25 million per month.174 This message led to the creation of 
a "defacto" plan, under which the U.S. paid US$25 million in 
exchange of CS $1 billion. It led to the finishing of the new 
airbases by June, 1944. China, however, had not agreed to a 
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realistic solution while the American representatives repeatedly 
demanded an exchange rate of US$ 1 to CS $100. China was not 
willing to go beyond US $1 to CS $60, and despite Clarence Gauss and 
Adler's repeated requests, FDR failed to take measures to compel the 
Chinese to come to a realistic solution.175 Most probably, due to 
his post-war political vision of China. FDR failed to do that. 
The settlement of the cost of U.S. military activities in China 
was made possible at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire 
on July 16, 1944 by an agreement signed by H. H. Kung and William 
Clay. Under this agreement both parties agreed to the sum of $185 
million, in addition to $25 million paid in early 1944. But the 
cost of airfield construction continued to create problems, and 
finally, in November 1944, "China agreed to take U.S. $185 million 
in full settlement to September 30, besides U.S. $25 million already 
paid." In reality, this compromise came out as a rate of about 74-1 
for the C $15.5 billion for which U.S. $210 million was paid, 
whereas the average free market rate for January-September was about 
200-1.176 The U.S·. met China's outlay of about C$103.3 billion 
against American surplus property in the summer of 1946. But, 
during the whole war period, the official exchange rate remained at 
20-1. 
During this critical war period, "the Chinese Government had 
been benefitted as a result of the unrealistic exchange rate .... also 
for non-military areas." The FEA spent in China "from 1941 through 
June, 1944 approximately $48,000,000 U.S. which at the official rate 
would purchase $960,000,000 CN worth of merchandise (strategic 
materialslike wood, oil, tungsten, and tin). At a realistic rate of 
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100 to 1, as a conservative average for the period, these purchases 
would have cost only $9,600,000 U.S." It means the U.S. lost 
$38,400,000 because of this unrealistic rate.177 The American army 
had to pay high prices for goods and services. About the American 
attitude toward this unrealistic exchange rate, Arthur Young 
remarks, "American attitude has been determined mainly by immediate 
consideration and little by longer-range policy. Both the Treasury 
and War Departments were understandably sore at China's 
intransigence about the 20-1 rate of exchange. The State Department 
though too often pushed around or ignored during the war, did manage 
in this instance to prevent blunt action that could have led to a 
costly national break with China. 11 178 In a telegram to the 
Secretary of State, Ambassador Gauss, with available data, tried to 
show that although the Chinese KMT authorities were prone to believe 
that the costs of airfield construction and the maintenance of the 
American army in China was the biggest factor in determining the 
rate of inflation, in fact, it was not. Gauss informed the 
Secretary of State'that the Americans were paying high prices for 
everything in China and they had no serious responsibility to curb 
the inflation in China.179 The Department, however, in iight of its 
immediate wartime considerations, rejected Gauss's proposals for 
improving the situation. 
Althoug~ Stilwell had gone and been replaced by Wedemeyer at 
the end of 1944, this had no effect on the amount of Lend-Lease 
received by China. But control of Lend-Lease supplies and handling 
by the US Theater Commander in China decreased. Wedemeyer was 
deliberately anxious to get along with Chiang and dropped any notion 
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of aiding the Communists against Japan. Except for a small amount 
of medicine, he provided nothing to the Communists. Although he was 
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "continue to assist the 
Chinese air and ground forces in operation, training, and logistical 
support", and also "to control the allociation of Lend-Lease 
supplies delivered into China, without priorities set by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,lBO he was instructed at the same time "not to do 
anything which the Generalissimo might oppose. 11 181 In this way, a 
consultation system concerning the use of military Lend-Lease in 
China gradually developed after the departure of Stilwell. With the 
passing of time and with the gradual introduction of big planes for 
China, "the hump tonnage mounted to a peak of 73,691 short tons in 
July 1945. 11 182 Meanwhile, the Assam-Bengal Railway, was improved, 
ferry services on the river Brahmaputra were established, and 
Myitkyina airfield was captured making possible a reduction in enemy 
interception. All these factors contributed to the dispatching of 
an increasing.amount of military Lend-Lease assistance to China in 
the last months of the war. Added to that, the end of war in Europe 
in early May, 1945, greatly eased "pressure to furnish Lend-Lease to 
fight Germany. 11 183 
China received half of its 1945 pre-V-J- Day allocation of 
Lend-Lease after the Japanese surrender of September 2nd, 1945. The ,: 
Chinese Government also continued requesting aid from the U.S. 
Government after Germany surrendered. In a letter to President 
Truman, the Chinese Finance Minister, H. H. Kung requested more 
assistance for China. He wrote, "The recent series of victory 
scored by our Chinese troops shows how much more can be expected of 
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us if America broadens the scope and releases the quantities of new 
aid to China. Such a policy will.not only shorten the war for the 
Pacific but will also reduce the loss of American lives. 11 184 
Responding to this Chinese request, the administration increased the 
amount of supplies sent to China. 
In 1945 the U.S. greatly increased Lend-Lease to China. The 
table below shows total Lend-Lease aid to all countries and to China 
by years (million):* 
Year All Countries 

























Note: Yearly figures don't add up to totals, because of rounding.185 
Meanwhile, Wedemeyer did many things for the reorganization of 
the Chinese army. He realized that the Chinese armies needed "food 
even more than they needed guns. 11 186 Wedemeyer revived Stilwell's 
method of studying the food situation, and in December 1944, he 
complained that the combat efficiency of Chinese soldiers was being 
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impaired by the inedequate supply of rations. He requested 
supplies of concentrated food from the US, and the Munitions 
Assignments Committee (Ground) approved a policy to supplement 
rations of the Chinese army from the United States.187 Very soon he 
was able to introduce the "Logan Ration" named after the director of 
the study. As a result, within a very short time, 185,000 men were 
regularly fed well and formed "a physically magnificent army. 11 188 
Although Wedemeyer was not able to cut the size of the Chinese 
army, as he hoped, he could concentrate on building 39 divisions of 
the Chinese army. In order to equip and train these soldiers on 
American models, Wedemeyer arranged "a plan for having American 
liaison officers attached as advisors to the Commanders of units, 
beginning at lower echelons, and several hundred Americans so 
served."189 This program was further strengthened by the Munitions 
Assignments Committee's (Ground) decision to support through normal 
US supply channels those Chinese Army ground forces which operated 
under the comriland of US Army officers both in India and China.l90 
By the summer of 1945 this program went into effect and almost "five 
hundred American officers and five hundred enlisted men were serving 
with the Chinese forces. Supplies for these soldiers came from 
Lend-Lease.191 Meanwhile, Wedemeyer also reorganized the American 
Air Force by transferring the 10th Air Force from India to China and 
combining it with 14th Air Force, put them under the Command of 
Stratemeyer.- Chennault was relieved from command. A medical 
service was developed, and Wedemeyer got "the Generalissimo to 
create a joint Chinese-American staff, with frequent meetings. 11 192 
Before the Japanese surrender, "China had five divisions that 
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had been trained and equipped in India; eleven that had finished 
training in China; and twenty-two that were 50 to 75 percent through 
training. Each of these 38 divisions had about enough ordinance to 
be operable in combat". Still, it was not a perfect army and was 
"not enough to ready the army for its post-war task of filling the 
power vacuum left by Japan's surrender. 11 193 Aware of the weaknesses 
of the Chinese troops and of the imminent conflict with the 
Communists, Wedemeyer requested that Marshall realize "the 
explosive and portentious possibilities in China when Japan 
surrenders". Although the War Department, in its reply to 
Wedemeyer, allowed him to continue the program "to support the 
Central Government and reoccupation by moving ·Chinese troops", he 
was told that the U.S. "will not support the Central Government of 
China in fratricidal war." Consequently, a week after V-J day, the 
War Department suspended all American sponsored and supervised 
training programs in Chiina. These training units were used to 
reoccupy the Japanese held areas. Moreover, two divisions of 
American soldiers·were sent to China to help the KMT Government in 
disarming and demobilizing the Japanese soldiers.194 
Although it had been the official policy of the United States 
to extend Lend-Lease aid to any faction which could make a real 
contribution against the axis aggression, the Chinese Communists 
were made a deliberate exception, even though potentially they could 
contribute to the war against Japan. Stilwell was the first to 
advocate the use of the Communist forces. In April, 1942, when he 
found no hope of getting an American Division to strengthen his 
hands in Burma, he urged the use of the Communist troops.195 Again, 
178 
during the increasing Japanese pressure in the Yangtze valley in 
1943, Stilwell developed a plan to use Communist troops and also 
"proposed that the Comminists be given supplies from the stocks of 
arms and ammunition in the possession of the National Government". 
Chiang, however, rejected the proposai.196 During Vice President 
Henry Wallace's visit to China in June, 1944, the US was able to 
secure permission of Chiang Kai-shek to send an army observer group 
to Yenan, the Chinese Communist Capital. As a result, the Dixie 
Mission was sent under the leadership of Colonel David B. Barrett 
197 But the situation in East China detetiorated so much that the 
US proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that Stilwell take command of all 
Chinese forces. This proposal meant that Lend-Lease supplies would 
go to the Communist forces once they formed part of Stilwell's 
command. FDR explained to Chiang that "when the enemy is pressing 
toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to refuse the aid of 
anyone who kill the Japanese. 11 198 But Chiang opposed the idea of 
arming the co·mmunists, who, he believed, were under the "influence 
of a foreign power. 11 199 The Communists on their part exploited the 
opportunity of a bad relationship between Stilwell and Chiang and 
tried to win US favor by repeatedly declaring their intentions to 
cooperate with America in its fight against Japan. 
John Stuart Service, one member of the Dixie mission, during 
this time, also suggested the possibility of independent American 
cooperation with the CCP. Service's proposal was supported by 
members of the OSS team in Yenan, who had developed a plan for the 
creation of "an American training program in Yenan, teaching 
selected students communications, demolition, and espionage skills." 
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By the end of August, 1944, the OSS began a simple training program 
in the use of American explosives and small arms.200 
Service continued to call for American political and military 
support for Yenan. He saw American aid to Communists as the only way 
to avoid Civil war and to separate them from the Russians. 
Service's proposal was endorsed by the Treasury Department's agents 
in Chungking, Irving Friedman and Solomon Adler. But the most 
vigorous supporters of American aid to the Chinese Communists were 
Stilwell's political advisor John Davies, and Stilwell's aide, 
Colonel Frank-Dorn. Davies developed a plan to land American forces 
in North China in cooperation with the Communists. Communist forces 
would be provided with American arms and enlisted under American 
command. D.avies believed that it would ensure both political and 
military success,201 
After Stilwell was recalled and Ambassador Gauss resigned, the 
new Ambassador Patrick J. Hurly and Commanding General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer were, both opposed to the idea of arming the Communist 
soldiers. Hurley believed that an understanding with the Soviet 
Union would help pacify the Chinese Communists. His purpose was to 
bring the Communists under I<MT control by peaceful negotiations. 
Moreover, he opposed any ki~d of independent aid program to the 
Communists without the approval of the National Government of China. 
Acting on this belief, Hurley rejected a plan approved by Wedemeyer 
to send 4000 to ·5000 American paratroopers to Communist territory 
and also rejected a request from Chu Teh for a loan of "twenty 
million dollars to be sent to induce the defection of Chinese puppet 
troops from the Japanese sponsored Government at Nanking. 11 202 
Although Hurley visited Yenan in November 1944, he failed to effect 
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a compromise between the two parties. Despite Hurley's adamancy, 
the US Embassy officials, Dixie Mission members, and ass officials 
continued their efforts to promote the possibility of a joint 
Communist-American military action. The Communists also redoubled 
their efforts to win American support, and repeatedly declared their 
willingness to co-operate against Japan and to join a broad 
coalition Government with the KMT to avoid a civil war. But Hurley 
convinced FDR that by tightening aid'to the Communitsts, he would be 
able to compel them to surrender to the KMT. During this time, the 
ass developed·a clandestine operations program in Yenan under which 
the OSS "would be prepared to 'carry out a disownable' military 
program with the Communists. 11 203 In the meanwhile, Mao declared 
that the ".Communists would co-operate in joint operations and would 
willingly serve alongside or even under American forces". In this 
point Schaller remarks that "Mao's suggestion must have been 
influenced by the positive indications Yenan continued to receive 
from the local ass contingent. 11 204 
But other developments were taking place. The Chinese members 
of the American Naval Group secretly collected information about the 
projected clandestine operations with the Yenan Communists and 
relayed it to Hurley. Enr~ged, Hurley promptly sent a cable to FDR 
and described the activities of disloyal Americans with Chou-En-Lai 
an.d Mao-tse-tung in Yenan. FDR angrily fired McClure and Barrett 
and this began the first purge of America's "China hands. 11 205 
Although Solomon Adler, Service, and ass officials continued to 
advocate aid to the Communists, nothing came of their efforts. 
Hurley continued to support Chiang Kai-shek and assured FDR that a 
good settlement with the Russians in Yalta would ensure a pr9-
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American China under Chiang Kai-shek. Consequently, at the Yalta 
conference, FDR bought Russian assurance for the KMT regime in 
China by granting valuable concessions to the Soviets.206 As Warren 
I. Cohen remarks, "while Roosevelt thus tried to strengthen the 
Nationalist position by depriving the Communists of the most lively 
source of aid .... Hurley believed it essential to deny them any hope 
of American support while continuing to aid the Kuominteng 
Government. Thus isolated the Communists would be forced to come to 
terms. n207 
The Congress was also suspicious of the Communists. 
Congressman Walter Judd was a severe critic of the Communists_ and 
their American sympathizers. Judd saw the Communists as Soviet 
puppets who would "endanger the fundamental security interests of 
the United States." Like Judd, John Foster Dulles also issued a 
similar warning against desertion of KMT.208 
By April, 1945, the Communists also adopted a hard line 
against the US. and vigorously criticized US policy. After FDR's 
death when Anti-Communist advisors like Averall Harriman, Admiral 
Leahy, James Byrnes, Joseph Grew and Navy Secretary James Forrestal 
entered the Truman Administration there remained no hope for a 
reconciliation. 209 Americat\ military aid to Chiang was greatly 
increased and relations with the Communists deteriorated. 
Before the Japanese surLender, the US granted$ 1,546 million, 
approximately 3% of all Lend-Lease aid, to China. Exports under 
this program were in addition to maintenance and replacement items 
for both ground and air forces and these were shipped by the War 
Department to maintain stocks for the US Air Service command and 
services of supply in India and China. When any of these supplies 
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were delivered to the Chinese Air Force and Army, they were recorded 
as Lend-Lease aid.210 Compared to that China's contribution in the 
War was very limited. It is true that under the reverse Lend-Lease 
system China contributed to the cause of War, a~d Stilwell's trained 
armies played a key role in occupying Myitykiyna and upper Burma, 
but most often China showed a negative attitude on the question of 
participation in the War. The main effect of Lend-Lease in China 
was that it helped China keep her morale high in the wartime. At 
the same time military Lend-Lease durlng wartime served as a model 
for long-term US rniltary assistance to China. 
In the final analysis, US military aid to China had limited 
benefits for the allies. With the exception of the invasion of 
Burma in 1944 and the construction of some B-29 bases which the 
Japanese eventually over ran, the military effects of US aid to 
China were very limited. The US received nowhere near the return on 
its investment in China that it did from US aid to Russia or France 
or Britain. The principal reasons for the low return on US Lend-
Lease in China were the exceptional corruption of the Chinese 
Government and the practice of hoarding military supplies for the 
upcoming civil war with the Communists. In the final analysis, 
Chiang considered the CCP, not imperialist Japan, his long term 
-: 
enemy. As a result, Chiang preferred to let the decrepid Japanese 
empire fall apart under the hammer blows of the US Navy in the 
Pacific while he stood on the defensive preparing for the 
forthcoming civil war with Mao. 
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